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SUMMARY
This thesis uses data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Health Survey for 
England (HSE) to examine the impact of disability on labour market outcomes in the 
UK.
The analysis documents the extent of, and examines the reasons for, the gap in 
employment and earnings between disability groups. In particular, it attempts to 
separate the effects of observable differences in characteristics, unobserved 
productivity differences and discrimination. Unobserved productivity differences are 
found to be an important influence on employment and earnings. As such, the 
existing evidence, which ignores this influence, overestimates discrimination against 
the disabled.
Relative to the non-disabled, disabled workers are concentrated in part-time and self- 
employment. The analysis examines if this concentration is due to marginalisation of 
the disabled, or if disabled workers have different preferences for non-standard work 
driven by the need to accommodate disability. The concentration of the disabled in 
part-time employment is found to be predominately driven by differences in 
preferences. Amongst males, preferences are also an important explanation for the 
concentration in self-employment.
Estimates of the impact of self-reported disability on labour market outcomes have 
been criticised due to the potential influence of measurement error and justification 
bias. The analysis uses more objective health information in the HSE to instrument 
self-reported disability in a labour market participation model. Self-reported 
information is found to underestimate the impact of disability, which suggests 
measurement error is important.
The employment provisions in the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) were 
intended to improve the labour market outcomes of the disabled. Data from the LFS 
indicate that, after controlling for characteristics, the employment gap between the 
disabled and non-disabled narrowed in the post-DDA period. In contrast, analysis 
based on a difference in difference procedure and data from the HSE (1991-2004) 
does not support a positive influence of the legislation.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The economic analysis of disabled workers in the labour market has been relatively 
neglected in the UK, especially in comparison to analysis performed on the basis of 
gender or race. This is surprising given the size of this group, which currently 
represents about 20 percent of the working age population, and the observed changes 
in their labour market performance. There has been an increase in size of the disabled 
population and deterioration in their labour market outcomes since the early 1980s 
(Bell and Smith, 2004).1 This has accentuated the difference in labour market 
outcomes between disabled and non-disabled groups. Currently, the employment rate 
of the disabled in the UK is less than half that of the non-disabled,2 whilst for those 
disabled individuals in employment average earnings are about 10-15 percent lower 
than the non-disabled. The situation in the UK is even more significant when 
considered in an international context. The UK has the second highest rate of 
working age disability in Europe3, a rate which is over ten percentage points higher 
than the EU average, and, the ratio of the employment rate for the disabled to the 
non-disabled is 52 percent, ten percentage points lower than the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average.4
These trends raise concerns about the presence of discrimination in the labour market 
and the wider social exclusion of the disabled (Burchardt, 2003b). Moreover, the 
substantial increase in the number of individuals claiming Incapacity Benefit (IB), 
currently about 2.6 million people (see McVicar, forthcoming), has also had
1 See Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for similar conclusions in the US.
2 For example, according to recent data from the Labour Force Survey (April 2005-March 2006), 32.9 
percent of the disabled are employed compared to 79.8 percent o f the non-disabled. The definition of  
disability requires an individual to be disabled using both the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 
and work-limiting definitions.
3 See Dupre and Karjalainen (2003).
4 See OECD (2003).
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important implications for public spending.5 As a result, and consistent with the 
government’s aspiration to raise the employment rate in the UK (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2005), a range of legislative and other reforms, aimed at 
securing an improvement in the labour market position of the disabled, have recently 
been introduced. For example, the employment provisions of the 1995 Disability 
Discrimination Act (DDA) make it unlawful to discriminate against the disabled and 
require employers to make reasonable adjustments to their workplaces and practices 
to facilitate access to work for the disabled. Whilst it may be anticipated that the 
legislation will have a significant impact on the labour market outcomes of the 
disabled, as yet, little economic evaluation has been undertaken on these important 
policy changes in the UK.6
The issue of disability, however, has continued to attract considerable political 
attention with a high profile investigation and the publication of Improving the Life 
Chances o f Disabled People by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (2005). In 
response, the Office for Disability Issues has been established, which aims to achieve 
the government’s 20 year vision: “By 2025, disabled people in Britain should have 
full opportunities and choices to improve their quality of life, and will be respected 
and included as equal members of society” (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2005,
p.12).
Achieving this ambitious aim requires an understanding of the barriers and 
challenges the disabled face in all aspects of life, including work. However, the 
relatively limited existing evidence relating to disability is, in part, due to the 
additional complexity in analysing labour market outcomes of this group relative to 
groups formed on the basis of characteristics. In reviewing the international evidence 
relating to the impact of disability on labour market outcomes, Chapter 2 identifies 
the key econometric difficulties that arise during this type of empirical investigation. 
Indeed, features of disability often limit the applicability of estimation strategies 
developed and applied in the context of gender and race. Amongst others, these 
include the difficulty in measuring disability, the possible endogeneity of disability
5 Data from The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) working age client group August 2006, 
obtained from www.nomisweb.co.uk.
6 This is in sharp contrast to the US, where there has been a substantial increase in publication on such 
issues following the passing o f the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990.
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and labour market status, the dynamic nature of disability, the heterogeneity within 
the disabled population, and the influence of disability on productivity and 
preferences. This review forms the basis of “Disability and the labour market: a 
review of the empirical evidence” which is forthcoming in the Journal o f Economic 
Studies.
Empirical Issues
Disability is a restriction or inability rather than a demographic characteristic and, as 
such, there is not a single, consistently used, definition of, or method for, the 
classification of the disabled (Wolfe, 1984). Estimates of the labour market impact of 
disability are conditional on the definition of disability chosen and measures may 
suffer from measurement error (due to the subjective nature of reporting) and 
justification bias (since non-employed individuals may use disability to justify their 
economic status) (Bound, 1991). Characteristics such as gender and race are also 
strictly exogenous and thus there is a random assignment of individuals between 
groups. In some cases disability may be exogenous; however, for some people at 
least, classifying themselves as disabled will be a subjective choice. If disability 
status is affected by work, or if there are unobservables that affect both disability and 
work, they become endogenously related, giving rise to an additional bias 
(Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002).
Characteristics such as gender and ethnicity are unlikely, in most cases, to affect 
productivity in work. This is not true of disability, which is complicated further by 
the impact of disability on productivity being unobservable and heterogeneous 
(Johnson and Lambrinos, 1985).7 However, in a more similar manner to race and 
gender, differences in preferences may be an important determinant of the gap in 
labour market performance. The influence of unobservables between groups cannot 
be controlled for in a decomposition analysis (Oaxaca, 1973) which seeks to account 
for differences in labour market performance due to differences in the composition of 
the groups. As such, these unobservables contribute to the unexplained gap in the 
outcome between groups, which is typically assumed to represent an upper-bound
7 The impact of a disability on work productivity depends both on the type and severity o f disability 
and the exact requirements o f that occupation, which are often unobserved.
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estimate on discrimination. Hence, this estimate will be biased if unobservable 
differences in productivity or preferences are important for the disabled.
There are several features of the disabled which give rise to heterogeneity in the 
population which is not typically captured by controls for personal and household 
characteristics. Most obviously, labour market outcomes will be affected by the type 
of impairment (Kidd et al., 2000) and severity (Berthoud, 2003) of a particular 
disability. Moreover, disability may not be a permanent state; a person may not be 
disabled for his or her entire life (Burchardt, 2000). Indeed, disability onset is 
correlated with personal and lifestyle characteristics giving rise to selection (Jenkins 
and Rigg, 2004) and timing effects (Wilkins, 2004).8
Research Objectives
The overarching aim of this thesis is to document and attempt to explain differences 
in labour market performance in the UK on the basis of disability. To achieve this 
aim, five main empirical Chapters develop a body of evidence which examines the 
impact of disability on employment, earnings and hours. Each Chapter is structured 
in a similar manner and considers a brief motivation, highlights the most important 
elements of the literature, before developing a methodology and presenting and 
discussing key results. The analysis of two large scale government surveys, the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Health Survey for England (HSE), forms the 
basis of this evidence and, as such, several of the main empirical issues identified 
above are explored during the course of the research. There is a particular focus on 
the influence of unobserved differences in productivity and preferences, and the 
measurement of disability. Further, as appropriate, the analysis also considers 
changes in labour market disadvantage over time to identify any change in 
performance of the disabled after the introduction of the DDA. In this respect, the 
thesis also attempts to evaluate the labour market effect of the legislation.
More specifically, the first analytical chapter (Chapter 3) focuses on explaining the 
differences in employment and earnings between disabled and non-disabled
8 The timing o f onset also has implications for labour market outcomes (Baldwin and Johnson, 2001). 
For example, disability onset while in employment affects return to work, whereas disability at birth 
will affect hiring and even characteristics such as educational attainment.
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individuals using data from the LFS. In doing so, it ecamines the issue of unobserved 
productivity differences between disabled and non-disabled individuals and 
calculates an alternative measure of labour market liscrimination.9 The analysis of 
the employment and the earnings gap both utilise a nethodology applied by DeLeire 
(2001) to examine wage discrimination against the disabled in the US. The 
decomposition technique separates the disabled population into two groups, the 
work-limited disabled and the non-work-limitd disabled. Under two key 
assumptions, firstly that the disabled who are not work-limited have equal 
productivity to the non-disabled and, secondly, that discrimination against the non- 
work-limited is equal to the work-limited disabled, it is possible to isolate the 
unobserved effect of health on productivity and to p*ovide a more accurate measure 
of unequal treatment between the groups. Moreover, given the recent changes in 
legislation, the research also considers how the outcomes of the disabled have 
changed in the six year period following the DDA.10 Any improvement (or 
deterioration) in the relative labour market outcomes of the disabled can be attributed 
to characteristic changes or unexplained changes in their treatment, the latter of 
which would signify the potential influence of changes in legislation. A version of 
the analysis based on earnings “Disability, gender ard the British labour market” was 
published in Oxford Economic Papers in July 2006 with two co-authors Dr P. 
Latreille and Professor P. Sloane. Similarly, the analysis of the employment gap 
formed the basis of “Is there employment discrimination against the disabled?” 
which was published in Economics Letters in July 2006.
The next two analytical Chapters are closely related and continue to examine the 
labour market disadvantage faced by the disabled. However, they follow recent work 
in the US that considers marginalisation of the disabled through non-standard 
employment rather than direct discrimination (Schur, 2002, 2003 and Hotchkiss, 
2004a). Also using data from the LFS, the concentration of disabled workers in part- 
time and self-employment is identified in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. In both 
cases a similar methodology is applied which seeks to identify the voluntary or 
involuntary nature of these outcomes. A concentration of the disabled in part-time
9 With the exception of a paper by Madden (2004), who uses data from the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS), UK studies have assumed equal productivity between disability groups.
10 The definition o f disability changes in 1997 which prevents a before and after DDA comparison.
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employment may reflect marginalisation by employers, which constrains the 
opportunities of disabled employees. However, as Schur (2002) argues, it may also 
be the case that the disabled are able to accommodate their disability by working 
part-time and thus have different preferences for hours of work. More specifically, 
the assumptions of DeLeire (2001) are modified to separate the role of employer 
marginalisation from differences in preferences which may result from the disabled 
being more able to accommodate their disability in part-time employment. A version 
of this analysis “Does part-time employment provide a way of accommodating a 
disability?” is forthcoming at The Manchester School in December 2007.
Anecdotal evidence from surveys of the disabled identifies the potentially important 
role self-employment plays for the disabled (see Prescott-Clarke, 1990). Consistent 
with evidence from Clark and Drinkwater (1998) in relation to ethnic minorities, it 
may be the case that the disabled are pushed into self-employment due to 
discrimination in the salaried sector. However, the influence of discrimination on the 
relative returns to self-employment is not straightforward. Boijas and Bronars (1989) 
argue that consumer discrimination may act in the opposite direction and reduce the 
relative reward from self-employment. The impact of discrimination is therefore 
ambiguous. However, much of the evidence presented by Prescott-Clarke (1990) 
suggests an alternative channel through which disability affects the self-employment 
decision. That is, self-employment may have accommodating features, such as the 
ability to choose hours, location and duties, that facilitate access to work, which will 
act to increase the concentration of the disabled in self-employment. In a similar 
manner to the part-time analysis, a modified version of the DeLeire (2001) 
decomposition is used to separate the influences of discrimination from 
accommodation and, importantly, to establish the voluntary or involuntary nature of 
the decision.
Chapters 3 to 5, and much of the existing literature, are based on the assumption that 
self-reported ‘global’ measures of disability, identified from survey questions, 
coincide with ‘true’ disability. The literature which focuses on health and the 
retirement decision highlights the potential issues associated with using self-reported 
disability in labour market analysis (see Deschryvere, 2005, for a review). However, 
there appears no reason why the potential bias created by misreporting should be
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confined to older workers. As such, Chapter 6 investigates the issue of justification 
bias and measurement error in self-reported disability for the working age 
population. This analysis requires more objective information on health to use as 
instruments for self-reported disability and, as such, the analysis uses data from the 
HSE. The HSE contains more objective self-reported information, such as functional 
limitations, together with true objective information collected from a nurse visit. By 
using an Instrumental Variable (IV) procedure, the sensitivity of estimates of the 
impact of disability on labour force participation can be tested and the direction of 
any bias associated with using self-reported disability identified (Campolieti, 2002). 
Recent and proposed reforms of the disability benefit system make examination of 
this issue particularly timely and policy relevant. Indeed, the existence of 
justification bias may suggest a differential policy response between those where 
disability genuinely precludes economic participation and those where impairment is 
used to rationalise not working.
Whilst Chapter 3 considers the influence of the DDA, analysis using the LFS is 
restricted by the discontinuity in the definitions of disability across time. Therefore 
the influence of the DDA on employment is reconsidered in Chapter 7, using data 
from the HSE (1991-2004) and by applying a more standard difference in difference 
approach which has been used in the US literature (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001). 
The initial US evidence found the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA) had 
a negative impact on the employment rate of the disabled and suggested this was a 
result of the increased costs to employers from accommodation and the increased 
risk of legal action outweighing any positive effects from any reduction in 
discrimination that occurred (see DeLeire, 2000 and Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001). 
The first study to consider the DDA in the UK, Bell and Heitmueller (2005), finds no 
evidence of a positive effect from the legislation using data from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Family Resources Survey (FRS). However, 
since the original analysis was published in the US, a series of studies have tested the 
robustness of the main conclusions (see Kruse and Schur, 2003, Beegle and Stock, 
2003, Jolls and Prescott, 2004 and Hotchkiss, 2004b). As a result of some of the 
issues raised in these studies, the present analysis conducts a range of sensitivity 
tests. This includes an examination of employment by firm size since, initially, small
7
firms were exempt from the provisions of the DDA.11 The additional information on 
health in the HSE also enables controls for changes in the composition of the 
disabled to be included in the analysis, to test that the results are not driven by 
changes in the composition of the disabled following the introduction of the DDA 
(see Kruse and Schur, 2003).
It is typical for labour market analysis of disability to split the population into two 
groups and consider disability as if it were homogeneous. However, recent evidence 
has highlighted that characteristics of the disability have an important influence on 
labour market outcomes (for the UK, see Berthoud, 2003). Therefore, throughout this 
research, consideration is given to heterogeneity within the disabled group and its 
implications for labour market outcomes. Since the type and severity of disability 
may be expected to impact on work productivity, non-work income, the disutility of 
work and discrimination, these features appear fundamental in the labour market 
analysis of the disabled. As such, the Chapters, where appropriate, also identify if the 
magnitude of disadvantage differs between certain sub-groups of the disabled. 
Indeed, there has been a long-standing recognition of the policy importance of this 
issue, with Baldwin and Johnson (1994 p. 14) stating “the success of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act may depend on the extent to which implementation of its 
policies recognises the differences among persons with disabilities”.
The final Chapter, Chapter 8, highlights the key findings from each of the empirical 
Chapters and establishes overall conclusions, particularly on issues that extend across 
Chapters. At this point, the main limitations of the current analysis are discussed and 
potential areas for future research are identified.
11 The small firm exemption was removed in October 2004.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter provides an overview of the international literature relating to the 
impact of disability on labour market outcomes. Section 2.2 explains the rationale for 
the growing interest in and policy importance of the disabled population. Section 2.3 
considers the definition of disability and the inherent bias and measurement error 
problems that arise in labour market analysis. This area has received considerable 
attention in the US literature. Section 2.4 reviews empirical evidence on the impact 
of disability on earnings and employment and considers, amongst other issues, the 
role of labour market discrimination, the influence of heterogeneity within the 
disabled group and the dynamic effects of disability. The final section, Section 2.5, 
focuses on literature which attempts to evaluate policy aimed at improving labour 
market outcomes for the disabled; the evidence is focused on legislative changes, 
such as the ADA, but the influence of disability benefits is also highlighted.
2.2 Background
The change in the composition of the economically inactive population over the last 
twenty years has been widely identified as a major problem facing the UK labour 
market (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999, Dickens et al., 2000 and Nickell and Quintini, 
2002). One of the most visible features has been the growth in the number of people 
classified as long-term sick or disabled at a time when the general level of health of 
the population has improved (Beatty et al., 1997, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999 and 
Faggio and Nickell, 2003). This increase has had extremely significant implications 
for public spending: the number of individuals claiming long-term sickness benefits 
doubled in the 1980s alone (Disney and Webb, 1991). Moreover, this phenomenon 
has not been confined to the UK; countries including the US (Bound and Burkhauser,
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1999), the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries (Bowitz, 1997 and Beljaars and 
Prins, 2000) and Australia (Wilkins, 2004) have all experienced increases in 
disability benefit claimants.
In the UK, the disabled represent about 20 percent of the working age population, 
corresponding to 3.7 million men and 3.4 million women (Smith and Twomey,
2002). The size of the group and the extent of the problem facing policy makers are 
illustrated by international comparisons. With the exception of Finland, in 2002 the 
UK reported the highest rates of long-standing health problem or disability amongst 
those of working age in all EU15 countries.12 As Figure 2.1 shows, the UK rate of
27.2 percent vastly exceeds that of Italy, which has the lowest rate of 6.6 percent, 
Spain at 8.7 percent and Ireland at 11 percent. Data from the OECD presented in 
Figure 2.2 also confirm that the labour market disadvantage associated with 
disability is higher in the UK than in the majority of OECD countries. With the 
exception of Poland and Spain, the UK has the lowest ratio of the employment rate 
of the disabled to the non-disabled. These statistics have been confirmed in cross 
country empirical studies such as Bardasi et al. (2000) who find that, whilst 41 
percent of disabled men are in employment in the UK, the corresponding figure in 
Germany is 67.8 percent and in the USA is 71.8 percent.13
12 Eurostat News Release STAT/03/142 5 December 2003.
13 They focus on long term work-limited disabled, although the definition differs between the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID).
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Figure 2.1. Working Age Disability Rates in Europe
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Source: Data obtained from Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Population and Social Conditions, Theme 3 
-26/2003.
Figure 2.2. Disabled Employment Rates as a Proportion of the Non-disabled by
Country.
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Source: Data from Transforming Disability into Ability: Policies to Promote Work and Income 
Security for Disabled People, OECD 2003 (Table 3.3).
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As a result of the disadvantage faced by the disabled, there have been important 
legislative and other reforms over the last few years aimed at securing improvements 
in the labour market position of disabled individuals in the UK. The most important 
legal change in this regard was the passing of the DDA in 1995, which was designed 
to protect the disabled against discrimination and to facilitate and enhance their 
access to employment by imposing obligations on employers to make reasonable 
adjustment to their premises and employment arrangements. In addition, the 
Disability Rights Commission was established in 2000 to provide advice and 
information for disabled people and to support them in securing their rights under the 
DDA, and campaign on their behalf. The Government has also improved incentives 
to work via the tax and benefit system and through the Disabled Person’s Tax Credit 
in particular. The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP), introduced in July 2001, 
further attempts to help those out of employment to get back into work.
It is also important to note there is substantial regional (and intra-regional) variation 
in disability rates in the UK. For example, Smith and Twomey (2002), using data 
from the LFS, find that the disability rates are highest in the North West and Wales 
(24.2 percent and 23.0 percent respectively) and lowest in the South East (16.3 
percent). Labour market outcomes for the disabled also vary by region and Jones et 
al. (2006b) demonstrate that the employment rate of the disabled varies from 26.7 
percent in Wales to 49.8 percent in the South West. Consistent with this, McVicar 
(2006) identifies a North South divide in the number of disability benefit claimants. 
Moreover, O’Leary et al. (2005) find that regional differences in ill-health are a 
dominant explanation of regional differences in rates of employment and inactivity.
As Smith and Twomey (2002) surmise:
“the reasons for regional variations in disabilities... are likely to be 
associated with regional variation in: the distribution of industries; the 
availability of, and access to healthcare and adequate housing; lifestyle and 
dietary behaviour; levels of education; and the age distribution of the 
population.” (p. 418)
Characteristics of the population and environment may explain some of the 
difference in disability rates across both countries and regions. However, social
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norms, public policy initiatives and individuals’ perceptions of their disability are 
likely to affect the propensity both to register as disabled and to participate in the 
labour market. Senior (1998), after accounting for influences such as working 
environment, lifestyle, deprivation and area demographics, finds that individuals in 
Wales are more likely to report a disability, confirming that cultural factors are 
important. These, in addition to more traditional supply side (for example, the 
severity of the disability) and demand side (for example, the existence of prejudice) 
factors are likely to influence the effect of a given disability on an individual’s labour 
market outcome.14
2.3 The Measurement of Disability15
There are two main ways to determine the existence of a disability from survey data. 
Disability can be self-assessed, where an individual assesses their own condition and 
capacity to undertake work, without any reference to outside standards. This type of 
information is widely collected in large scale surveys such as the LFS and the 
General Household Survey (GHS) in the UK, and the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS), Current Population Survey (CPS), Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) in the US. The survey questions typically take the form Do you 
have a health condition that limits the kind or amount o f work you can perform?. 
However, the exact wording of the question does affect the number classified as 
disabled (see Banks et al., 2004). The main advantage of these questions is that they 
give direct information on work ability and, as such, they are extensively used in
14 The literature relating to ‘hidden unemployment’ highlights the importance o f demand side factors 
on the activity status o f those with a health problem. For example, Beatty et al. (2000) argue that the 
sick/disabled are particularly vulnerable and that during the decline o f heavy industry, disabled 
individuals moved from employment to inactivity (sickness related benefits).
15 The International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (World Health 
Organisation, 1980) provides definitions for each o f these concepts. An Impairment is any temporary 
or permanent loss or abnormality o f a body structure or function, whether physiological or 
psychological. An impairment is a disturbance affecting functions that are essentially mental 
(memory, consciousness) or sensory, internal organs (heart, kidney), the head, the trunk or the limbs. 
A Disability is a restriction or inability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range 
considered normal fo r  a human being, mostly resulting from impairment. A Handicap is the result o f  
an impairment or disability that limits or prevents the fulfilment o f  one or several roles regarded as 
normal, depending on age, sex and social and cultural factors.
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labour market analysis (Kidd et al., 2000, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001 and DeLeire,
2000). However, determining whether an individual has a long-term health problem 
and if it is work-limiting, are both subjective. A certain medical condition may be 
interpreted as work-limiting by one individual, but not by another, making self- 
reported disability non-comparable across individuals (Campolieti, 2002). This 
subjective individual nature of reporting creates measurement error in self-reported 
information. This measurement error is compounded across countries where 
institutions, policy regimes and culture may differ significantly. Banks et al. (2004) 
examine differences in the rate of self-reported disability across countries and across 
labour market states. The results suggest that over 50 percent of the difference in 
rates of self-reported disability between US and the Netherlands is due to differences 
in disability thresholds. If the American thresholds were imposed on the Dutch 
population, the self-reported work disability rate in the Netherlands would fall by 7.6 
percentage points to 27.3 percent, which would narrow the gap between self-reported 
disability rates in the US and the Netherlands from 14.1 percentage points to 6.6 
percentage points.
There may, however, be social and economic incentives to misreport disability 
status; therefore, an individual’s declaration may depend on their preference for work 
and the possibility of claiming disability benefits. If the propensity to classify a given 
disability as work-limiting is affected by employment status, disability becomes 
endogenous in regression analysis. This ‘justification bias’, that is, that disability is 
over-reported amongst the non-employed to justify their economic status, has been 
examined extensively in the US literature (see Bound, 1991, Kreider, 1999 and 
Currie andMadrian, 1999).16
Importantly, the reporting of disability, and particularly work-limiting disability, 
depends on a range of factors, including an individual’s own employment 
opportunities (Kruse and Hale, 2003), the accessibility of the workplace, 
technological advances, changes in the nature of employment and labour market 
conditions (Baldwin and Johnson, 2001). Thus, even if an individual had the same
16 The rationale for justification bias may also extend to other circumstances. For example, even 
amongst the employed, individuals may use disability to justify labour market outcomes such as not 
getting promotion or working part-time.
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reporting thresholds for health, since disability, by definition, depends on individual 
circumstances, it is likely to differ between individuals. Moreover, an individual’s 
own reporting of disability may change over time as a result of changes in their 
circumstances. Policy changes that increase the accessibility of workplaces may, 
thus, affect the number of people reporting a work-limiting disability (Kruse and 
Schur, 2003). The effect of social stigma (which may result in under-reporting of 
disability) may also change over time, leading to changes in the size of the disabled 
group, particularly after changes in policy (Kruse and Schur, 2003).
Following the approaches used to examine the validity of self-reported health 
information (see. for example, Bound, 1991 and Au et al., 2005), a series of studies 
have used ‘more objective’ information on health in addition to the ‘global’ self- 
reported measure of disability (see for example, Stem, 1989 and Campoletti, 2002). 
This ‘more objective’ infomiation ranges from self-reported more specific 
information such as reporting particular functional limitations to, at the other 
extreme, true objective information. This may, for example, include measures 
collected from blood/saliva samples. Examples of ‘more objective’ measures used in 
studies concerning the measurement of self-reported disability/health include:
1) Impairment specific information (Burkhauser et al., 2002), for example self- 
reported deafness.
2) Self-reported activity limitations (Kruse and Schur, 2003), for example 
functional activity (seeing, hearing, speaking, walking) or daily activities 
(dressing, preparing meals).
3) Self-reported or physician diagnosed medical conditions or symptoms (Stem, 
1989).
4) Subsequent mortality rates (Parsons, 1982) and other objective measures, for 
example, body mass index (BMI) (Campolieti, 2002) or sick days 
(Burkhauser, 1979).
5) Health indices based on a range of medical conditions and functional 
limitations (Au et al., 2005).
Several studies have compared the difference in outcomes that result from different 
measures of disability or ill-health, since they are subject to different sources of bias 
(Bound, 1991, Bound et al., 1995). Subjective information is likely to suffer from
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two sources of bias. Justification bias creates an endogeneity between disability and 
work and the subjective nature of reporting creates measurement error. This 
endogeneity, whereby the non-employed are more likely to report disability, will 
enhance the effect of disability on labour market outcomes and lead to an upward 
bias on the effect of disability. However, the influence of measurement error will 
lead to a downward (attenuation) bias on disability and, thus, act in the opposite 
direction. Overall, the bias associated with self-reported information is ambiguous, 
but, if the influence of endogeneity outweighs that of measurement error, self- 
reported information will overestimate the impact of disability. More objective 
information, although less likely to suffer from justification bias, tends not to be as 
closely related to work limitations and, thus, may suffer from an alternative source of 
measurement error (Bound, 1991). This alternative form of measurement error leads 
only to a downward bias on the effect of disability on labour market outcomes. As a 
result, studies have identified a range of estimates of the influence of disability on 
labour market activity, dependent on the type of measure used (Loprest et al., 1995, 
Kruse and Schur, 2003).
Burkhauser et al. (2002), using US data, find there are no differences in the trends 
over time identified from self-reported and more objective measures. They conclude 
that, although work-limiting definitions are not ideal, nationally representative data 
sets (for example, the CPS) are able to monitor trends in labour market outcomes. 
However, it should be noted that work-limiting disability questions tend to be 
included in surveys which focus on labour market issues (see for example, the CPS 
in the US and the LFS in the UK), whilst more detailed and objective health 
measures traditionally come from surveys focusing on health (for example, the NHIS 
in the US and the Welsh Health Survey (WHS) in Wales). Hardy and Pavalko (1986) 
argue the difference in the purpose of the questionnaires may affect responses.
Studies also use more objective health measures to instrument self-reported measures 
in an attempt to eliminate the endogeneity of disability (see Stem, 1989, Bound, 
1991, O’Donnell, 1998, Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999, Campolieti, 2002 and Disney et 
al. 2006). This procedure enables the aspects of ill-health that have most influence on 
self-reported disability to be identified and, in some cases, measures the extent to 
which self-reported disability depends on labour market status. Au et al. (2005)
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include a variable controlling for labour market participation, alongside detailed 
health measures and individual characteristics, to identify justification bias directly.
Kerkhofs and Lindenboom (1995) and Kreider (1999) adopt an alternative approach 
in that they use objective health measures to estimate true health on the assumption 
that workers have no incentive to misreport. However, these studies, which identify a 
point estimate of the true disability rate, have to impose strong parametric 
assumptions over the reporting error process. More recent studies, such as Kreider 
and Pepper (2007) and Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming), estimate bounds on the 
true disability rate under weaker assumptions (varying the percentage of misreports). 
Under the assumption that disability is non-decreasing with age, models of 
participation which assume that self-reported measures correspond with true 
disability are found to be mis-specified.
The empirical evidence on the bias associated with self-reported disability is mixed. 
Several authors find that assuming self-reported health coincides with true health 
leads to biased inferences, with non-workers, or workers with low expected wages, 
over reporting disabilities (Chirikos and Nestel, 1984, Bowe, 1993, Kerkhofs and 
Lindeboom 1995, O’Donnell 1998, Kerhofs et al. 1999, Kreider 1999, Lindeboom 
and Kerkhofs, 2002 and Kreider and Pepper, 2007, forthcoming). However, there are 
also studies that find that labour market status has no effect on misreporting health 
(Stem 1989, Dwyer and Mitchell 1999, and Benitez-Silva et al. 2004). Others 
suggest that the propensity to misreport depends on individual characteristics, with 
those receiving disability insurance (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995), non-working 
women, high school dropouts, non-whites and former blue-collar workers being 
more likely to overstate disability (Kreider, 1999). The type of disability reported has 
also been found to be significant. For example, Baker et al. (2004) match self- 
reported health measures from the Canadian National Population Health Survey with 
individuals’ health records from the Ontario Health Insurance Plan and find that 
reporting error varies between types of disability. The ratio of the error variance 
ranges from 30 percent for diabetes to over 80 percent for arthritis.
Kreider (1999) argues the existence of over reporting health problems results in an 
upward bias of estimates of the effect of disability on employment. This has been
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supported in a range of empirical studies (Parsons, 1982, Chirikos and Nestel 1984, 
Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985). However, other studies find that the effect of 
disability on both employment and wages is consistent across different disability 
measures (Lambrinos, 1981 and Stem, 1989). This may even be the case when the 
evidence supports justification bias (Au et al., 2005). In contrast, Campolieti (2002) 
finds evidence that self-reported disability underestimates the effect of disability on 
labour force participation, suggesting the effect of measurement error may outweigh 
justification bias.
In addition to the measurement error criticism associated with more objective health 
measures (Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002, Campolieti, 2002), the issue of 
endogeneity may be relevant. In line with the arguments above, any self-reported 
information, no matter how specific, may be subject to some degree of justification 
bias. However, even if justification bias is not present, measures of disability are 
endogenous if work has a direct effect on health or if there are common 
unobservables which affect work and health, which can lead to biased estimates of 
the effect of disability on employment (Ettner, 2000). Social interaction through 
work may have benefits on health, as may the additional income from employment, 
which may improve housing, diet and healthcare. Consistent with this, Baker et al. 
(2004) find that even objective health measures are more likely to be reported by the 
non-employed. However, there are also potential negative effects of employment, 
including stress and risk from hazards at the workplace. Haveman et al. (1994) find, 
using US data, that estimates that do not account for the interdependence of health, 
work-time and wages are biased, though, when controlling for this, they still find a 
negative relationship between health limitations and work-time and wages.
The appropriate definition of disability will depend on the issue being examined. 
Measures of health from survey data have been criticised since they may differ from 
those used to assess the validity of disability benefit claims and disability as defined 
by legislation (Kirchner, 1996, Schwochau and Blanck, 2000 and Kruse and Schur,
2003). A measure that is appropriate to analyse labour market outcomes may, 
therefore, not be as appropriate for specific evaluation of policy. For example, 
studies that focus on the labour supply effect of disability benefits define the disabled
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group by application (Bound, 1989) or by receipt of these benefits (Autor and 
Duggan, 2003).
2.4 Disability and Labour Market Outcomes
2.4.1 International Evidence
In theory, there are many channels through which a disability can affect labour 
market outcomes. Ill-health or disability may be expected to reduce an individual’s 
productivity in work and thus earnings, though this will vary depending on the 
requirements of an occupation and the severity of the disability. This reduced 
capacity for work may also change an individual’s preferences away from 
consumption towards leisure. In addition, the non-work income a person can obtain 
may increase with the onset of disability, which will have a similar positive influence 
on the reservation wage. However, it is possible that the observed inferior labour 
market outcomes of the disabled are due, in part, to employers discriminating on the 
basis of disability. This may be the result of prejudice (Becker, 1971) or due to 
imperfect information, where an employer uses the presence of a disability as an 
indicator of the productivity level of the group (Phelps, 1972). This issue, separating 
the influence of observable characteristics from discrimination, has received 
considerable empirical examination. However, it should be acknowledged that the 
existence and expectation of discrimination may also affect pre-labour market 
decisions of the disabled and, thus, observable characteristics and employment 
choices.
Independent of the definition of disability or the data set used, US evidence 
consistently finds disabled workers earn significantly less than non-disabled workers, 
even after controlling for differences in human capital and job related characteristics 
(Baldwin and Johnson, 1994, 1995, 2000; Haveman and Wolfe, 1990, Hale et al., 
1998, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001 and DeLeire, 2000 and Kruse and Schur, 2003).17
17 Studies also consider the impact of disability on poverty, for a UK study see Burchardt (2003b) and 
for a US study see Kruse (1998). The evidence suggests that disabled individuals are more likely to 
live in poverty, but this depends on their situation prior to disability. When the costs associated with 
being disabled are taken into account, the effect is enhanced (Burchardt, 2003b and Zaidi and 
Burchardt, 2005).
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This is typically taken to represent earnings discrimination against the disabled. 
However, there may be large unmeasured productivity differences between disabled 
and non-disabled workers in a human capital wage equation, which, without 
sufficient controls, are likely to contribute to the unexplained proportion of the wage 
differential. Several studies address this issue directly by attempting to control for the 
effect of health on productivity, using measures of health and functional limitations 
(for example, cognitive, mobility and sensory) as additional explanatory variables in 
the earnings equation; however, an unexplained wage gap is still observed (see 
Hendricks et al., 1997 and Baldwin and Johnson, 2000 for US studies).
An alternative method to separate the effect of health from the effect of 
discrimination has been to distinguish between groups o f the disabled who are likely 
to face different degrees of prejudice. Johnson and Lambrinos (1985), using US data 
from the 1972 Social Security Survey of Disabled and Non-disabled Adults, identify 
the disabled population as those that are handicapped (defined as visible impairment 
subject to prejudice rather than by the severity of the disability). They find that, 
whilst including an index of health problems and controlling for selectivity bias, 
wage discrimination accounts for between 30 and 40 percent of the offer wage 
differential. Baldwin and Johnson (1994), using data from the SIPP, also identify 
disabled individuals who are likely to face little discrimination, but who have health 
problems that affect productivity and compare the outcomes with those disabled 
likely to face discrimination. They find that those with impairments that are subject 
to prejudice suffer lower average wages and employment probabilities than those 
with impairments that are less subject to prejudice. Approximately 40 percent of the 
wage gap between those disabled subject to prejudice and the non-disabled is due to 
discrimination. However, even though the offer wages for the disabled who are less 
likely to suffer prejudice are nearly the same as the non-disabled, a discriminatory 
component exists reflecting something other than prejudice (approximately 10 
percentage points). The most obvious explanation appears to be the influence of 
disability on productivity that is not controlled for in the regression. DeLeire (2001) 
criticises these techniques, suggesting that the prejudice associated with a disability 
may be related to the severity of the disability itself and is, therefore, correlated with 
work productivity, making it impossible to separate discrimination from the effect of 
health problems on productivity. Instead, he splits the population into three groups:
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the self-reported work-limited disabled, the disabled who class their disability as 
non-work-limiting and the non-disabled. The disabled who have a non-work-limiting 
disability are assumed to have equal productivity to the non-disabled and, therefore, 
any unexplained gap in wages between these two groups of workers is due to 
discrimination. The unexplained gap between the work-limited disabled and the non­
disabled is a combination of discrimination and productivity differences. Using data 
from the SIPP (1984, 1992, 1993), he finds that only a small percentage of the 
earnings gap (5-8 percent) is due to discrimination.
Heterogeneity
Further complicating the analysis of the disabled group, there are differences 
between disabled individuals on the basis of the type and severity of the disability. 
Bartel and Taubman (1979) examine four groups of diseases and find that the labour 
supply effects of ill-health are negative in all cases, with larger effects caused by 
bronchitis and athsma and psychoses and neuroses than by heart disease and arthritis. 
Zwerling et al. (2002) use data from the NHIS Disability Supplement and find those 
with cardiovascular, musculoskeletal and respiratory diseases are less likely to work 
than other disabled individuals. Within psychiatric disease, there is a large variation 
in the propensity to work, with the lowest employment rates associated with 
schizophrenia and paranoid delusional disorder. The severity of a disability is more 
difficult to measure, but, using self-reported classifications from the SIPP, Hale et al. 
(1998) split the disabled group into severely, moderately and not disabled. They find 
the disabled have lower participation rates, lower rates of full-time work and a 
greater prevalence in lower paying occupations. These effects are more pronounced 
as the severity of the disability increases and, although some of these outcomes are 
explained by the disabled possessing fewer qualifications, increasing education does 
not eliminate the differences. Hum and Simpson (1996) use Canadian data and 
confirm that the disabled have lower participation rates, average hours of work and 
average earnings. They examine the influence of both severity and type (mobility, 
sensory, mental or multiple impairments) of disability. They find that the severity of 
the disability is an important influence on all labour market outcomes and that only 
sensory disability is not associated with any labour market disadvantage. In an 
Australian study, Wilkins (2004) finds that disability is associated with a 25 percent 
decrease in employment probability, but this probability is greater for the more
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severely disabled, those with multiple impairments and those with mental health 
problems, confirming that the type, severity and number of health problems are 
important.
The extent to which an impairment will affect an individual’s productivity will not 
only depend on the type and severity of the disability, but also on the specific 
requirements of a particular job and the interaction between the disability and the 
requirement (Wolfe, 1984). Schumacher and Baldwin (2000), using data from the 
SIPP, attempt to control for this by including measures of job demands (verbal, 
spatial, numerical aptitudes, strength and physical demands of the job) by occupation 
and by functional limitation, in the wage equation. A significant unexplained wage 
differential remains for workers with disabilities, consistent with the previous 
literature.
It may also be the case that an employer can make necessary accommodations to 
equalize the productivity between a disabled and non-disabled worker. At the most 
extreme, these accommodations may enable a disabled person to continue working. 
In a dynamic study, Burkhauser et al. (1995) examine the influence of workplace 
accommodations on labour market exit in the US. They estimate a time hazard 
model, using Social Security data, and find employer accommodation has a positive 
effect on job tenure; indeed, they suggest workplace accommodation is as important 
as the benefit replacement ratio in the participation decision. Since accommodations 
are costly to firms they may be passed on to disabled workers in the form of a wage 
gap (Baldwin and Johnson, 2001). This issue has received limited attention, mainly 
due to data restrictions; however, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) use a unique data 
source, the Ontario Workers Compensation Board Survey 'of Workers with 
Permanent Impairments, which provides information on workplace accommodation 
(that is, adjustments made in terms of physical tasks and hours and material 
modifications of the workplace). In their study of injured workers in Ontario 1979- 
88, they find that the proportion of the cost of the accommodation passed on to 
workers through lower pay depends on whether the worker was employed with the 
same firm prior to injury. In this case, the employer was found to pay for workplace 
modifications (but not for changing physical demands), whereas, a substantial part of 
the cost is borne by the employee if he/she is injured at another firm. Campolieti
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(2004a), using the same data and accounting for the return to work selection 
problem, finds that workers who have received training prior to an accident and who 
return to work with the same employer are more likely to receive accommodation.
The type of injury is also an important influence on accommodation. Zwerling et al. 
(2003), using a nationally representative dataset, examine the relationship between 
personal characteristics and accommodations in the US. Although 12 percent of 
disabled people have workplace accommodations, female, more educated, older, full­
time workers and the self-employed are more likely to receive accommodations. 
Provision is also greater for more severe limitations, but is less likely for those with 
mental health impairments.
Although the literature has considered the influence of unobserved productivity 
differences in some detail, less attention has been paid to the problem of selection 
bias that results from non-random assignment of individuals into disability status. 
One of the few studies in this area is Lechner and Vazquez-Alvares (2004) who use 
matching techniques and data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
(1984-2001) to overcome this problem. The disabled (treatment group) are 
individuals who become disabled and remain disabled at the third year. The control 
group is those who remain non-disabled for the same period. The non-disabled are 
found to have nearly a 10 percent higher rate of employment and 16 percent higher 
earnings than their disabled counterparts. Previous studies have focused, instead, on 
another source of selection bias in earnings equations, the selection bias that results 
from a non-random sample choosing employment (Johnson and Lambrinos, 1985, 
Baldwin and Johnson, 1994, 1995) and have controlled for it using the Heckman 
(1976) two-step procedure.18
The effect of disability on labour market outcomes may differ on the basis of other 
observable characteristics (Baldwin and Johnson, 1995 and Bound et al., 1995). 
Johnson and Lambrinos (1985) find that the proportion of the wage gap attributed to 
discrimination is greater for disabled women (nearly fifty percent) than disabled men
18 The sign and significance of the selection term varies between genders but the negative 
discrimination wage effect is still identified. For males, taking selection into account increases the 
non-discriminatory wage difference (Baldwin and Johnson, 1995).
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(thirty percent). Madden (2004), using UK data, finds that discrimination is greater 
for disabled women than disabled men, in terms of both participation and wages. 
Baldwin and Johnson (1995) examine women and find that, in the US, about 50 
percent of the wage differential between disabled and non-disabled women is due to 
discrimination. Loprest et al. (1995) examine gender differences in participation 
among older workers in the US and find the effect of disability on participation is 
larger for men and single women than for married women. Particular limitations are 
also found to affect genders differently, labour market outcomes are more adversely 
affected for men with mobility and strength limitations, whilst women are more 
severely affected by ill-health affecting sensory incapacity and appearance (Baldwin 
et al., 1994). Several of these studies go on to examine the impact of disability on 
discrimination on the grounds of gender. They find that disabled workers also suffer 
from gender discrimination (Johnson and Lambrinos, 1985) but the magnitude of this 
gender discrimination is not increased due to disability (Baldwin and Johnson, 1995).
Employment
Whilst the focus of the literature has been on wage discrimination, the difference in 
employment probabilities between the two groups is actually more dramatic. Several 
studies model the probability of employment, using a probit model as part of a 
Heckman (1976) correction for sample selection (Baldwin and Johnson, 1994, 1995) 
or in analysis of health conditions on the labour supply of older workers (Loprest et 
al., 1995 and Disney et al., 2006). Studies consistently identify a negative 
employment effect from disability and frequently find the influence of health is 
greater on employment than wages (Baldwin and Johnson 1994, 1995). Baldwin and 
Johnson (1992) note that the presence of wage discrimination will force some 
individuals to exit the labour market and may, therefore, explain some of the 
observed difference in employment rates. Baldwin and Johnson (1994), using data 
from the 1984 SIPP, find the disincentive effects of wage discrimination account for 
only 2 of the 29 percentage point difference in employment rates between disabled 
men subject to prejudice and non-disabled men. In a related study for females, 
Baldwin and Johnson (1995) find that wage discrimination accounts for less than 1 
percentage point of the 26 percentage point gap in employment.
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Since the influence of wage discrimination on employment is small, it is important to 
examine discrimination in hiring which may explain more of the observed 
employment difference. In the UK, Blackaby et al. (1999) and Kidd et al. (2000) 
decompose the employment gap and find less than half is explained by 
characteristics, suggesting discrimination at this stage is important. More recently, 
studies have begun to examine whether disability affects the type of employment 
undertaken. US evidence suggests that the disabled are concentrated in non-standard 
forms of employment, including independent contracting, part-time and temporary 
employment (Schur, 2002, 2003 and Hotchkiss, 2004b) which have lower wages and 
fewer benefits on average. The important question is whether this is the result of 
discrimination or a voluntary choice for the disabled. Schur (2003) finds that, even 
when personal characteristics are controlled for, the disabled are significantly more 
likely to be in temporary and part-time employment. She argues that there are three 
possible reasons for this: the disability benefit regime, employer discrimination and 
the flexibility required by the disabled. The evidence suggests that flexibility is the 
dominant reason and that these forms of employment enable individuals to work who 
are unable to undertake standard types of employment. Consistent with this, 
Hotchkiss (2004b) finds that part-time employment among the disabled has increased 
and there is a higher propensity for disabled people to be employed part-time relative 
to the non-disabled. She finds this is predominately due to differences in voluntary 
part-time employment.19
In similar research, Presser and Altman (2002) use data from the US Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and do not find a significant relationship between 
working non-day shifts and disability, about one fifth of each group working late or 
rotating shifts. However, the disabled face less wage discrimination when working 
undesirable hours, consistent with employers being less able to discriminate when 
labour supply is more restricted. Blanck et al. (2000) find that workers with 
disabilities are nearly twice as likely to be self-employed as the non-disabled. In the 
UK, the rate of self-employment is also higher for the disabled (Boylan and
19 Part-time employment may be an intermittent step between inactivity and full-time employment 
with benefits for the employee (training, experience) and employer (information about productivity).
20 This may be due to two conflicting influences, employers may be more willing to hire the disabled 
in less desirable jobs where there are greater staff shortages, whilst, relative to the non-disabled, the 
disabled may suffer greater discomfort from working shifts.
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Burchardt, 2002). Again, there appear to be two central explanations. Firstly, 
discrimination pushes people into self-employment as a last resort and, secondly, the 
disabled require greater freedom and flexibility to work around their disability. The 
high rates of self-employment are consistent with the higher rates of home working 
among the disabled (Schur and Kruse, 2002).
Less attention has been given to the occupational choice of disabled workers, 
although initial evidence for the US (Hale et al., 1998) and the UK (Meager et al., 
1998 and Smith and Twomey, 2002) find disabled workers are concentrated in low 
skilled jobs such as administrative, secretarial, administrative skilled trades and 
personal services. Schumacher and Baldwin (2000), using data from the SIPP, find 
evidence for the quality-sorting hypothesis, where, because disabled workers have a 
lower amount of unmeasured skill, both disabled and non-disabled workers receive 
lower wages in occupations with a higher proportion of disabled workers.
Amongst the employed, the impact of disability on measures such as job satisfaction 
and job mobility has also been examined. Uppal (2005) finds that job satisfaction is 
lower among the disabled relative to the non-disabled in Canada, and that part of the 
effect is explained by experience of discrimination and harassment in the last 12 
months. Schumacher and Baldwin (2000), using data from the SIPP, find few 
differences in job mobility between disabled and non-disabled workers. One 
exception is that workers with disabilities have higher rates of involuntary job 
change, indicating that there may be discrimination in firing or that job mismatch is 
greater among workers with disabilities. Baldwin and Schumacher (2002), using data 
from the US SIPP, find similar results and suggest that either the disabled group are 
secondary workers, who are less likely to be hired and more likely to be fired, or that 
the disabled face greater mismatch. There is limited evidence to suggest differences 
in the wage effect of job changes. In addition, there is no evidence to support the 
notion that discrimination increases involuntary job turnover, despite increased legal 
action since ADA.
2.4.2 UK Evidence
Regardless of source, the contrast in labour market outcomes for disabled and non­
disabled persons in the UK is stark: the employment rate for the disabled is about
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half the rate of the non-disabled, whilst for those disabled people in employment, 
average earnings are substantially lower than for the non-disabled (Smith and 
Twomey, 2002 and Kidd et al., 2000).
Economic analysis of the disabled in the UK has been far more limited relative to the 
US or similar studies in the UK on the basis of gender or race. However, the 
evidence that exists finds that disability has a consistent negative effect on both 
earnings and employment. Blackaby et al. (1999) use data from the 1991 Census, 
1992-4 LFS data and the GHS and find, irrespective of data source, that the 
unemployment probabilities of the disabled are higher than those of the non-disabled, 
while their earnings are lower.21 Differences in characteristics account for a 
maximum of around one half of the difference in employment or earnings. Similarly, 
Kidd et al. (2000) use data from the 1996 LFS, but restrict the analysis to males only. 
Again, observable productivity differences between the disabled and non-disabled 
explain around 50 percent of the wage and participation rate differentials between the 
two groups when they control for selection into employment. They also identify 
some within group differences in outcomes, with mental health problems having the 
most adverse impact on labour market outcomes. Using the method of Baldwin and 
Johnson (1992), they also find the employment effect of wage discrimination to be 
small.
The UK evidence fails to control for the effect disability has on the productivity of 
those in work. Madden (2004) uses cross sectional data from the FRS in 1995 to 
examine the effect of health status on earnings, whilst controlling for selection into 
health and employment status. In addition to controlling for the endogeneity of health 
status, he examines the effect of health on productivity by distinguishing between 
those who have a health problem that is work-limiting and those who have a health 
problem that is non-work-limiting, in a similar way to DeLeire (2001). Although the 
self-selection into disability is not found to be important, controlling for the effect of
21 In a study examining the relationship between ill-health and income, Contoyannis and Rice (2001) 
use data from the BHPS and find that psychological ill-health reduces earnings for men, whilst 
excellent self-assessed health leads to higher wages for females. They exploit the panel element of the 
data to allow for a time lag between the effect o f health on wages. The endogeneity o f health and 
earnings is controlled for using instrumental variables, but the efficiency gains are largely accounted 
for by time-invariant endogenous variables, particularly education.
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disability on productivity eliminates the unexplained (discriminatory) wage gap and 
the participation gap, suggesting there is no discrimination against the disabled.
Berthoud (2003), using data from the Disability Survey attached to the FRS, 
highlights the variation within the disabled group and finds that the severity of the 
disability is an important determinant of employment. He also finds that the disabled 
are more sensitive to other forms of disadvantage such as having poor education or 
living in a high unemployment region. Interestingly, O’Donnell (1998) argues that 
some disabled people are unable to work, so that the literature based on the 
assumption of individual choice may be inappropriate in this situation. Using data 
from the 1985 British Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS), 
O’Donnell models employment as an outcome of two decisions - capacity for work 
and desire to work - and finds that failure to model the inability to work 
overestimates the impact of disability on wages.
2.4.3 Dynamic Effects
As Baldwin and Johnson (2001) highlight, disability, unlike gender or race, can be a 
non-permanent state, with the most common forms of disability, musculoskeletal or 
cardiovascular and circulatory, often developed during middle age. UK evidence 
confirms this, since only 11 percent of the disabled adult population are bom with 
their disability, 12 percent aquire it in childhood and the remaining 75 percent 
become disabled during their working life (Burchardt, 2003b). Baldwin and Johnson 
(2001) suggest that the disabled population should, therefore, be split into two main 
groups: those who are disabled during childhood and those who are disabled later in 
life (after entering work). This distinction appears important since they face very 
different labour market issues. The first group may face discrimination in education 
and upon entry in work, whereas the second group are affected by discrimination
when returning to work after illness. However, it is rare for cross section studies to
22contain retrospective information on the date of disability onset. Furthermore, 
disability may not be sudden, but a gradual deterioration in health (Burchardt, 
2003b). Where this information does exist, after controlling for observable 
characteristics, mature disability onset is found to be associated with poorer labour
22 Moreover, even when onset is observed in panel data, both the length of the panel and the sample 
size tend to restrict the analysis (see Jenkins and Rigg, 2004 for an examination o f the BHPS).
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market outcomes (see Wilkins, 2004, who uses data from the 1998 Australian Bureau 
of Statistics Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers and Jones, 2006a, who uses 
data from an ad-hoc module on disability in the 2002 UK LFS). Similarly, Pelkowski 
and Berger (2004) who use data from the US Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 
find the adverse effects of ill-health depend on the age of onset, with more 
pronounced effects for males aged in their 40s and females in their 30s. This suggests 
that individuals disabled at birth or in childhood are more able to adapt to their 
disability. In addition to the timing of onset, the cause of onset may have important 
labour market implications. For example, an individual who becomes disabled as a 
result of an industrial accident may be more likely to receive financial compensation; 
this is likely to increase an individual’s reservation wage relative to other sources of 
onset. In addition, whether onset is sudden or gradual may have implications for 
adaptation and, thus, labour market outcomes.
Previous analysis of longitudinal data in the US focuses on the relationship between 
disability, employment and benefit income (Burkhauser and Daly 1996, 1998). 
Similar UK studies have investigated transitions in relation to incapacity benefits 
rather than disability and employment directly.23 They find that economic incentives 
(benefit levels, pay, pension rights, local labour market conditions), in addition to 
personal characteristics, are important determinants of inflows, outflows and the 
duration of sickness claims (Fenn, 1981, Holmes and Lynch, 1990 and Disney and 
Webb, 1991). However, more recently, longitudinal data has begun to examine the 
dynamic impact that disability has on labour market transitions.
In an international study, Bardasi et al. (2000) compare the impact of disability on 
the labour market in Britain, the US and Germany. The onset of disability is 
associated with a larger outflow from employment in Britain, with 81 percent 
employed two years prior to the onset of disability and only 36 percent two years 
after onset compared to 96 percent and 83 percent in Germany. Moving into non­
employment, however, is not associated with major reductions in income. The 
employment rate of disabled men is about 50 percent of the non-disabled group, but 
disabled men earn 70 percent of the non-disabled wage in Britain. Burchardt (2003a)
23 A discussion of the impact o f disability benefits on labour supply is included in Section 2.5.1.
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uses the longitudinal element of the LFS and finds that 2.6 percent of people become 
disabled (as defined by the DDA) quarter on quarter. As a result of the onset of 
disability, 5 percent leave employment immediately, whereas after 9-12 months 13 
percent have left employment. The probability of exiting employment is higher for 
those with low levels of human capital and poor employment protection. Jenkins and 
Rigg (2004) use data from the BHPS to split the effect of disability into three stages 
i) a selection effect, ii) the effect of disability onset, and iii) the effect of disability 
post onset. Consistent with self-reporting bias, individuals who experienced 
disability onset were typically more disadvantaged prior to the disability onset, 
having fewer qualifications, lower incomes and lower employment rates. Indeed, 
having no qualifications increased the probability of disability (by over 50 percent); 
although this is consistent with justification bias, it may, in part, reflect higher rates 
of disability among low income groups. However, the effect of onset is negative in 
itself, with the proportion of persons in paid work falling by 26 percent and their 
median income falling by 10 percent. After the initial onset effect average work 
income increases, but the probability of being in employment falls with the duration 
of disability.24 Gannon (2005) uses data on Ireland from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) (1995-2000) and controls for the influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, past disability and labour market status on current labour market 
participation. The results suggest that failing to control for these influences results in 
the impact of disability being over-estimated by 40-60 percent for men and 5-10 
percent for females.
Burchardt (2000) also uses the BHPS and focuses on the duration of disability. She 
finds that, although at any time the long-term disabled account for a large proportion 
of all disabled people, only a small proportion of those who have ever experienced 
disability are long-term disabled. Indeed, over half of those who become disabled as 
adults have a duration of 2 years or less, emphasizing that it is not a permanent state 
for many, although after four years, the exit rate from disability is severely reduced. 
The study highlights the heterogeneity of disability in a cross sectional study, which, 
depending on the definition used, could treat an individual with long-term sickness in
24 Gannon and Nolan (2007) undertake a similar analysis using Irish data and find that being older and 
less well educated increases the probability of persistent disability. While disability onset and 
persistent disability are associated with poverty and social exclusion, part of the disadvantage is found 
to exist prior to disability onset.
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the same way as an individual with a temporary spell of incapacity. Confirming this 
heterogeneity, Pelkowski and Berger (2004) find that temporary health problems 
only have limited effect on either hours worked or earnings.
Rigg (2005) examines the labour market progress of the disabled using the annual 
longitudinal element of the LFS and finds the disabled are also disadvantaged in 
terms of progression. The disabled have lower rates of earnings growth, are more 
likely to exit employment, move from full-time to part-time work and have 
significantly less training. However, there is little evidence of a difference in 
occupational progression. Interestingly, it is prime age disabled men and disabled 
individuals in manual occupations that face the least favourable trajectories.
The effect of disability on labour market transitions can be related to the more 
extensive literature on the impact of health on the retirement decision (Disney et al., 
2006 for example), which suggests that poor health encourages retirement (Anderson 
and Burkhauser, 1985, Sickles and Taubman, 1986, Bound, 1991, Loprest et al., 
1995, Campoleiti, 2002 and Hagan et al., 2006). Bound et al. (1999) use data from 
the HRS and emphasise that it is both poor health and deteriorating health conditions 
that have an important influence on labour market exits. They also suggest that onset 
of poor health causes some people, who remain employed, to change jobs, consistent 
with workers adapting their type of employment so that they can remain in the labour 
force. Recent evidence for the UK (Disney et al., 2006), using the BHPS and 
instrumenting self-reported health, confirms that it is a deterioration in health that is 
most closely associated with transitions into non-employment. Kerkhofs et al. (1999) 
take into account the endogeneity of health when modelling the retirement decision 
and find, when using data from a Dutch survey, that subjective measures overstate 
the effects of health on retirement, while endogeneity has the reverse effect. 
Similarly, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) use self-rated and objective measures of health 
from the HRS and find that ill-health brings forward retirement by a couple of years, 
but that the effects differ with the type of health problem; the greatest acceleration in 
retirement is due to chronic conditions such as functional limitations and circulatory 
disorders. The impact of disability may also affect the retirement decision of other 
members in the household. Johnson and Favreault (2001), using data from the HRS, 
find that, whilst both men and women are more likely to retire if their spouses have
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already retired, this does not hold for spouses whose partner has exited the labour 
force due to ill-health, particularly when spouses are not yet eligible for retirement 
benefits. This may indicate that the incentive to care for a disabled partner is 
outweighed by the incentive to compensate for the loss in income.
2.5 Policy Evaluation
2.5.1 Disability benefits25
The effect of disability benefits on labour supply has been examined extensively and 
studies consistently find a significant negative relationship (Bound and Waidmann 
1992, Harkness 1993, Gruber and Kubik 1997, Bound and Burkhauser 1999, Gruber 
2000, Buddelmeyer 2001 and Autor and Duggan, 2003). The impact of benefit levels 
on participation has been quantified by examining how participation rates vary with 
the replacement ratio in cross section data (Parsons, 1980, Haveman and Wolfe, 
1984, Haveman et al., 1991). The studies confirm large disincentive effects from 
benefits. Parsons (1980) estimates that the elasticity of non-participation to changes 
in benefits is between 0.49 and 0.93 in the US; however, subsequent evidence 
suggests lower values between 0.1-0.2 (Leonard, 1986). A problem with this 
approach is that the replacement ratio is a decreasing function of past earnings, 
making it difficult to distinguish between low earnings or generous benefits as the 
reason for non-participation. More recently, studies have identified ways of 
examining differences in the replacement ratio that are independent of earnings. Bell 
and Smith (2004), for example, use the 1995 reform of UK disability benefits to test 
the effect of benefit generosity on the number of claimants and find an elasticity of 
0.26, which increases to 0.63 for the least educated males. Gruber (2000) performs a 
similar test in Canada, but focuses on differences between types of disability benefits 
and estimates the elasticity of non-participation to be in the range 0.28 to 0.36. In 
contrast, Campolieti (2004b), using the same data source, but for an earlier time 
period than Gruber, finds that a region specific change in the benefit level in Canada 
did not have a large effect on labour market activity. One suggestion for the 
difference in results is the more stringent screening used in the earlier period 
examined by Campolieti.
25 McVicar (forthcoming) provides an overview o f the current disability benefits available in the UK.
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Similar studies examine the impact of benefit rejection on participation. Bound 
(1989) uses those who fail the medical test for disability benefits as a control group. 
Only half of those who are refused benefits are employed, which suggests claimants 
have serious health reasons for not working rather than non-participation being 
entirely due to receipt of benefits. Gruber and Krubik (1997) examine US state 
variation in benefit rejection rates and find a 10 percent increase in rejection leads to 
a reduction in non-participation of 2.8 percent among older males. Differences in 
policy regimes across countries also provide information about the work incentive 
effect of alternative schemes. Burkhauser and Daly (1998) compare the US and 
Germany, and although disability rates are similar between the two countries, 
differences in their welfare systems create large differences in employment 
probabilities and the number of benefit claimants. In the US, where the policy 
emphasis has been on transfer payments, the onset of disability is found to be 
associated with a greater decline in work than in Germany.
The dramatic fall in participation of males in the UK since the 1980s has prompted 
an increased interest in the possible role that disability benefits might have played in 
this process (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999, Bell and Smith, 2004 and McVicar, 
forthcoming). Although most of these studies define the disabled population as those 
in receipt of benefit income, the impact of changes to the benefit regime provides
9 f\important information about the incentive structures created by such schemes. 
Evidence suggests that the rise in disability claimants has been the result of a 
combination of both an increase in the generosity of disability benefits and the 
deterioration in the labour market for low skilled workers (Bound and Burkhauser, 
1999, Autor and Duggan, 2003 and Bell and Smith, 2004).27 McVicar (forthcoming) 
argues that the UK, unlike the US, has not experienced falling real earnings at the 
lower end of the wage distribution and so benefit replacement rates have not grown
26 Most authors agree that the increase in disability benefit claimants cannot be explained by changes 
in average health levels (Beatty et al., 2000 and Autor and Duggan, 2003). However, recent evidence 
does provide support for real increases in disability among younger individuals. Lakdawalla et al. 
(2007) find that disability in the US has increased by 40 percent among those aged in their 40s and 
this has coincided with an increase in diabetes and asthma. Whilst Bell and Smith (2004) note that 
self-reported disability has not increased overall in the UK, it has increased dramatically among the 
least qualified, who are also the group that have had a large rise in benefit uptake.
27 Earlier studies also concluded that economic factors are important determinants o f disability 
claimants (Molho, 1989, 1991).
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in the UK. Bell and Smith (2004), however, find evidence that the decline in 
participation has been concentrated on unskilled men who have reported long-term 
illness. Although this supports the disincentive effects of incapacity benefits, job 
destruction following a negative demand shock offers an alternative explanation for 
the decline in participation. Beatty et al. (2000) model the effect of an adverse 
demand shock and argue that the sick are the first to lose their jobs and that they are 
the individuals who have most incentive to move on to disability benefits. Rupp and 
Stapleton (1995, 1998) examine the determinants of benefit receipt, and suggest that 
economic contractions create an inflow of new benefit claimants, but that expansions 
do not create equal outflows, leading to the rising pool of claimants. In the UK there 
is also a greater incentive to claim disability benefits than unemployment benefits 
(Beatty et al. 2000). This is explained by differential benefit rates between schemes, 
means testing (Fothergill, 2001) and conditions of receipt (for example, meeting job 
advisors) associated with job seekers allowance (JSA), and the incentive for job 
centres to reduce unemployment figures (Nickell and Quintini, 2002).
In analyzing the increase in incapacity benefit in the UK, Moncrieff and Pomerleau 
(2000) find the largest increase in claimants suffer from musculoskeletal disorders 
and mental disorders, particularly milder depressive and neurotic disorder (see also 
Autor and Duggan, 2006). Bell and Smith (2004) find an almost three-fold increase 
in the proportion of the disabled with mental health and behavioural disorders (1979- 
2001). This increase in mental health problems may be the result of increasing 
recognition and diagnosis of these conditions rather than real increases. However, 
since both recognition and diagnosis of mental health and musculoskeletal 
limitations are cited by doctors as subjective, it is difficult to explain these increases 
and to identify true disability (Hiscock and Ritchie, 2001).
2.5.2 Disability Discrimination Acts
Recent changes in legislation relating to the disabled have led to a growing literature 
evaluating the effects of the ADA in the US. However, there has been little formal 
evaluation to date of the equivalent legislation in the UK (that is, the DDA). The 
ADA was introduced in the US in 1990 to eliminate discrimination by employers 
against individuals with disabilities. DeLeire (2000), using data from the SIPP, finds 
that, on average, employment of men with disabilities is 7.2 percent lower in the
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post-ADA period than before the Act was passed. The largest employment declines 
were observed in manufacturing, managerial and blue collar occupations. There were 
no observable changes to the wages of disabled men, which remained at 82 percent 
of the male non-disabled wage. Although other policies could have contributed to the 
change in employment, DeLeire (2000) argues that the timing and magnitude of the 
changes were consistent with an ADA effect. In direct support of these findings, 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) document similar results using an alternative dataset, 
the CPS, particularly for men and women aged between 21 and 39. There is no 
evidence that the ADA reduces job separations for the disabled, which suggests that 
the ADA has not acted as a form of employment protection. Furthermore, even 
though the number of disability transfer payments rose during the same period, this 
cannot, on its own, explain the decline in employment. Confirming the ADA as the 
reason for the decline in employment among the disabled, the impact was found to be 
greater in larger firms (smaller firms being exempt from legislation) and in states 
with more ADA-related discrimination charges. The important implication of these 
results is that the legislation reduced the demand for disabled workers by raising the 
costs of employing such workers.
These results, however, have been questioned on the grounds that the work disability 
measure used may not accurately reflect coverage under the ADA (Schwochau and 
Blanck, 2000, 2003 and Kruse and Schur, 2003). Legislation, by removing the stigma 
of disability, may encourage more individuals to report a disability. In contrast, 
some, who reported a disability prior to the legislation, may not do so after its 
introduction if improvements to the workplace change the effect of the disability to 
non-work-limiting. As Kruse and Schur (2003) conclude, the analysis of the 
employment effects of disability legislation is confounded by changes in the 
composition of those reporting disabilities , the role of disability income and the 
relative effects of business cycles on workers with and without disabilities (see, also, 
Kruse and Hale, 2003). Indeed, they find greater reporting of disability post-ADA. 
They use data from the SIPP to examine fourteen alternative measures based on 
differences in self-reported disability, the severity of limitations and receipt of
28 Over time, the number work-limited is affected by changes in technology and the changing nature 
of employment regardless of changes in legislation.
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disability benefits. Consistent with the previous studies, they find evidence of 
decreasing employment of the disabled several years after the ADA, but, when more 
specific disability measures are used relating to the ADA, employment is found to 
increase.
Neutral evidence with respect to the ADA is presented by Schumacher and Baldwin
(2000) who identify very few differences in labour market outcomes for the disabled 
between 1990 and 1993. Although this suggests that the ADA has had little impact 
on the labour market, the timing of the study may be important in so far as the effects 
of the legislation may not have been observable by 1993. Indeed, the wage 
differential between disabled and non-disabled men was found to increase between 
1990 and 1993. Similarly, DeLeire (2001) finds the discriminatory component of the 
wage gap did not fall after the introduction of the ADA. However, during the period, 
the negative effect of health on earnings did decline (through the productivity effect), 
which may have been due to improvements in technology/accommodation by 
employers for the disabled.
The most recent studies have used state variation in data to evaluate the effects of the 
ADA. Beegle and Stock (2003) create an experimental framework that generates 
treatment and comparison groups by using state differences in legislation prior to the 
introduction of the ADA. Compared with previous research, where evaluation of the 
ADA only captures the additional effect of the ADA over and above existing 
legislation, this method allows separation of those who were previously subject to 
legislation from those who were not, in the same period (that is, in different states), 
with the advantage of controlling for pre-existing trends in outcomes (that were 
common across states). They find negative effects of the laws on the relative 
earnings of the disabled. However, when pre-existing trends in employment are 
controlled for, there is no discemable effect on relative employment rates.
Jolls and Prescott (2004), also use state level differences in the ADA, but examine 
the influence of the components (primarily anti-discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation) of the ADA. By comparing states that, due to their existing 
legislation, were only subject to one (additional) component of the ADA, they are 
able to separate the effect of each of the elements. They report two main findings.
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Firstly, the negative employment effects were mainly the result of employers having 
to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees, rather than the effect of 
increased firing costs for this group. Secondly, the state level data suggests that the 
fall in disabled employment, post-ADA, reflects other factors rather than the ADA 
itself. Jolls (2004) argues that the fall in employment after the ADA may be the 
result of the ADA increasing the return to education for the disabled and thus 
increasing educational participation. Using variation in state laws prior to the ADA, 
she finds that there has been an increase in educational participation amongst the 
disabled in states where the ADA significantly changed the rights of disabled people 
relative to states where the impact was more limited.
Hotchkiss (2004a) criticises the evaluation studies, suggesting they fail to control for 
selection into the labour market. When controlling for this selection effect, the 
predicted unconditional employment probability for a disabled person increased 
since the ADA legislation. There is evidence that non-participants moved into 
disability, which reduced the participation rate of the disabled. Using state level data, 
the evidence suggests that the impact of the ADA has been limited; she argues this 
may be due to prior state level legislation crowding out the impact of the ADA.
DeLeire (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) suggest disability benefits were 
not an important influence on the fall in employment post-AD A, since employment 
fell most for those groups least likely to receive disability benefits. However, 
Bound and Waidmann (2002) find the growth in the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) programme in the 1990s (which resulted from changes made in the 
1980s) explains nearly all of the fall in employment during the 1990s. However, 
Kruse and Schur (2003) note that the ADA may have contributed to this growth in 
benefits if, for example, fewer disabled people were hired. Business cycles also 
generate disproportionate effects on the disabled, given the nature of the jobs they 
hold in the labour market. The recession of the early 1990s could, therefore, have 
contributed to the increase in non-employment among the disabled in the post-ADA 
period. However, Kruse and Schur (2003) account for labour market tightness in
29 DeLeire (2000) also notes that the change in employment in the post-ADA period was a break 
rather than a continuation of a trend and that disability benefits did not change significantly during the 
period.
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their evaluation of ADA and this does not change the effect of the ADA on 
employment.30
Analysis of legislation has also occurred in other European countries including the 
UK. Verick (2004) uses the GSOEP to evaluate the impact of the People with Severe 
Disabilities Act (PSDA). Previously, a 5 percent quota system was in place to 
enforce the employment of the disabled, but, due to high unemployment amongst the 
disabled, the PSDA was reformed in 2001 and an increased penalty introduced for 
not meeting targets. The government claimed the reform reduced unemployment 
among the disabled by 24 percent, but Verick’s study suggests gains in 
unemployment were partly met by individuals exiting the labour force, rather than 
increasing demand for these workers. Lalive et al. (2007) consider the Austrian 
Disability Act, which also consists of a quota type system. Employers face a penalty 
for non-compliance if they fail to hire one severely disabled worker per 25 workers. 
Using social security data, the study finds greater employment of the disabled in 
firms above the threshold than those below it and argues that the legislation has a 
positive effect on the employment of the disabled. Bell and Heitmueller (2005) apply 
the methodology of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) to evaluate the impact of the DDA 
in the UK.31 Data from the BHPS and the FRS use a definition of disability which is 
most consistent with the DDA. Using a difference in difference approach, they find 
some evidence of a negative impact (or at least no positive effects) of the DDA. They 
suggest that the lack of awareness of the Act and low levels of take up of financial 
support by employers and individuals are possible reasons for the absence of a 
significant impact. Also within the UK, the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) has undertaken evaluation studies into the New Deal for the disabled, which 
is a scheme offered to those who claim incapacity benefits to aid their move into 
employment through a series of job brokers. Adelman et al. (2004) outline the 
characteristics of participants, the service they received and the employment
'i 'y
outcomes for those who registered between May and June 2002. One year after 
registration, 46 percent had entered post-registered employment, of which 38 percent
30 Schwochau and Blanck (2000) raise several other important issues for the evaluation o f the DDA, 
including controlling for individuals who are not able to work and controlling for the type and severity 
o f the disability, since the impact of the DDA may vary depending on disability itself.
31 See Goss et al. (2000) for a critique of the employment provisions o f the DDA.
32 Ashworth et al. (2004) report on the first interview, at approximately 6 months after registration.
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moved into employment within six weeks. Poor education and basic skills and those 
with a negative attitude to employment were found to be least likely to find work. An 
earlier report (Department for Work and Pensions, 2004), which synthesises the 
findings from the first 18 months (July 2001-November 2003), found that 32 percent 
had gained employment, but that only 39 percent of these had found sustained 
employment up to May 2003.
Summary
This review of the international evidence relating to disability has highlighted several 
issues which are important for empirical research on disability in the UK. Firstly, it is 
crucial to acknowledge the influence the definition and method for identifying the 
disabled has in evaluation of the labour market impact of disability. Since the 
literature does not provide a consensus over the most appropriate measure of 
disability, studies continue to use self-reported information on work or activity 
limitations available in large scale surveys.
Regardless of the definition, data source, country or time period, disability is found 
to have a negative impact on labour market outcomes. The differences in 
employment and earnings cannot be entirely explained by differences in 
characteristics between the two groups, but what remains a contentious issue is 
estimating the role of discrimination. Without sufficient controls for type of 
impairment, severity, visibility, work capacity, job demands and employer 
accommodation, it will be difficult to identify the precise role of discrimination, 
though varying the assumptions in relation to productivity and discrimination 
provides useful insights into the problem disability poses for estimation. The 
dynamic nature of disability also creates additional heterogeneity and the evidence 
suggests selection, timing and duration effects are all important.
There, initially, appeared to be a consensus in the evaluation studies of the ADA, 
namely, that the legislation reduced the employment of disabled workers due to the 
additional cost it imposes on employers. However, more recent evidence appears to 
question these conclusions and highlights the range of influences that should be 
considered in evaluation of changes in legislation, most importantly other policy 
changes, business cycles and changes in the composition of and economic shocks
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specific to the disabled population. The importance of evaluating the corresponding 
legislation in Europe has been recognised, but the literature is in its infancy.
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CHAPTER THREE
ESTIMATING EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE DISABLED
3.1. Introduction
Empirical analysis which attempts to identify and measure discrimination against 
minority groups within the labour market represents a significant component of 
empirical labour economics. Studies, typically, employ a version of the 
decomposition methodology suggested by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). As 
Chapter 2 demonstrates, the issue of discrimination and the application of this 
methodology have featured prominently in the literature relating to disability. 
However, in this context, there have been concerns raised over the accuracy of the 
estimate of discrimination, since there may be unobserved differences in productivity 
between disabled and non-disabled groups. This unobservable productivity 
difference would contribute to the unexplained gap in a decomposition and, thus, 
result in an overestimation of discrimination against the disabled. This Chapter uses a 
modification of the original decomposition, suggested by DeLeire (2001), to estimate 
the contribution of any unobserved productivity difference between the groups to 
their difference in labour market outcomes. Hence, it attempts to obtain a more 
accurate estimate of discrimination against the disabled, in terms of both earnings 
and employment in the UK.
Since previous empirical evidence concerning discrimination is discussed in depth in 
Section 2.4, it is not repeated here. However, it is worth highlighting that studies in 
the UK, using the standard decomposition methodology, have found more than 50 
percent of the earnings and employment gap is not explained by differences in 
observable characteristics between the groups. Thus, they attribute a significant 
proportion of the gap to differences in the returns to these characteristics and, hence, 
suggest the (potential) contribution of discrimination is substantial (see Blackaby et
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al., 1999 and Kidd et al., 2000). Indeed, the perceived significance of disability 
discrimination led to the establishment of the Disability Rights Commission in 2000, 
which promotes equality of opportunity for disabled people.
The second main aim of this Chapter is to identify any change in outcomes, including 
discrimination, that have occurred since the introduction of the employment 
component of the DDA in 1996 {Part II  of the Act) which made it unlawful to 
discriminate against the disabled. As documented in Section 2.5.2,‘ there has been 
considerable investigation into the ADA since a negative impact was identified by 
DeLeire (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). In a similar manner, the DDA, 
which was designed to improve the chances for disabled people, may have had a 
positive or negative effect, since it, too, imposed additional costs on employers. 
However, the only direct study of the employment impact of the DDA in the UK is 
by Bell and Heitmueller (2005), who adopt a similar methodology to Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) and who find no evidence of a positive effect, using data from the 
BHPS and the FRS.
The analysis in this Chapter, which uses data from the LFS at two points in time, 
1997 and 2003, compares the outcomes during the post-DDA period. This evidence 
will indicate to what extent the position of the disabled has improved (or 
deteriorated) over time. It is also possible to identify any part in the change that is 
explained by changes in the characteristics of the disabled. Importantly, any change 
that is unexplained can, therefore, be identified; it is this component that would be 
consistent with a change in treatment by employers over time and, thus, may be 
influenced by the DDA.33
Two other themes are investigated during this analysis34; the first is the influence of 
gender. Studies frequently constrain their analysis to males (see Kidd et al., 2000) 
due to an inaccurate perception that they form the majority of the disabled 
population. However, Figure 3.1, which traces rates of work-limiting disability 
amongst the working age population over time, confirms that a similar proportion of
33 For justification o f the choice of years see Section 3.2. This issue is reconsidered in more detail in 
Chapter 7, using data from the HSE that permits an analysis o f the pre and post-DDA period.
34 Both these issues are also considered throughout the evidence that follows in Chapters 4 to 7.
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males and females report themselves as disabled. Moreover, the labour market 
impact of disability is pronounced for both groups (see Figure 3.3, for example) and, 
therefore, the empirical analysis undertaken here is conducted separately for each 
group. Identification of the heterogeneity that exists within the disabled group and 
examination of its influence on labour market outcomes constitute a second 
important theme. In particular, information on the type and severity of the disability 
is used to test if the disadvantage associated with disability is more pronounced for 
those with more severe disabilities or disabilities of a particular type. Since the 
severity and type of disability may affect productivity and discrimination, it would 
seem that understanding differences within the disability group will also inform the 
understanding of the differences between disability groups.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 considers the data and methodology 
used for the analysis of earnings and employment. Section 3.3 outlines and discusses 
the main results and considers the validity of the assumptions on which the analysis 
is based. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2. Data and Methodology
3.2.1. The Labour Force Survey
The data are obtained from the UK LFS, which is a quarterly survey of 60,000
T Ahouseholds. Each quarter is made up of five waves and each wave of individuals 
remains in the survey for five consecutive quarters, so that in any quarter 20 percent 
will be having their first interview, 20 percent their second interview and so on. Thus 
there is an 80 percent sample overlap between quarters. Annual data sets are created 
separately for two years (1997 and 2003) to increase the sample size relative to the 
single quarter and to remove the effect of seasonal fluctuation. Observations on 
individuals from waves 1 and 5 are included from each of the four quarters, which 
means repeated observations on the same individual are excluded. The motivation 
for analysing data across time is to consider the influence of the employment
35 The LFS does not contain information about other aspects o f heterogeneity, such as the duration of 
the disability or the age o f disability onset.
36 The LFS is accessed from the Data Archive www.data-archive.ac.uk where full details and 
questionnaires are also available.
3 There is no longitudinal element to the analysis.
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component of the DDA, which came into force on the 2nd December 1996. Ideally, 
data would have been selected in the pre- and post-DDA periods for the comparison. 
However, it is not possible to undertake a comparison before and after the DDA, 
since the questions in the LFS prior to Spring 1997 are not consistent with the current 
series of questions relating to disability.38 As Cousins et al. (1998) note, this simple 
change identified 24 percent fewer respondents in the UK reporting a long-term 
disability which affected the kind of work they might do, and of those it did identify, 
a greater proportion were economically inactive. This makes any attempt to estimate 
the employment effects of the DDA, on the basis of a before and after study, using 
the LFS, hazardous.39 The years of 1997 and 2003 were chosen since, at the time of 
analysis, this period represented the longest consistent definition of disability in the 
post-DDA period.40 Since the focus is on employer discrimination, the self- 
employed, unpaid family workers and government trainees are all eliminated from 
the sample. Similarly, observations from Northern Ireland, those not of working age 
and those with missing information for any of the explanatory variables are excluded 
from the analysis.
The estimation of discrimination largely follows a methodology outlined by DeLeire
(2001). Fundamental to this is the identification of a group of disabled individuals 
who have no unobserved difference in productivity from the non-disabled. As such, 
the population is split in to three groups based on their disability status; the work- 
limited disabled (£>;), the non-work-limited disabled (£>2) and the non-disabled (N). 
The use of work-limiting disability is standard in the analysis of labour market 
outcomes and the present definition is consistent with that used by the DWP (see 
Tibbie, 2004). The measure of disability status is based on self-reported responses to
38 Prior to Spring 1997, individuals are asked I) if  they had a health problem which would affect the 
kind o f  paid  work they might do and (if yes) 2) if  the health problem was expected to last more than a 
year. This does not allow the disabled population to be split using the DeLeire (2001) definitions.
39 The LFS recorded 16 percent more disabled in Winter 1997 than in Spring 1997. However, the ONS 
suggests data for Summer, Autumn and Winter are more reliable and imply a decline of only 10 
percent in the number of disabled compared to the results from the earlier question format.
40 Where possible, the variables used in the analysis are defined in the same way in both periods. One 
exception is the 2001 change in occupational classifications. Since there is a 75 percent overlap in the 
occupational groups before and after the change, these variables are included in the analysis. 
Regressions and decompositions were estimated without occupational groups and the results did not 
change significantly. In addition, the definition of the variable indicating the number of days off work 
during the working week also changed. In 1997 sikday measured the number o f days off sick or 
injured in the reference week, whilst in 2003 illdays only records days o f sickness when an employee 
is both sick and scheduled to work.
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the following questions in the LFS and, thus, potentially suffers from the biases 
common to self-reported measures reviewed in Chapter 2.41’42 Firstly, the entire 
sample are asked:
a) Do you have any health problems or disabilities that you expect will last for  
more than a year?
Those who answer yes to question a) are asked two additional questions:
b) Does this health problem affect the KIND o f paid work that you might do?
c) Does this health problem affect the AMOUNT o f paid work that you might do?
An individual who has a long-term health problem (yes to a)) that does not affect the 
amount or type of work (no to b) and c)) is non-work-limited disabled (D2). An 
individual who has a long-term health problem (yes to a)), that affects either the 
amount or type of work they can do (yes to either b) or c)), is work-limited disabled 
(D]) and those without a long-term health problem (no to a)) form the non-disabled 
group (A).43 In the present context, the misreporting associated with justification bias 
could also affect the distinction between work-limited and non-work-limited disabled 
and, hence, also exaggerate any employment gap within the disabled group.44
In 2003, 28 percent of the sample reported a long-term health problem and, of those, 
58 percent also say it limits the kind or amount of work. The breakdown of the
41 The definitions follow DeLeire (2001) which enables the effect o f disability on productivity to be 
identified; however, this definition does not follow the DDA definition: A (or multiple) long-term 
health problem or disability that substantially limits a person’s ability to carryout normal day-to-day 
activities. The work-limiting definition will exclude individuals who are covered by the DDA (which 
represent 18 percent of the entire disabled sample) and include those who are not covered by the DDA 
(17 percent o f the entire disabled sample). There is an 80 percent overlap between the two alternative 
measures in the estimation samples.
42 As discussed in Chapter 2, the evidence is mixed on the issue of justification bias. However, since 
no objective health information is available, the issue cannot be examined using the current dataset. 
Instead the issue is considered in detail in Chapter 6 using data from the HSE.
43 The non-disabled may, o f course, have short-term health problems which may affect their capacity 
for work.
44 This would occur if, for example, an individual with a given disability is more likely to report it as 
non-work-limiting if  he/she is in employment. However, the questions are designed so that individuals 
who are not in employment can be non-work-limited. They refer to the effect o f health problems on 
the kind or amount of work an individual might do.
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sample into the three groups is illustrated in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 traces the 
concentration across time. Since the DDA there has been a growth in the reporting of 
disability amongst males and females, which has led to a decline in the size of the 
non-disabled group. However, the increase in reporting has only occurred among 
non-work-limiting disability.
3.2.2 The Econometric Model
The offer wage for the zth individual, W° is modelled separately for each of the j  
disability groups {j=DjD2,N) and by gender as follows:
where, following a traditional human capital approach, AL contains characteristics
specific to the y'th group. The offer wage, however, will only be observed for 
individuals who are currently employed and, therefore, equation (3.1) can only be 
estimated on a sample from the population, which is unlikely to be random. In this 
situation, inferences will be based on the difference between the disabled and non­
disabled who work, rather than the entire disabled and non-disabled populations. 
Since individuals who may have left the labour market as a result of wage 
discrimination are excluded from the analysis and this may be particularly important 
for the disabled group, a correction is made for sample selection bias (Heckman, 
1976, 1979).
An individual will be observed working if their offer wage exceeds their reservation 
wage, Wy . At any offer wage less than the reservation wage the individual will 
reject a job offer in preference for non-employment.45 The reservation wage is given
45 O’Donnell (1998) notes this is not the case for those who are incapable o f work and, therefore, 
cannot work. No information is available from the LFS to identify this group.
(3.1)
which affect an individual’s productivity in work and J3? are the rates of return
by:
(3.2)
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where Zy includes characteristics which affect an individual’s productivity, but also
characteristics that will affect the value an individual places on time. An individual’s 
reservation wage is unobserved; however, whether the individual is employed 
( Ey = 1), which implies ( W° > W y ), or non-employed ( Ey = 0) is observed. Thus 
the probability that individual i works can be expressed as:
Since the difference in errors in equation (3.3), £* -  £ ° , denoted, jUy, is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean zero and variance <7uj2, the probability that an 
individual works can be written as:
where O is the cumulative normal density function, Ytj combines variables from both 
Xy  and Zy and y.  is a vector, combining the parameters of the offer and reservation 
wage equations, B°  and By . This employment decision can be modelled empirically 
using a probit model, with the associated equation for the unobserved latent variable 
E*ij related to employment being:
Pr (Ey = 1 ) = Pr [ Wy -  Wy >0] = [ Xy -  fly Zy > £y -  £y ] (3.3)
Pr (Ey = 1) = Pr----- ^
cr ;
(3.4)
(3.5)
where the observed variable Ey is related to E*y as follows:
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E  J 1  if E*y > 0 
u [O otherwise
An individual is defined as employed (Ey =1) if they are an employee with a
positive hourly wage, the non-employed include the inactive and the unemployed.46 
The employment probits are estimated separately for each group, j ,  and by gender as 
follows:
f y>Yu'1 ? i ub-< II a 0 ' j n 1 eie£,y=l <7 •V UJ J ieEy=0
The vector of characteristics,]^., in equation (3.5), includes variables that influence
both the offer and reservation wage. This includes personal characteristics (such as 
qualifications, marital status, and ethnicity), household related variables (such as 
housing tenure) and a set of regional dummy variables. The presence of dependent 
children and an indicator of another earner within the household, which only 
influence the reservation wage, are also included.47
The inclusion of additional variables in the probit equation (3.5) Yi}, relative to the 
wage offer equation (3.1), X i}, allows identification of the Heckman inverse mills 
ratio. As is traditional in these models, the presence of dependent children, age and
4 o
an indicator of the presence of another earner in the household perform this role. 
This is consistent with these variables affecting the reservation wage (through the 
value placed on time) and not the offer wage.
Several other studies include measures of health in the participation and wage 
equations to control, albeit incompletely, for the effect of health on productivity. 
Although the LFS is a rich source of labour market information, the information on 
health is more limited; there are no competency based questions and further analysis
46 Those who are in employment but have missing hourly pay information are, therefore, dropped 
from the regression analysis. The employment rates presented here, therefore, underestimate the true 
number employed.
47 A full list o f the definitions o f variables is included in Table A3.1.
48 The amount o f non-wage income traditionally used in this role is not available from the LFS.
of health is confined to the long-term disabled only.49 Instead, the unobserved 
productivity difference between the groups is considered using the DeLeire (2001) 
method.
The expected wage of those who are employed is given by:
E (W ° \E; >0) = /3°Xij+E(s°  | Mij > -YjYy)
= P ° X iJ+e iJXiJ (3.7)
where 0Xj — p. .a o, 1 = -----J— —^ , p u = corr ( , jnu) , (j) is the standard normal
£J OtyjYy)
density function and <ruj has been normalised to 1.
Thus, following a Heckman two step procedure, the selectivity corrected wage 
equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) to provide unbiased 
coefficient estimates for the population as a whole, since the selection variable 
removes the part of the error term that is correlated with the explanatory variables:
W,° +6>,i, + ®, (3.8)
W f  is the log of hourly earnings defined as usual weekly pay divided by usual
hours, and X. is estimated from the employment probit A,, = -----. The
V O (fjYy)
vector Xy  includes the personal and housing characteristics mentioned above, but
also employment related characteristics including industry sector, occupation, 
experience, tenure, overtime, firm size, firm sector and part-time/full-time status.51 In 
theory, all the variables included in X i} should also be in Z tj, but, since some of the
49 An alternative specification which controls for the heterogeneity within the disabled group is also 
estimated.
50 Heckman’s (1979) method is used to derive consistent estimates o f the coefficient covariance 
matrix.
51 Whilst occupational and industry variables will control for some aspects of job demands, no more 
detailed information is available on the particular demands of employment. No information is 
available on workplace accommodations which are also expected to affect a disabled individual’s 
productivity.
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variables included in the analysis are only observable for those in paid employment, 
this restriction is not imposed (similar to Baldwin and Johnson, 1994 and Kidd et al., 
2000). The more restrictive approach is illustrated in Kidd et al. (2003). Job related 
characteristics are traditionally included to control for compensating wage 
differentials. However, for the work-limited disabled, the job requirements may also 
affect their productivity. This specification may adversely influence the correction 
for selectivity bias in the offer wage equation, but, since the residual from the wage 
equation forms the measure of discrimination, all variables thought to determine 
offer wages are included.53
Within Group Heterogeneity
The above specifications of the employment and earnings equations examine the 
impact of disability status on labour market outcomes. Alternative specifications, 
which control for heterogeneity within the disabled group in terms of the type of 
health problem, are also computed to examine within group differences and to 
answer questions such as which types of disability are associated with the greatest 
labour market disadvantage? The wage (3.8) and employment (3.6) equations are 
modified to include a series of dummy variables, indicating the type of main health 
problem and a measure of the number of health problems, which, as Berthoud (2003) 
shows, is a proxy for the severity of the disability. The more severe any given 
disability the greater restriction on work and, thus, it is anticipated that those with the 
most severe disability will have inferior labour market outcomes, all else constant. 
Theoretically, the influence of the type of disability is more difficult to predict, since 
labour market outcomes are likely to be the result of an interaction between the type 
of restriction imposed by the disability and the particular requirements of the job,
52 Baldwin and Johnson (1994) include worker characteristics (age, education and health) that affect 
both offer and reservation wages and variables that only affect the reservation wage (income, marital 
status and children) in the employment probit. However, in addition to the worker characteristics, the 
offer wage equation also includes variables relating to job characteristics and other working specific 
influences (part-time, experience, union), which cannot be included in the employment probit. Kidd et 
al. (2003) include only personal characteristics that are observed for the entire sample in the offer 
wage equation (education, experience, region, race), whereas the reservation wage also includes 
variables relating to the value o f time (children, marital status, non-wage income).
53 In practice, there may be other influences (including tastes), which are not controlled for in the 
model, and thus, as is standard in the literature, the unexplained component o f the decomposition is an 
upper bound estimate o f the effect o f discrimination on wages. Consistent with Baldwin and Johnson 
(2001), accommodations by employers for the disabled is not captured in the wage equation, which 
may cause a wage gap between disabled and non-disabled employees. The preference for work may 
be different between the disabled and non-disabled as a result o f the additional difficulty in getting to 
work and the additional benefit income available.
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which themselves are heterogeneous. This issue is examined empirically by 
including controls for the main type of health problem. Five types are constructed 
from the seventeen possible categories included in the LFS namely limbs; 
sight/hearing; skin, breathing and organs; mental health and other.54
3.2.3 Employment Decomposition
The difference in the average predicted probability between any two groups can be 
decomposed into that part due to differences in observed characteristics (explained 
component) and an unexplained or residual term (see Gomulka and Stem, 1990 and, 
subsequently, Even and McPherson, 1990, 1993 amongst others). The difference in
the average predicted probability of employment ( PN -  PDi) can be expressed as
follows:
P „ - P D] = ( l l n „ ) f d®(YiNyM) - ( \ l n Di) Y d<X>(Y.DiyDt) (3.9)
;=1 /=1
where the first term on the right hand side is the average prediction for the non­
disabled and yN are the estimated coefficients from the employment probit for the
non-disabled with sample nN. Similarly, the second term on the right hand side is the
average predicted employment probability for the work-limited disabled group with 
sample size nDi. The predicted employment probability for each individual O (Yyfj)
is denoted Pi}, and P. represents the average of the individual predicted probabilities 
in group j.
54 The groups that comprise the variable limbs are (1) problems or disabilities (including arthritis or 
rheumatism) connected with arms or hands (2) legs or feet (3) back or neck. The group relating to 
sight/hearing include (4) difficulty in seeing (while wearing spectacles or contact lenses) (5) difficulty in 
hearing and (6) speech impediment. Skin, breathing and organs includes (7) severe disfigurement, skin 
conditions, allergies (8) chest or breathing problems, asthma, bronchitis (9) heart, blood pressure or 
blood circulation problems, (10) stomach, liver kidney or digestive problems and (11) diabetes. Mental 
health problems include (12) depression, bad nerves or anxiety (14) severe or specific learning 
difficulties (mental handicap) and (15) mental illness, or suffer from phobia, panics or other nervous 
disorders. The other group includes (13) epilepsy (16) progressive illness not included elsewhere (for 
example, cancer, multiple sclerosis, symptomatic HIV, Parkinson’s disease, muscular dystrophy) and 
(17) other health problems or disabilities.
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A generalised description of the decomposition of the average predicted probability, 
into the explained component (due to differences in endowments) and the 
unexplained component (due to differences in coefficients), is given by Gomulka and 
Stem (1990). Where the explained gap, which measures differences in characteristics 
evaluated at the equal treatment coefficient structure, is given by:55
P D{ )  explained ( i/n N) | ; o ( r wr*)
i=\
( i/n D_ ) |;o ( y iDir*)
i= l
(3.10)
and the unexplained gap, which measures the difference in the coefficient structure 
from the equal treatment case, is:
( A ~ A , ) unexp (l/n „
(=1 
«z>,
1=1
+
(3.11)
(1 /n ) £  ® (y  y*) ■- ( I fa D] ) £  0 ( 7 ^  f  )
1=1 /=1
where the coefficient vector that would prevail, in the absence of different treatment 
amongst the groups, is denoted y *.
The unexplained gap, equation (3.11), would, typically, be attributed to 
discrimination; however, the unobserved effect of disability on productivity will 
contribute to this gap.56 The DeLeire (2001) decomposition, which considered this 
issue in the context of earnings, can be applied to the employment gap. Firstly, the 
same decomposition is computed for the non-work-limited disabled (that is, 
replacing D, with D2in equations (3.10) and (3.11)) and the non-disabled. If the 
non-work-limited disabled are assumed to be as productive as the non-disabled
55 Differences in endowments due to pre-labour market discrimination or the anticipation o f labour 
market discrimination are clearly included within the explained non-discriminatory part of the model 
and cannot be separated using this framework. However, as Baldwin and Johnson (2001) note, pre­
labour market discrimination will only be important for a section o f the disabled sample, those who 
were disabled from birth/as children.
56 It may also be‘the case that having a work-limiting disability not only affects productivity between 
the two groups but, since the costs o f participating will differ, preferences for work and receipt of 
benefit income. As such, these influences will be contained within the estimate o f the unobserved 
productivity component.
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(conditional on characteristics), estimation of equation (3.11) between these groups 
isolates the role of discrimination. If this measure of discrimination is assumed to be 
the same for the work-limited disabled, it can be imposed on the work-limited 
disabled equations and the role of unobserved differences in productivity can be 
identified as follows:
A A
(PN — PD ) unexplained = discrimination plus unobserved differences in productivity
A A
( P N  - p D t ) unexplained = discrimination
(PN Pot ) unexplained ~ (Pn ~ Pd2 ) unexplained = unobserved differences in productivity 57
Since the non-disabled group dominates the population, it is often used as the 
reference or base group ( f*  = yN) in a decomposition such as equations (3.10) and
(3.11) (see for example Kidd et al., 2000). However, as noted by Neumark (1988) 
and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), unequal treatment implies that the non-disabled 
group face a discriminatory advantage and, as such, their coefficient structure would 
not prevail under equal treatment between the groups. The discriminatory component 
of the employment gap, calculated using the non-disabled base, overestimates the 
effect of discrimination. A coefficient structure from the pooled model of all the 
groups in the population is more commonly used. This would impose the same 
coefficient structure between the work-limited disabled, the non-work-limited 
disabled and the non-disabled ( y* = f p3). However, in the DeLeire (2001) type 
approach, the elimination of discrimination does not imply the wage structures are 
identical in the case of disability, because differences in the wage structure between 
the groups may be due to the unobserved effect of disability on productivity. As 
such, the non-discriminatory employment structure is formed by pooling the non­
disabled and the non-work-limited disabled (y* = y P2)\ this is the structure that 
would exist if discrimination was zero but that allows unobserved productivity 
differences to exist.58
57 This is equivalent to ( -  p ^ ) untxpW.
58 It is also possible to examine the components of the unexplained gap in the decomposition. The first 
term in brackets in equation (3.11) can be interpreted as the advantage (difference in the predicted 
probability of employment) a non-disabled worker experiences when discrimination against the 
disabled exists. Or, alternatively, it is the fall in predicted employment probability that would occur if  
discrimination is eliminated. The second term in brackets is the increase in predicted employment 
probability for the disabled that would result from eliminating discrimination.
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To identify differences in the impact of disability on labour market outcomes by 
gender, each of the equations is estimated by disability group j ,  but also gender k 
(k=M,F). To analyse the effect of the legislation, the equations are also estimated 
separately for each year {t=1997, 2003) under consideration. This allows similar 
decompositions to be computed across genders and over time. The following 
decomposition is performed between genders within the yth disability group where 
* are the coefficients from a pooled model of both genders within the same
disability group. As before, the equations represent the difference in the predicted 
employment probability across genders, equation (3.12), the part of the gap that is 
explained by differences in observable characteristics, equation (3.13) and the 
unexplained component, equation (3.14).
n M j n Fj
Pmj ~ h i  = ( ^ n Mj) ^ ( Y IMJf MJ) - ( V n FJ) 2 ^ ( . Y iFjf Fj) (3.12)
1= 1 1= 1
(Pm-Pr,)Mj Fj /  explained
_ mJ
(l/n
1=1
nFJ
1=1
(3.13)
Mj Fj J  unexp
" M j
( l/n *  ) £  O X X t f * ) -  0  Ai* ) 2 > (  W /  *>
1=1 1=1
( l/n ,,) £ ®(Y,Fjf j  * ) - ( l/n „ ) £ <t>(YiFjf FJ)
+
1=1 1=1
(3.14)
Similarly, the three equations can be modified to analyse the same group of 
individuals (j,k) between the two different time periods (t) as follows:
72003j 71997 j
2003j  \ 997j  =  ( 1  /  " 2003J  )  £  ^ ( 1 ) '2 0 0 3 j Y 2003J  )  ’  0  '  « , » „ •  )  Z  )  ( 3 - 1 5 )
1=1 1 =  1
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where yJ * is now the pooled model across the two time periods for the same gender
and disability group. The explained gap represents the contribution changes in 
characteristics have had to predicted employment probability over time. The 
unexplained gap represents the difference in treatment that exists for a given worker 
after 6 years of legislation, relative to the post implementation year. This difference 
in treatment over time can arise for several reasons, including changes in 
preferences, but any change in behaviour as a result of legislation will work through 
this component.59
3.2.4 Earnings Decomposition
A prediction of the offer wage can be calculated for each individual using the 
estimates from equation (3.8) as follows: W° = X tj +6j Xij, where are the
coefficients on the productivity related characteristics and 0. is the coefficient on the 
selection term for theyth group. The mean predicted log offer wage for they'th group, 
with sample size rij is therefore:
(3.18)
7=1
59 In April 1995 the main disability benefit for individuals who are unable to work was changed from 
invalidity to incapacity benefit. The increased stringency o f testing that accompanied incapacity 
benefit may have an influence on employment and hence contribute to the unexplained component.
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where X  j  and X j  are the mean values for the explanatory variables and the 
selection term for the yth group. In a similar manner to the probit equation, the 
difference in the predicted wage between the groups can be decomposed, using the 
method based on Oaxaca (1973), Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988), into the part of 
the difference that is due to differences in characteristics and the part that is 
unexplained, which includes unobserved productivity differences and differences due 
to discrimination.
The selectivity corrected offer wage differential can be defined as:60
K  -  K  -  ^  -  6 *  K  ) = )PS, + (P S  - P S t ) + ( x N -  x Dl K P S  -  P %)
(3.19)
The first term on the right hand side represents the difference in the selectivity 
corrected wage due to differences in endowments, the second term represents the 
difference in coefficients between the groups and the final component is the effect of 
the interaction between coefficients and endowments.61 The interaction term can
60As Neuman and Oaxaca (2003) note, there are several alternative ways of treating the sample 
selection term in wage decompositions, depending on the assumptions made about the model. While 
equation (3.20) provides a decomposition o f the selectivity corrected wage equation, it does not 
provide a decomposition o f the observed wage differential. There are several alternative options. The 
selectivity term ( 9 N XN -  0 D XD ) can be included as a separate component o f the total wage gap, in
addition to the explained and unexplained components. Alternatively, assuming differences in the 
coefficients from the probit equation between groups are partly the result o f discrimination, there are a 
number of alternative decompositions. Assuming the non-disabled is the base structure, the difference 
in selection term can be decomposed into:
oNK - K J ^ r §N ^ - ^ +oN{TN- ^ y { e N- e Di) j;x
where X°D is the average selection term if  the disabled faced the same coefficients from the
employment probit as the non-disabled. The first term on the right hand side is the effect that 
differences in the parameters o f the probit due to disability have on the wage differential. The second 
term captures the effect disability status has on the characteristics that determine employment. The 
final term captures differences in the wage response to employment by disability status.
A range of alternative decompositions is possible depending on how these three terms are allocated 
(see Madden, 2004 for a discussion). It may be more appropriate to include the first term (disability 
differences in the parameters o f the probit) in the discriminatory component o f the wage differential 
and the remaining two components into the endowment effect. However, a wider definition of 
discrimination may include both the first term and the third term (disability differences in the impact 
of selectivity on wages) in the discriminatory component, leaving the second term to form part of the 
endowment.
61 Differences in earnings caused by differences in the distribution o f employment across occupations 
and industries will form part o f the explained component of the wage gap. This is only valid,
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contribute to the explained or unexplained component, depending on the structure 
that is assumed for the non-discriminatory group. A more general form of the 
decomposition is:
K - K  - ^ ) = (** — + (!-W %  ]+[x ~n(i - q)+x ^ q ] ^  - j % )
(3.20)
where I is the identity matrix and Q is a vector representing the relationship between 
the observed and the non-discriminatory wage structure. Oaxaca (1973) suggests that 
either the low or high group should form the non-discriminatory structure and, thus, 
Q is a null or an identity matrix. Reimers (1983) alternatively suggests the mean of 
the coefficients between the two models and Cotton (1988) suggests a weighted 
mean of the coefficients, based on the size of the group. The alternative, as in the 
employment decompositions, is to use a pooled structure (Neumark, 1988); this leads 
to the following decomposition where p °  is the column vector of coefficients from 
the pooled model.
K  - K -  ~  K  K  ) = ( * * -  ) P ?  + [ x *  ( P Z  - P ? ) + (*? -  P°o, )]
(3.21)
Using the same reasoning as before, the non-work-limited disabled and the non­
disabled are pooled to form the wage structure that would occur if discrimination was 
eliminated but that allows health to have an unobserved effect on productivity
theoretically, if  individuals are free to choose their occupation and industry; if  there is any 
discrimination in entry to certain occupations the amount o f discrimination identified will be under­
estimated in the model. For the work-limited disabled, occupational choice may be constrained by 
their disability, however as long as this is a result o f productivity differences and is not the result of 
discrimination or employer preferences it can be included within the explained gap. Alternatively, 
Brown et al. (1980), Miller (1987) and Reilly (1991) separate the effect o f occupational segregation 
from either endowments or wage discrimination. Since occupational segregation has not featured in 
the literature relating to disability and following other authors, no attempt is made to isolate this 
effect. Confirming the similarity in the occupational distribution between disability groups, the 
Duncan and Duncan (1955) index o f occupational segregation is 0.12 (for male work-limited disabled 
and non-disabled) and 0.03 (for male non-work-limited disabled and non-disabled). For women the 
corresponding figures are 0.09 and 0.03. The same measures o f segregation are even lower by 
industry. These figures are put into context when you consider the index value between genders is 
nearly 0.4. The issue of the choice of employment type is considered separately in Chapters 4 and 5.
57
(j3° = Bp2) .62 Following DeLeire (2001), the unexplained component of a 
decomposition of the work-limited group (Dy) and the non-disabled group (TV) 
represents the combined influence of discrimination and unobserved differences in 
productivity.63 The unexplained wage gap from a comparison of the non-work- 
limited group (£>2) and the non-disabled group (TV) represents discrimination, since 
the productivity difference is zero by assumption. Hence, in a similar manner to 
employment when discrimination is assumed to be equal across the two disabled 
groups, discrimination can be separated from the unobservable effect of disability on 
productivity.
3.2.5 Gender and Timewise Decompositions
As with the employment decompositions, the wage decompositions can also be 
computed across genders and across time. Gender wage decompositions can be 
computed for each of the j  disability groups as follows:
K - K  - W = ( ^  -X JN P & , + ( / - C * $ ] + [ ^ ( / - £ ? + V ? C &  -Mj)
(3.22)
The left hand side of the equation now refers to the selectivity corrected gender 
difference specific to the y'th group; thus averages are constructed using all 
individuals in the kth gender andy'th disability group. In the same manner as before, 
the selectivity difference in wages between males and females is decomposed into an 
explained part and an unexplained part. Again, coefficients from the pooled model 
are used as the non-discriminatory base, which, in this case, is formed using a pooled 
regression of men and women in the y'th group; thus, only discrimination between 
genders is eliminated.
62 Sensitivity analysis for the basic wage decompositions is reported in Appendix Table A3.5.
63 DeLeire (2001) actually performs the decomposition on the basis o f results from a tobit model 
where earnings o f the non-employed are treated as censored observations. The tobit model is actually 
a special case o f the Heckman model, where the selection and the outcome decisions are assumed to 
be identical. The main advantage of the tobit is that the employment equation is not modelled 
explicitly and identifying variables are not required. However, since the selection decision is itself o f 
interest and is determined by variables which affect the value o f time, the Heckman model, which is 
applied more widely in the literature, is used here. In doing so, the employment decision can also be 
decomposed.
58
In addition to comparing how the amount of discrimination against the disabled 
changes over time, by comparing the unexplained component from equation (3.21) 
between 1997 and 2003, it is possible to examine the factors that have caused a 
change in the real wages in each of the j  groups over time.64 The following timewise 
decomposition is computed:
^2 0 0 3 / ^1997/ (^2003/'^2003/ 997/ ^ 9 9 7 / )  — (^ 2 0 0 3 / ^ 1 9 9 7 / ) [ Q A 003/ +  ( 7  ^ ) P ] 9 9 1 j ]  +
[ ^ ( i - n ) + ^ p ] 0 ? o o 3 j  - P m i j )
(3.23)
The left hand side is now the selectivity corrected real wage gap between 2003 and 
1997 for workers in the y'th group and Ath gender. Again, a pooled model is 
constructed, such that there are no differences in the way the same group of 
individuals is treated over time (1997 and 2003 are pooled), but the coefficients are 
still allowed to vary by j  and k. The change in the real wage of an individual with the 
same characteristics can, thus, be attributed to changes in the rewards to work, for the 
y'th group, over time.
3.2.6 Employment Effects of Earnings Discrimination
The existence of wage discrimination against the disabled will, given the presence of 
an upward sloping labour supply schedule, also reduce the employment rate of the 
disabled group.65 Baldwin and Johnson (1992) develop a three stage procedure to 
quantify the effect of wage discrimination on employment. In the first stage, the 
probit model equation (3.6), is used to estimate the average employment probability
for each of the j  groups (77). In the second stage, equation (3.8) is used to estimate 
the average offer wage for each of the j  groups ( W f ). The average non-
discriminatory offer wage is also predicted for each of the j  groups using the non- 
discriminatory wage structure. Finally, the probability of employment that would 
exist in the absence of wage discrimination can be estimated.
64 Earnings are deflated using ONS Retail Price Index series CHAW.
65 Conversely the wage premium received by non-disabled workers due to discrimination will increase 
their relative employment.
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This procedure is more routinely employed for a standard decomposition, since it 
assumes that the non-discriminatory wage structure only eliminates discrimination. It 
is complicated by the use of the DeLeire (2001) decomposition of the unexplained 
component into discrimination and unobserved productivity differences. However, it 
is possible to use the assumptions of the DeLeire (2001) decomposition to identify 
the employment effect of eliminating discrimination and unobserved productivity 
differences separately for the work-limited disabled.
For the standard case, where the entire unexplained gap represents discrimination, 
equation (3.3) can be modified to show, in the absence of discrimination, the 
probability an individual would work is:
individual’s own characteristics and the non-discriminatory wage structure. Equation
(3.24) can alternatively, be written as:
(3.24)
where the non-discriminatory offer wages, are predicted using an
(3.25)
(3.26)
(3.27)
By substituting the estimated difference in offer wages between the discriminatory 
and non-discriminatory cases in equation (3.27), the probability of employment for
each individual in the absence of discrimination, P& *, can be calculated. Baldwin
and Johnson (1992) use the average offer wages to create the predicted employment 
probability for group j  in the absence of discrimination (Pj*)  as follows:
P . * =  <D ? J Y 'J +
a uj
(3.28)
The non-discriminatory wage, as before, is formed by pooling the non-disabled and 
the non-work-limiting disabled.67 Equation (3.28) is also modified, by replacing the 
value of the non-discriminatory wage, to separate the effect of discrimination from 
unobserved differences in productivity for the work-limited disabled. To capture the 
change in earnings of eliminating the unobserved productivity effect, the earnings for 
the work-limited disabled are predicted using the non-work-limited disabled wage 
structure.68 The difference between this prediction and the prediction from the non- 
discriminatory wage structure, which eliminates both discrimination and unobserved 
differences in productivity, provides the positive wage effect eliminating 
discrimination would have. This is added to the work-limited disabled own predicted 
wage to calculate the wage which is purely a result of removing the DeLeire (2001)
discrimination component. Thus, P^ * can be estimated separately in the absence of 
discrimination and unobserved productivity effects.
The method requires cruJ to be known or estimated. The coefficient estimates from
y .
the reduced form probit, equation (3.6), are but this does not isolate a  •. One
way of identifying <ruj is to exclude one variable (n) from the reservation wage 
equation (3.2) that is present in the offer wage equation (3.8). The offer wage 
equation would provide an estimate of p °n, whilst the employment probit gives an
66 This is the approach employed here, although the average of p  * over the individuals in the yth 
group can be used as an alternative method for calculating p  *. The main results are not- sensitive to 
this.
67 This differs from Baldwin and Johnson (1992) and Kidd et al., (2003), who both use Cotton style 
weights.
68 Since discrimination is assumed to be equal between the groups the change in earnings is due to 
unobserved productivity effects alone.
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On
estimate of n J and, thus, cr . can be identified.69 Kidd et al. (2003) outline an
alternative method for identifying <juj, that can be applied if more than one exclusion
restriction is imposed. They estimate the structural form equivalent of equation (3.4) 
as follows:
Pr ( £ „ = ! )  = P r [ £ ( <  ) -  B f Z ,  >/ / „]= <D
' E ( W ° ) - B f Z s
(3.29)
where E(]Y°) is the expectation of the offer wage. The prediction from equation
(3.29) is an alternative expression for P.j in equation (3.4). In the absence of wage 
discrimination, W°* replaces W° and equation (3.29) can be rewritten as:
Pr ( £ * = ! ) * =  P r -  B«ZU > ^  ] = «D
E(W?*) -  Bj Z~
(3.30)
where, as before, Pi} * is the predicted value or the probability of employment that
would prevail if discrimination was eliminated.70 Estimation of equations (3.29) and
(3.30) utilise a standard probit model, where the variables that are included in Z,y
need to be specified explicitly:
i = n
ie E ,;= l
(  IP/TJ/O
o
E(W~ ) - B j Z ij y fn 1 - 0
ieEjj=0 V
E { W ° ) - B j Z i
(3.31)
The predicted log offer wage (from equation (3.8)) is used, instead of the expected 
wage, in estimation and F(fVf*) replaces E(W°)  for the non-discriminatory case.
69 The choice of a single variable is arbitrary and Kidd et al. (2003) examine the variation in 
employment probabilities that results from changing the exclusion restriction. The impact on the 
employment probability is small.
70 This is equivalent to equation (3.27).
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The coefficient on the expected wage in equation (3.31) provides an estimate o f  ,
as long as at least one variable in the offer wage is excluded from the reservation 
wage. However, this procedure will uniquely identify a uj even if more than one
exclusion restriction is imposed. The above methods for identifying cruj require that
Yy contains all the variables in X y and Z iy, which restrict variables to be observable
for all workers (E ij= 1 and Eij= 0). Thus, X iy cannot include employment related
variables.71
Baldwin and Johnson (1992) do not impose this restriction and the offer wage 
equation contains employment related variables which cannot be included in the 
probit equation. They, instead, estimate a uj using a Heckman labour supply model,
where the number of hours worked (ht) is assumed to be proportional (1/v.) to the
difference between the offer and reservation wage.
Heckman (1976) shows that if Ey * were observed, a regression of Ey * on the 
predicted difference between the offer and reservation wages for the employed 
sample, with a sample selection bias correction, can provide an estimate of cruj .72
where the predicted difference between the offer and reservation wage from the 
probit model, equation (3.4), is used. However Eiy * is not observed, even if Eiy = 1.
71 The predicted log offer wage cannot be constructed i f  Xy contains employment related variables.
72 Equations 12b, 13b and 13b’.
(3.32)
An alternative representation is:
(3.33)
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Hours of work hi are, however, observed if Eg = 1 and are assumed to be
proportional to Eg *. Hence Baldwin and Johnson (1992) estimate crujl v . from a
regression of hours worked on the predicted difference between the offer and 
reservation wage from equation (3.6) and the sample selection term:
Baldwin and Johnson (1992) assume one variable (experience) affects the offer (and 
not the reservation) wage. Given exact identification, an estimate of v ., which is the
factor of proportionality relating the gap in offer and reservation wages to hours 
worked, can be calculated by dividing the coefficient on experience in the wage 
equation (3.8) by the coefficient on experience in a regression of hours worked on all 
variables that determine either the offer or reservation wage:
Since hi is only observed when (Eg= 1), variables can be included in Xg that are 
specific to the employed; this means that Xg is equivalent in equations (3.8) and
(3.35), so Vj can be identified. However, if equation (3.35) is over-identified, which
is a more realistic assumption given the presence of employment related variables 
'rnXg, multiple estimates of v . will be produced.73 An alternative procedure can
then be employed where the predicted offer wage can be substituted into equation
(3.35) to give:
(3.34)
(3.35)
E( h ^ E l  >0)= -L [E(W° |£ ,* > 0 ) - 2 ? ;z s ]+<Vt, (3.36)
73 Baldwin and Johnson (1992) actually include three experience related variables in the offer wage 
equation that are not present in the probit, but still assume exact identification.
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and the coefficient on the offer wage is — as long as at least one variable is
excluded from the reservation wage. While this seems the most appropriate 
approach, given the presence of employment related variables in the wage offer 
equation and the resultant exclusion of groups of variables in the probit, there is one 
issue. When employment related variables are included in Xyt the specification used
to calculate— , equation (3.36), will differ from equation (3.34) used to estimate
V7
a  .
—-  and, as such, estimates of v . may differ. The sensitivity of v . to the difference in 
v ■u
specification is examined by comparing the results from the original wage 
specification to a restricted specification which excludes the employment related 
variables. The estimate of v. can be used to isolate an estimate of &.  which can,J J
then, be used to calculate the employment probabilities that would exist for each 
group in the absence of wage discrimination, P. * ,74
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The labour market disadvantaged, associated with work-limiting disability, is evident 
in Table 3.1. Disabled male (female) relative employment rates (as a ratio of the non­
disabled) are 40 percent (46 percent) and, for hourly earnings, the corresponding 
figures are 83 percent (89 percent). Thus, when measured relative to their non­
disabled counterparts, disabled females only perform slightly better than males. In 
contrast, both employment rates and average hourly earnings are far more similar 
between the non-work-limited and the non-disabled (consistent with DeLeire, 2001 
and Madden, 2004). Indeed, the employment rate is, actually, significantly greater 
for the non-work-limited disabled than the non-disabled, indicating their fundamental 
difference from the work-limited disabled. It is also interesting to note that, despite 
the work-limited disabled being slightly more likely to be unemployed than the non­
disabled, this does not explain the gap in employment rates between the work-limited
74 A reduction in hours due to discrimination cannot be identified from this model. In addition, failure 
to hire because o f wage floors, for example the minimum wage, is not included in the estimates.
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disabled and non-disabled. It is differences in the economic activity rate of the work- 
limited disabled that are the predominate cause of their low employment rate.
The relativities in employment and earnings between the three groups are evident 
throughout the period since the DDA (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Importantly, given 
the anticipated positive impact of the DDA, there is little evidence indicating 
convergence or divergence between the disability groups in terms of earnings. There 
is evidence of an increase in the work-limited disabled employment rates across time, 
particularly between 1997 and 1998, which contribute to a narrowing of the 
employment disadvantage associated with disability. For example, the employment 
rate for work-limited disabled males increases from 35.6 percent to 42.9 percent 
between 1997 and 2004.
Prior to the econometric analysis, it is also informative to consider differences 
between the groups in terms of observable characteristics that may contribute to the 
gap in employment and earnings. As such, the variable means are presented in Tables
3.2 (a) and (b) for males and females respectively.75 Several differences among the 
disability groups are worthy of note. Given the significance of education for labour 
market outcomes, it is important to recognise the extent of the average gap in 
qualifications between the disabled groups. The work-limited disabled are less than 
half as likely as the non-disabled to hold a degree and are particularly concentrated 
among the other and no qualification groups.
In addition, and consistent with the existing literature, disabled persons are also 
typically older, by an average of 10 years for men (reflecting the fact that many 
disabilities exhibit age-related onset), and, possibly for this reason, have greater 
average experience, tenure and are also more likely to own their own home. They are 
also, however, more likely to be in public housing, which is consistent with their 
economic disadvantage. Moreover, the disabled are, on average, less likely to be in a 
household where another individual has a source of earned income, suggesting that 
they cannot rely on this as a means to ameliorate their own disadvantage in the 
labour market. Interestingly, on average, the disabled have a greater number of days
75 Given the gender differences in characteristics are well established, they are not considered here.
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off work due to illness, supporting the suggestion that there may be differences in the 
productivity between the groups. Note, also, that this effect is greater for the work- 
limited than the non-work-limited disabled, who again are more similar to the non­
disabled.
For those who are in employment, there are also differences between the work- 
limited disabled and the non-disabled. These differences are most marked in the 
proportions working in certain occupational groups, the public sector and small 
firms. There is evidence to suggest the disabled are more concentrated amongst the 
less skilled occupations, consistent with their lower level of average education. The 
non-disabled work more overtime hours than the disabled; this is inversely correlated 
with the proportions working part-time, as would be expected.
It is interesting to note that, in almost every case, the differences in characteristics 
are more marked between the work-limited disabled and the non-disabled relative to 
the non-work-limited disabled. Indeed, a consideration of the nature of disability 
between these groups again highlights how distinct they are. On average, non-work- 
limited disabled have slightly more than half as many different health problems as 
the work-limited disabled and they have a concentration of health problems affecting
K\skin, breathing and organs, rather than problems affecting limbs or mental health.
While there are relatively few significant changes in the variable means over time 
(1997-2003), there is evidence of a general upskilling of the workforce in terms of 
educational qualifications for both men and women.
3.3.2 Employment Probabilities
The Heckman selectivity corrected wage equations in 2003 are presented in Tables
3.3 and 3.4 for males and females, respectively. In this sub-section, estimates from 
the selection equation, which estimates the probability of employment using a probit 
model, are considered.77 In all cases, Likelihood Ratio tests unambiguously reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients in each regression are jointly insignificant. While
76 See Section 3.3.8 for further discussion.
77 The results for 1997 are qualitatively similar and are, therefore, presented in the Appendix to the 
Chapter, Tables A3.3 and A3.4 respectively.
67
qualitatively similar, tests of parameter equality among the different comparator
78sub-groups unambiguously reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity m each case.
Most findings are in accordance with the literature and are qualitatively similar 
amongst the three disability groups. For example, the results show that both men and 
women with educational qualifications are significantly more likely to be in 
employment than those without any qualifications. However, the marginal effect of 
having qualifications is considerably stronger for the work-limited disabled,
• 79indicating the particular importance of obtaining an education among this group. 
There are, in addition, strong age effects, with positive and negative signs on the 
linear and quadratic terms, respectively, observed in all cases, and conforming to the 
usual pattern, although the probability of employment is maximised at a lower age 
for the work-limited disabled. Married men, whether disabled or not, are more likely 
to be employed than single men, while the reverse applies to women, reflecting 
conventional household roles. In a similar vein, the presence of children, generally, 
has a negative effect on employment for females. The presence of an earned source 
of income by another household member has a positive effect on employment, which 
is consistent with polarisation of households as being either dual income or no 
income types (Dickens et al. 2000) and, for men, it is considerably stronger for the 
disabled. Possession of a mortgage also has a positive effect, while habitation of 
social housing works in the opposite direction. Being white increases the probability 
of employment, consistent with previous evidence relating to ethnic minorities (see, 
for example, Blackaby et al., 2002) and the regional controls indicate lower 
employment rates in regions typically associated with slacker labour markets, such as 
Wales, Scotland and the North West. The significance of age and another earner in 
the household, and, for females, the number of dependent children, provide 
identification for the model.
78 For example, testing the pooling restriction across disability groups results in a x2 test statistic o f  
4246.58 for males and 3425.16 for females; with 54 degrees of freedom, both are clearly significant.
79 In terms o f the highest qualification, the marginal effect is 0.35 for work-limited disabled males and 
0.09 for non-disabled males. A full set o f marginal effects for the probit equations in Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 are provided in the Appendix Table A3.2.
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3.3.3 Earnings Equations
Selectivity corrected earnings equations are also presented for males and females in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Earnings are also determined in a qualitatively 
similar fashion for all disability groups, although F tests of parameter equality are 
rejected. The selection term lambda is not significant for males but is positive for 
disabled females, indicating that unobservables that are positively correlated with 
employment also have a positive influence on earnings, whilst for non-disabled 
females the term is negative.
In terms of specific coefficient estimates, these once again conform to priors. Thus, 
wages are higher for those with qualifications relative to those without qualifications 
in each of the sub-group regressions, with the coefficients, generally, increasing in 
magnitude in progression up the qualifications’ hierarchy. Interestingly, for men, the 
return to education is similar across the disability groups, whereas for females the 
return is higher for the disabled. Other human capital variables, such as experience 
and tenure with the current employer, are always positive and significant, and, in all 
cases, there is evidence of decreasing returns. For males, the lower return from 
experience for the disabled may reflect their intermittent work histories, which are 
not captured by the potential measure of experience available from the LFS. Turning 
to other variables, wages are higher for married men than for single men, but this 
influence is not significant for the work-limited disabled. For females, being married 
has no influence on earnings. The housing status variables are largely in accordance 
with expectations: being in social housing is negatively related to earnings, while the 
reverse is true for those in possession of a mortgage, though not always significantly 
so.
As might be expected given the omitted category (London and the South East), all 
regional dummies have negative coefficients. Being employed in a small firm (fewer 
than 20 employees) is associated with lower earnings for all of the sub-groups. The 
occupational group dummies, which are included to capture employment 
heterogeneity, are, generally, significantly negative, as would be anticipated given 
the omitted category of managers and senior officials; the only notable exception is
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80females in professional occupations, whose earnings are higher than the base group. 
Similarly, the industry dummies also have a fairly consistent effect across disability 
groups and gender, with higher earnings in banking and finance, energy and water, 
construction, manufacturing and transport and communications. Interestingly, being 
employed in the public sector confers a significant wage advantage for women and 
also seems to offer a greater return for the work-limited disabled relative to the other 
groups.
3.3.4 Employment Decompositions
The results from the decompositions of the employment equations on the basis of 
disability status are presented in Table 3.5. The difference in predicted employment 
probability between the work-limited disabled and the non-disabled is substantial at 
about 0.50 for men and 0.40 for women, although the difference does fall for both 
groups between 1997 and 2003. In all cases, the majority of this difference (over 75 
percent) cannot be explained in terms of differences in characteristics, and this is 
slightly higher for females.81 These results are slightly greater than Kidd et al. (2000) 
and Madden (2004) who find 50 percent and 65 percent of the participation gap is 
unexplained, respectively. If the unobserved productivity difference between the 
work-limited disabled and the non-disabled were assumed to be zero, the upper 
bound on the discrimination would account for 0.37 (79 percent) and 0.33 (86 
percent) of the gap in employment probabilities in 2003, for males and females, 
respectively. However, when the non-work-limited disabled are considered, the 
employment gap is effectively zero, actually being negative, indicating the non- 
work-limited disabled have a slightly higher employment probability than the non­
disabled (consistent with DeLeire, 2001 and Madden, 2004). The decomposition of 
this gap isolates a small unexplained component in absolute terms, although 
representing the majority of the employment gap in most cases.
In Table 3.6, the DeLeire (2001) decompositions are applied, where the 
discriminatory component is identified from the decompositions of the non-work-
80 Differences in the influence of occupation on earnings between the disability groups may reflect 
differences in the ability to accommodate disability between occupations, since accommodations may 
have a positive influence on productivity.
81 For simplicity, the pooled base a ^ h a s  been used throughout. Alternative definitions o f the equal 
treatment case were examined, but the results do not change significantly.
70
limited disabled and the gap due to unobserved productivity differences can, 
therefore, be isolated from the work-limited disabled decomposition. The 
discriminatory component is negative, indicating the non-work-limited disabled 
actually receive favourable treatment in the labour market; thus the entire 
unexplained gap from the work-limited decomposition is attributed to unobservable 
productivity differences between the two groups. Moreover, this accounts for more 
than 80 percent of the overall gap in all cases. Over time, the raw gap has narrowed, 
as have the contributions of characteristics and discrimination; but, while falling in 
absolute terms, the productivity difference still explains the vast majority of the 
employment gap in 2003.
The traditional decomposition would suggest 79 percent of the employment gap is 
due to unequal treatment, or that the employment probability for a disabled 
individual would increase by 37 percentage points for males in 2003, if 
discrimination were eliminated. The DeLeire (2001) procedure, which takes into 
account that the work-limited disabled may be less productive than the non-disabled, 
suggests that discrimination is not significant and that efforts should be concentrated 
on raising the productivity of the disabled, through, for example, workplace 
accommodations.
Table 3.7 considers gender decompositions for each of the disabled groups in 1997 
and 2003. The gender gap in employment probabilities is narrower for the work- 
limited disabled (actually being negative), but around 10 percentage points for the 
non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled. For the work-limited disabled, the 
small gender gap is explained by differences in the characteristics between males and 
females, whereas, for the other groups, the gap is largely (approximately 90 percent) 
unexplained. Employment discrimination against females, as measured by the 
unexplained component of the decomposition, seems to be more prevalent amongst 
the non-disabled and non-work-limited disabled groups than the work-limited 
disabled.
The results from the timewise decompositions are presented in Table 3.8 and are 
again split by gender and disability status. Consistent with Figure 3.3, the largest 
changes in employment probability are experienced by the work-limited disabled,
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where employment increased by about 4 percentage points between 1997 and 2003. 
The change over time for the other groups ranges from 0.6 to -1.4 percentage points, 
indicating this improvement was not common across groups, as would be expected if 
the growth was part of a cyclical effect. For the work-limited disabled, the increase 
in employment probability is largely unexplained or due to changes in parameters 
between the two periods; this is particularly the case for men, where 82 percent is 
unexplained. This is consistent with the positive effects of policy change over the 
period and indicates there have been improvements in the treatment of the disabled in 
the labour market over time. In contrast, the majority of the change for the non­
disabled was explained by changes in the characteristics of the group. This evidence 
is in contrast to Bell and Heitmueller (2005), who find no evidence of a positive 
employment effect of the DDA, albeit with a different methodology and dataset to 
this analysis.
3.3.5 Earnings Decompositions
Table 3.9 presents the wage decompositions by disability status for each gender and 
time period. As with the employment probabilities, the work-limited disabled earn 
considerably less (between 16 and 29 log points) than the non-disabled, regardless of 
gender or period. This is in contrast to the non-work-limited disabled, where the gap 
is very small (less than 5 log points).83 For both men and women, the percentage 
explained, typically, constitutes less than half the differential between the non­
disabled and the work-limited disabled (similar to the 50 percent identified by Kidd 
et al. 2000). Thus, if there were no unobserved productivity difference between 
groups, the unexplained or discriminatory component would account for over 50 
percent of the wage gap. In 1997, the wage gap is larger for males than females 
(consistent with Madden, 2004) but, by 2003, the situation has been largely reversed, 
with the differential now being larger for women, and the unexplained component for 
this group having increased to approximately three quarters of the differential, in 
comparison to around half for men. Thus the relative earnings position of work- 
limited disabled women, compared to the non-disabled, has worsened over the
82 The results are only presented for the baseline pooled specification ( B ° ), consistent with the 
DeLeire (2001) decomposition. Decompositions were also computed using alternative base structures 
and the results are reported in Table A3.5.
83 In the case of males, the offer wage for the disabled actually exceeds that o f the non-disabled in 
2003, albeit the gap is tiny (0.003), and is wholly explained by characteristics.
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period. Considering the non-work-limited disabled, differentials are very small in 
both years and the small unexplained component, by assumption, captures 
discrimination. On this basis, there is little to suggest substantial discrimination 
against the disabled, at least where disability is not work-limiting in nature, and its 
absolute magnitude has fallen over time for both men and women.
Table 3.10 follows the decompositions suggested by DeLeire (2001) and identifies 
the contributions of observed and unobserved productivity differences and 
discrimination. Since the non-work-limited disabled are assumed to have no 
unobserved productivity difference, the entire unexplained component of the wage 
differential between the non-work-limited and the non-disabled reflects 
discrimination. In contrast, for the work-limited disabled, the unexplained 
component captures both discrimination and unobserved productivity differences, 
but, by using the two decompositions, it is possible to isolate these two effects. 
Discrimination accounts for about 10 percent of the disability earnings gap in 2003, 
which is considerably less than the 50 percent calculated when unobserved 
productivity differences are assumed to be zero. DeLeire (2001), when using US 
data, similarly attributes only 8 percent of the earnings differential to discrimination, 
although unobserved productivity differences account for over 75 percent. In the UK, 
the unobserved productivity effects are slightly lower, accounting for 44 percent (66 
percent) of the male (female) gap.
Over time, the discriminatory component of the wage gap has fallen for both groups, 
consistent with an improvement in the treatment of the work-limited disabled. For 
males, the earnings differential has fallen overall and is the consequence of decreases 
in the absolute sizes of the unobserved and discriminatory components; these might, 
therefore, be taken as evidence of the beneficial impact of the legislation for men, the 
reduction in the unobserved health effect being consistent with disability having less 
impact on work. For females, in contrast, the raw differential has increased over 
time, primarily due to a large rise in the contribution of unobserved effects. While 
the legislation may have had a positive effect by reducing discrimination, the 
evidence does not support the view that the legislation has significantly improved the 
relative earnings of the female work-limited disabled. As such, it would appear that 
the legislation may have impacted in an unforeseen, gender-specific manner.
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The gender decompositions in Table 3.11 compare the earnings of men and women 
within each of the disability categories (work-limited disabled, non-work-limited 
disabled and non-disabled) to assess if gender discrimination varies by disability 
status. The gender differential is larger for each of the two disabled groups in 2003 
compared to 1997, which confirms the worsening position of disabled women, and,
8 4in particular, those whose disability is work-limiting, relative to disabled men. 
Indeed, in 2003, the percentage unexplained is greatest for those whose disability is 
work-limiting at 58.4 percent of the wage gap, compared to 26.1 percent for the non­
disabled, consistent with gender wage discrimination being greater for disabled 
females. This contrasts with the results for the employment decompositions and with 
Baldwin and Johnson (1995), who find gender discrimination in the US is no worse 
for the disabled relative to the non-disabled.
In order to examine the factors contributing to changes over time, time-wise 
decompositions are presented in Table 3.12, using deflated wages for 2003 for each 
of the 6 sub-groups. As can be seen, very different patterns emerge for men and 
women, as might be expected given the preceding discussion. For men, the biggest 
gain over time occurred for the work-limited disabled and the lowest for the non­
disabled. In contrast, for women, the improvement is greater for the non-work- 
limited disabled and the non-disabled, both of whom have a very similar gain in real 
terms. For work-limited women, the gain is, however, very modest (0.047), 
confirming the previous discussion. For work-limited disabled men, the majority of 
the improvement is unexplained by variables in the model, which leaves room for the 
potentially positive role of legislation. However, the majority of the improvement, 
albeit smaller in absolute terms, is also unexplained for non-disabled and non-work- 
limited disabled men. In the case of women, while only about a quarter of the 
improvement can be explained for the non-work-limited disabled and non-disabled, 
for the work-limited disabled the improvement is fully explained by variables in the 
model. This implies that the legislation is unlikely to have played any part in the 
wage gains of work-limited disabled women.
84 The differential due to the selection term changes dramatically over the period for work-limited 
women.
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3.3.6 Employment Effects of Earnings Discrimination
The results of the Baldwin and Johnson (1992) procedure, used to estimate the 
employment effect of wage discrimination, or, more accurately in this context, the 
unexplained component of a wage decomposition, are set out, using data for 2003, in 
Table 3.13. The first specification follows Baldwin and Johnson and uses experience 
to identify a UJ.. The second specification assumes an over-identified model and the
final specification tests the sensitivity of this method, by using a restricted model 
where employment related variables are excluded from the earnings equation. The 
typical non-discriminatory wage structure eliminates both the discrimination and 
unobserved productivity differences identified using the DeLeire (2001) method. 
This means that, for the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled, the 
estimated employment effects are a result of discrimination alone, whereas, for the 
work-limited disabled the employment effect is a combination of discrimination and 
unobserved productivity effects. However, for the work-limited disabled the 
employment effect is decomposed into the effect of discrimination separately from 
the effect of the unobserved productivity differences.
The earnings of the non-disabled and the non-work-limited disabled are relatively 
unaffected by the elimination of discrimination; this is expected given the 
construction of the non-discriminatory wage. As such, the employment response to 
removing discrimination is minimal for these groups. However, consistent with the 
evidence of discrimination from the earnings decompositions, the earnings and 
employment probabilities rise for the non-work-limited and fall for the non-disabled. 
As would be anticipated, applying the non-discriminatory wage structure to the 
work-limited disabled has a positive effect on earnings. The rise in earnings causes 
an increase in the average employment probability of a maximum of 5 percentage 
points for men and a maximum of 7 percentage points for women. However, 
consistent with the earnings decompositions, the dominant cause of the increase in 
employment is the elimination of the influence of unobserved differences in 
productivity. Indeed, the elimination of discrimination alone increases the probability 
of employment by less than 1 percentage point.
75
The results are not sensitive to the exact form of the method used, although the 
employment response using the restricted specification is more modest. However, in 
all cases the employment effect is considerably greater than the estimates of Kidd et 
al., (2 0 0 0 ) and, although the non-discriminatory wage structure differs between the 
studies, this evidence suggests that the labour supply of the work-limited disabled 
may be more elastic than previously estimated. However, given the modest 
employment effects, particularly when discrimination, rather than the unexplained 
wage gap, is removed, there is a more important role for the direct effect of 
unobserved productivity differences on employment.
3.3.7. Within Group Heterogeneity
In Table 3.14, the preceding model of employment and earnings is estimated for the 
disabled, with additional controls for the type of main health problem and the 
number of health problems reported. The employment probits indicate that those 
with each of the broad types of disability are significantly more likely to be in 
employment than the omitted category of mental health, regardless of whether the 
disability is work-limiting. For the work-limited disabled men, those with health 
problems related to limbs, sight/hearing or skin, breathing and organs are 25 percent 
more likely to be employed than those with health problems related to mental
85 •health. The earnings equations also show that, for work-limited disabled men, those 
with all types of disability earn significantly more than those with mental health 
problems, but, for women, only the skin, breathing and organs variable is significant. 
Therefore, the evidence confirms previous studies that have identified those with 
mental health problems as particularly disadvantaged (Blackaby et al., 1999, Kidd et 
al., 2000 and Meager et al., 1998). Mental health is more problematical both for 
gaining entry into the labour market and in obtaining earnings comparable to those of 
other workers. In contrast, for the non-work-limited disabled, the type of health 
problem has no significant effect on earnings.
The reasons for the disadvantage faced by those with mental health problems are 
difficult to determine, but two factors seem likely to be important. The first is that 
employers may, for various reasons, be more reluctant to hire those with mental
85 A full set o f marginal effects are reported in Appendix Table A3.8.
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health problems than with other forms of disability, and, consequently, when this 
group does find work, it does so at a lower wage. However, discrimination may, in 
many cases, reflect not prejudice, but rather misconceptions of the nature and 
consequences of mental health problems. The second is that employers may have a 
tendency to interpret disability in terms of “physically obvious, or particularly 
severe, impairments” (Aston et al. 2003, p.5), and hence to focus on the physical 
adaptations to premises required under the DDA, rather than adjustments to working 
arrangements. This implies that employers may, therefore, inadvertently, not be as 
accommodating to the needs of those with mental health problems.
As anticipated, the number of health problems has a negative effect on both 
employment and earnings for the work-limited disabled, consistent with it being a 
proxy for severity. For this group, each additional health problem reduces the 
probability of employment by about 6  percent and earnings by 2 percent. This is 
consistent with Berthoud (2003), who argues that controlling for the severity of a 
disability is fundamental to understanding labour market outcomes. The effect on the 
non-work-limited disabled is far less significant, although it is still negative for males 
on earnings and on both employment and earnings for females at the 1 0  percent 
level.
The significance of the within group characteristics has important implications for 
policymakers and future research. It suggests that policies which aim to improve the 
labour market outcomes of the disabled may be more effective if they can be 
differentiated to take into account the different needs of individuals within the 
disabled group. Future research needs to consider a more comprehensive set of 
controls including type, severity, cause, age of onset and duration to reduce the 
problem of omitted variable bias. Moreover, identifying the influence of each of 
these measures may also provide useful information about the channels of 
disadvantage faced by the entire disabled group.
3.3.8 Validity of the Assumptions
The DeLeire (2001) decomposition relies on two main assumptions. Firstly, there is 
no unobservable productivity difference between the non-work-limited disabled and
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the non-disabled. Secondly, discrimination against the disabled will be equal against 
the work-limited and non-work-limited disabled.
It is not possible to test the assumptions directly, since productivity and 
discrimination are not observable. However, the results in Table 3.14 show that the 
inclusion of a measure of severity of the disability to proxy productivity is strongly 
significant and negative for the work-limited disabled, but has a far smaller effect on 
the non-work-limiting disabled. This certainly supports a greater productivity effect 
for the work-limited disabled than the non-work-limited disabled. Moreover, the 
descriptive statistics also identify that the work-limited disabled have a higher 
incidence of multiple health problems, with 36 percent of the work-limited disabled 
having only one type of health problem compared to 71 percent of the non-work- 
limited disabled. This confirms that it is the most severely disabled, or those with 
lowest productivity, that are concentrated amongst the work-limited group.
The second assumption is likely to be more contentious. If the non-work-limited 
disabled have less obvious health problems and/or the distribution of type of health 
problems is biased towards those that are likely to face less prejudice, then the 
second assumption will not hold. Similarly, if discrimination is related to the severity 
of the disability, then the discriminatory component will not be equal across the two 
disabled groups.86 In the most extreme case, employers may not be aware that their 
employee is disabled with certain types of non-work-limiting disabilities and, as 
such, there will be no discrimination effect.
In an attempt to consider these issues, Table 3.15 (a) and (b) report the composition 
of the disabled by the type of main health problem. The distribution of the main 
health problem differs considerably between the work-limited and non-work-limited 
disabled as might be expected. For both genders and time periods, the work-limited 
disabled are more likely to suffer from a health problem that affects limbs (arms, 
hands, legs, feet, back or neck) or a mental health problem (depression, phobia, 
learning difficulties). Health problems with hearing and skin, chest and breathing,
86 Discrimination against the work-limited disabled will be underestimated in this case.
87 However, individuals are currently requested to supply information about disability status on 
application forms as part o f disability monitoring.
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heart, blood, digestion or diabetes are more likely to be reported by the non-work- 
limited disabled. If health problems are subject to different amounts of prejudice, the 
discriminatory component cannot be assumed to be constant between the two groups. 
Since, by assumption, the non-work-limited disabled have no unobserved 
productivity difference, decompositions between the type of disability within this 
group provide a test for variations in discrimination alone. The unexplained gap in 
the employment disability type decompositions are small, with the exception of 
individuals with mental health problems, who have a lower employment rate relative 
to all other types of health problem that is not explained by differences in observable
88 89characteristics, consistent with variations m discrimination. ’
Even within types of impairment, if discrimination is positively related to the work- 
limiting nature of the disability, the second assumption will not hold. The influence 
of the work-limiting nature on discrimination cannot be isolated in this framework, 
since it will also influence the unobserved productivity effect.90 If, as this suggests, 
discrimination is larger for the work-limited disabled, the DeLeire (2001) estimates 
will overestimate the influence of unobserved productivity differences by the 
difference in discrimination between the two groups. In this situation, the measure of 
discrimination identified must be interpreted as a lower bound91, but can still be used 
to contrast with the estimates from the traditional decomposition, which represent an 
upper bound on discrimination.
In an attempt to shed further light on this issue, the recent module on disability in the 
2005 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) is used to consider perceptions of 
prejudice against the disabled.92 Table 3.16 contains responses from the working age 
population to the following question: Generally speaking, do you think there is a lot 
o f prejudice in Britain against disabled people in general, a little, hardly any or
88 For example, the unexplained component between problems with limbs and mental health is 0.18 or 
73 percent o f the overall gap.
89 Individuals with mental health problems are concentrated in the work-limited group (14 percent) 
relative to the non-work-limited disabled (3 percent).
90 For example, the unexplained gap from a decomposition within the work-limited disabled on the 
grounds o f severity would capture any difference in discrimination, but also any difference in 
productivity.
91 More specifically, it is the discriminatory component that would exist if  the work-limited disabled 
face the same discrimination as the non-work-limited.
92 Data are available from the Data Archive.
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none?. Importantly, the responses are split between definitions of disability that map 
as closely as possible with DeLeire (2001). Under the assumption that perceptions 
are, at least in part, formed on the basis of own experience, this information can be 
used to test the second assumption. As may be anticipated, the disabled report a 
higher perception of prejudice; however, what is more interesting for the current 
analysis is that perceptions also differ depending on whether a disability limits 
activities.93 Those who are activity-limited disabled report a greater amount of 
prejudice among the population. This analysis supports the interpretation of the 
estimates of discrimination as a lower bound.
3.4 Conclusion
Despite the DDA being in place for over 6  years, significant differences in the raw 
employment rates and average hourly earnings remain between the work-limited 
disabled and the non-disabled. Indeed, in 2003, the work-limited disabled earn 8 6  
percent of the non-disabled and their probability of employment is only 43 percent of 
the non-disabled. Moreover, despite significant differences in characteristics, 
particularly education, the characteristic effect of a decomposition accounts for less 
than 25 percent of the employment gap and 50 percent of the wage gap. This leaves a 
significant unexplained gap and, therefore, a potentially important role for labour 
market discrimination against the disabled.
Quantifying the effect of discrimination against the disabled depends, crucially, on 
the assumptions made regarding the effect of disability on productivity. In terms of 
employment, if the unobserved productivity difference between the work-limited 
disabled and the non-disabled groups is assumed to be zero, eliminating 
discrimination would increase employment for the work-limited disabled by 37 and 
33 percentage points for males and females respectively. However, when the 
unobserved effect is controlled for, there is no evidence of employment
93 The non-disabled answer no to the following: Do you have a long-standing physical or mental 
health condition or disability? By long-standing, I  mean anything that has lasted at least 12 months or 
that is likely to last at least 12 months? Whilst the non-activity-limited disabled answer yes to the 
above but no to the following: Does this condition or disability have a substantial adverse effect on 
your ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities? Being activity-limited is consistent with a 
positive response to both.
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discrimination against the disabled. This has major implications for the design of 
effective policies to increase the employment rate of the disabled. If unobserved 
productivity differences are important, policies aimed at eliminating discrimination 
will not be effective. Instead, policymakers should consider if, and how, the 
influence of unobservables between the groups can be reduced.
In terms of earnings, the conclusions are similar. Accounting for unobserved 
differences in productivity reduces the estimate of discrimination from 52 percent to 
8  percent for men and 76 percent to 10 percent for women. Thus, even if 
discrimination was eliminated, the majority of the wage gap will remain, unless 
unobserved productivity differences are simultaneously reduced. Hence, this analysis 
illustrates the potential problems created by ignoring the effect of unobservables in a 
decomposition analysis.
Whenever possible, the analysis considers the validity of the two key assumptions on 
which the decomposition analysis is based. While there is some support for the first 
assumption in the data, the second assumption is more difficult to test. However, 
acknowledging this issue, the estimate of discrimination is interpreted as a lower 
bound. It is also important to acknowledge that the decomposition has been 
performed at the mean and, thus, it is the average effect of disability that is 
identified. The analysis could be naturally extended to identify how the earnings gap 
differs across the earnings distribution, using quantile regression methods. In a 
similar manner to the distinction made between ‘glass ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’ in 
the context of gender, this type of analysis may shed light on the determinants of the 
discriminatory and unobserved productivity components.
Over time, the gap in employment between the disabled groups has narrowed for 
both sexes, consistent with a positive effect of the legislation on employment. The 
reduction in the productivity component of the employment gap is consistent with a 
positive influence of the workplace accommodation component of the DDA. 
Moreover, timewise decompositions confirm that the improvement in the disabled 
employment rate is not explained by changes in the (observable) composition of the 
group. This evidence, therefore, adds to that of Bell and Heitmueller (2005) in 
assessing the employment impact of the DDA, although the present evidence is more
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sanguine concerning the impact of the legislation. In terms of earnings, there is some 
evidence of an improvement, at least for men. The selectivity corrected earnings gap 
has fallen for men and there is evidence of a fall in the estimate of wage 
discrimination for both males and females. Moreover, the improvement in earnings 
for males is not explained by changes in the characteristics of the disabled, indicating 
legislation may have helped in this regard. For women, in contrast, not only has the 
wage gap between the disabled and non-disabled grown, but, also, any improvement 
in their position in the post-DDA period is the consequence of changes in 
characteristics, leaving little scope for the role of legislation. It should, however, be 
acknowledged that this evaluation of the influence of the DDA is restricted by the 
absence of comparable data pre and post the introduction of the legislation. The 
comparison made here between 1997 and 2003 will identify an incremental influence 
of the DDA; however, any immediate impact of the DDA (prior to and during 1997) 
will not be captured in these estimates.
Significant heterogeneity within the disabled group is also identified, with the type 
and number of health problems having an important influence on employment and 
earnings. The evidence suggests that those suffering from mental health forms of 
disability fare particularly badly, and indicates that future efforts may need to be 
directed towards assisting this particular group. Although the data do not permit 
investigation of the reasons for the particularly extreme degree of disadvantage faced 
by this group, part of the answer may reside in improving employers’ access to 
information concerning the various types of mental illness and their implications for 
work. It may also be helpful to emphasise the reasonable adjustments that can be 
made for workers with this type of disability; the popular conception of such 
adjustments is perhaps more with the physical environment.
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Figure 3.1. Disability Rates in Great Britain 1997-2004
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Figure 3.2. Average Hourly Pay in Great Britain 1997-2004
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Figure 3.3. Employment Rates in Great Britain 1997-2004
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics, 2003
Male Female
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non-
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
% in working age 
population
16.98 12.08 70.94 15.68 11.35 72.97
Employment (%) 31.39*** 80.78*** 78.57 31.47*** 71.21*** 68.72
Unemployment
(%)
5.69*** 3.78*** 4.98 3.31 3.07 3.38
Average hourly 
earnings
9 7 0 *** 11.48 11.63 7 9 3 *** 8.57*** 8.91
Notes: Sample is restricted to individuals o f working age in Great 
employed, unpaid family workers and those on government training 
differences from the relevant non-disabled comparator group at the 
level respectively.
Britain and excludes the self­
schemes. *****  and * denote 
1%, 5% and 10% significance
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Table 3.2. Variable Means
(a) Male variable means
Variable
Work-limited
disabled
Non-work-limited
disabled Non-disabled
1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003
Log hourly pay 1.822 2.109 2.013 2.280 2 .0 0  F 2.275
Summer 0.247 0.246 0.243 0.260 0.25T 0.246
Autumn 0.256 0.250 0.263 0.240 0.248 0.250
Winter 0.256 0.247 0.273 0.250 0.246 0.246
North 0.080 0.079 0.065 0.058 0.055 0.056
Y orkshire&Humberside 0.106 0 .1 0 0 0.087 0.103 0.089 0.098
East Midlands 0.070 0.075 0.081 0.077 0.071 0.074
East Anglia 0.032 0.033 0.045 0.039 0.040 0.034
South West 0.070 0.080 0.081 0.091 0.082 0.086
West Midlands 0.090 0.093 0 .1 0 1 0.090 0.098 0.097
North West 0.133 0 .1 2 2 0.096 0.105 0.104 0.095
Wales 0.074 0.069 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047
Scotland 0.115 0 .1 0 2 0.092 0.091 0.099 0.096
Professional 0.083 0 .1 1 0 0.119 0.131 0.116 0.144
Associate professional 0.086 0.118 0.089 0.133 0.093 0.142
Administrative 0.090 0.064 0.074 0.054 0.076 0.052
Skilled trades 0.181 0.168 0.179 0.154 0.171 0.154
Personal service 0.085 0.034 0.072 0.026 0.072 0 .0 2 2
Sales & customer services 0.045 0.040 0.054 0.038 0.055 0.046
Process, plant & machine 0.187 0.154 0.159 0.144 0.147 0 .1 2 2
Elementary 0.107 0.173 0.065 0.123 0.075 0 .1 2 0
Agriculture & fishing 0.016 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 1 0.013 0 .0 1 0
Energy & Water 0.016 0 .0 2 0 0.015 0.024 0 .0 2 0 0.019
Manufacturing 0.295 0.229 0.299 0.252 0.288 0.234
Construction 0.075 0.072 0.082 0.080 0.080 0.087
Distribution 0.178 0.176 0.147 0.151 0.166 0.174
Transport& communication 0.085 0.109 0.088 0 .1 0 2 0.093 0.099
Banking & finance 0 .1 1 0 0.129 0.126 0.140 0.139 0.153
Public administration 0.180 0.196 0.184 0.192 0.159 0.182
Days illness 0.579 0 .2 0 0 0.180 0.081 0 .1 2 2 0.057
Married 0.619 0.561 0.642 0.643 0.563 0.519
Experience 30.932 30.794 25.351 27.360 19.523 19.307
Age 46.840 47.088 42.213 44.589 36.802 37.030
Degree 0.056 0.077 0.136 0.175 0.162 0.204
Other higher education 0.048 0.057 0.081 0.095 0.084 0.084
A level 0.277 0.263 0.314 0.324 0.297 0.288
O level 0.109 0.132 0.174 0.161 0.196 0.195
Other 0.169 0.161 0.157 0.131 0.140 0.124
Small firm 0.261 0.264 0.218 0.235 0.231 0.236
Part-time 0.123 0.128 0.068 0.073 0.068 0.079
White 0.945 0.929 0.960 0.952 0.939 0.917
Tenure 9.143 8.915 9.958 10.249 8.336 8.087
Public sector 0.218 0.205 0.223 0.216 0.198 0.199
Employment 0.267 0.310 0.812 0.807 0.794 0.783
Dependent children 0.465 0.442 0.545 0.504 0.647 0.616
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Hourly pay 7.468 9.704 8.971 11.512 8.861 11.653
Overtime 4.179 3.633 4.934 4.305 4.828 4.092
Social housing 0.349 0.331 0.140 0.109 0.135 0.108
Home owned 0.226 0.248 0.181 0.233 0.137 0.163
Home mortgaged 0.348 0.334 0.599 0.579 0.622 0.614
Other earner 0.412 0.416 0.643 0.636 0.665 0.675
Limbs 0.382 0.194
Sight/hearing 0.038 0.058
Skin, breathing and organs 0.314 0.633
Other 0.125 0.084
Number of
health problems 2.669 1.424
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(b) Female variable means
Variable
Work-limited
disabled
Non-work-limited
disabled Non-disabled
1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003
Log hourly pay 1.588 1.913 1.707 2.014 1.720 2.033
Summer 0.250 0.256 0.262 0.249 0.251 0.250
Autumn 0.257 0.259 0.262 0.245 0.248 0.246
Winter 0.254 0.241 0.259 0.255 0.247 0.246
North 0.071 0.073 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.057
Y orkshire&Humberside 0.097 0 .1 0 0 0.097 0.106 0.089 0.097
East Midlands 0.065 0.075 0.077 0.074 0.071 0.073
East Anglia 0.034 0.031 0.041 0.032 0.038 * 0.035
South West 0.069 0.082 0.089 0.092 0.082 0.085
West Midlands 0.099 0 .1 0 2 0.089 0.086 0.095 0.092
North West 0.130 0 .1 1 0 0.093 0.099 0.105 0 .1 0 0
Wales 0.074 0.068 0.049 0.047 0.050 0.048
Scotland 0 .1 1 0 0.099 0.083 0.094 0.099 0.096
Professional 0.079 0.081 0.095 0 .1 0 1 0.097 0.117
Associate professional 0.089 0.131 0.114 0.137 0.113 0.147
Administrative 0.242 0 .2 1 2 0.255 0.246 0.263 0.230
Skilled trades 0.029 0.019 0.024 0.019 0 .0 2 2 0.016
Personal service 0.162 0.146 0.168 0.131 0.159 0.129
Sales & customer services 0.126 0.137 0.109 0 .1 2 2 0 .1 2 0 0.123
Process, plant & machine 0.058 0.037 0.051 0.026 0.041 0.024
Elementary 0.131 0.158 0.091 0.119 0.081 0.115
Agriculture & fishing 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003
Energy & Water 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
Manufacturing 0 .1 2 0 0.077 0.117 0.073 0.117 0.082
Construction 0.013 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 1 0.017 0.013 0.015
Distribution 0.241 0.240 0.213 0.208 0.232 0 .2 2 1
Transport& communication 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.039 0.036 0.037
Banking & finance 0.125 0 .1 2 2 0.141 0.141 0.145 0.146
Public administration 0.401 0.453 0.426 0.469 0.390 0.436
Days illness 0.718 0.207 0.263 0.092 0.174 0.071
Married 0.593 0.557 0.596 0.599 0.599 0.551
Experience 27.362 27.279 2 2 .6 6 6 24.039 18.903 18.911
Age 43.337 43.641 39.428 41.151 36.027 36.471
Degree 0.041 0.068 0.091 0.130 0.114 0.162
Other higher education 0.068 0.079 0.107 0.106 0.095 0.097
A level 0.109 0.128 0.140 0.174 0.160 0.184
O level 0.195 0 . 2 2 0 0.274 0.271 0.292 0.281
Other 0.168 0.158 0.172 0.154 0.153 0.133
Small firm 0.356 0.319 0.299 0.295 0.308 0.289
Part-time 0.503 0.518 0.399 0.409 0.440 0.432
White 0.934 0.915 0.944 0.943 0.935 0.909
Tenure 6.924 7.089 7.493 8.043 6.253 6.600
Public sector 0.351 0.371 0.386 0.389 0.345 0.370
Employment 0.274 0.312 0.724 0.709 0.679 0.685
Dependent children 0.610 0.645 0.689 0.703 0.872 0.880
Hourly pay 5.799 7.934 6.429 8.567 6.569 8.910
Overtime 2.468 2.044 2.684 2.403 2.444 2.261
Social housing 0.360 0.342 0.198 0.170 0.168 0.147
Home owned 0.175 0.198 0.148 0.199 0.131 0.150
Home mortgaged 0.391 0.377 0.562 0.545 0.598 0.595
Other earner 0.506 0.510 0.681 0.682 0.725 0.722
Limbs 0.401 0.181
Sight/hearing 0.035 0.032
Skin, breathing and organs 0.252 0.565
Other 0.156 0.184
Number of health problems 2.681 1.473
Notes: In all cases figures relate to the estimation samples used.
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Table 3.3. Male Heckman Corrected Earnings Equations, 2003
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ
Constant 1.833*** -3.372*** 1.912*** -4.834*** 1 879*** -5.068***
(14.55) (16.56) (23.76) (18.82) (51.58) (51.73)
Summer 0.008 0.109** 0.014 -0.023 0 .0 0 1 0.034
(0.33) (2.29) (0.81) (0.35) (0.09) (1 .2 2 )
Autumn -0.009 -0 .0 0 1 0.018 0.015 0 .0 1 0 -0 .0 1 0
(0.37) (0.03) (0.99) (0 .2 2 ) (1.27) (0.37)
Winter 0.025 0.119** 0.036** 0.033 0.014* 0.009
(1 .0 2 ) (2.52) (2.04) (0.49) (1 .8 6 ) (0.33)
North -0.163*** -0.278*** -0.151*** -0.267** -0.207*** -0.131***
(4.21) (3.96) (5.11) (2.50) (16.04) (2.98)
Yorkshire & -0.156*** -0.124** -0.157*** 0.016 -0  1 9 4 *** 0.030
Humberside (4.81) (2 .0 0 ) (6.94) (0.17) (19.30) (0.83)
East Midlands -0.096*** -0.095 _0 1 4 4 *** 0.079 -0.187*** 0.046
(2 .6 6 ) (1.37) (5.70) (0.77) (16.72) (1 .11)
East Anglia 0.024 -0.107 -0.167*** 0.069 -0.159*** -0 .0 2 0
(0.49) (1 .11) (5.00) (0.51) (10.16) (0.35)
South West -0.087*** 0.103 -0.109*** 0.048 -0  163*** 0.129***
(2.75) (1.57) (4.56) (0.52) (15.76) (3.26)
West Midlands -0.076** -0.080 -0.126*** -0.104 -0.157*** 0 i 1 4 ***
(2.27) (1.25) (5.22) (1.16) (15.56) (3.08)
North West -0 .1 1 0 *** -0.230*** -0.123*** -0.260*** -0.187*** -0.081**
(3.33) (3.82) (5.20) (3.12) (18.16) (2.26)
Wales -0 .1 2 0 *** -0.458*** -0.158*** -0.129 -0.198*** -0.130***
(2.58) (5.99) (4.92) (1 .11) (14.19) (2.72)
Scotland -0.073** -0.219*** -0.138*** -0 .1 2 0 -0.177*** -0.007
(2 .11) (3.42) (5.65) (1.33) (17.26) (0.19)
Professional 0 .0 0 1 -0.076*** -0.051***
(0 .0 2 ) (3.16) (5.05)
Associate -0.173*** -0.159*** -0.154***
professional (4.90) (6.82) (15.42)
Administrative -0.358*** -0.371*** -0.382***
(8.25) (11.71) (27.46)
Skilled trades -0.375*** -0.379*** -0.392***
(1 1 .12) (16.38) (38.84)
Personal service -0.405*** -0.533*** -0.468***
(7.24) (11.99) (22.97)
Sales & customer -0.526*** -0.463*** -0.437***
services (10.19) (1 2 .10) (28.14)
Process, plant & -0.517*** -0.496*** -0.473***
machine (14.91) (20.32) (42.46)
Elementary -0.582*** -0.579*** -0.526***
(16.73) (22.32) (45.97)
Agriculture & 0.071 -0.168** -0.053*
fishing (0.80) (2.43) (1.74)
Energy & water 0.320*** 0 .2 1 0 *** q 197***
(4.42) (4.05) (8.14)
Manufacturing 0.225*** 0.085** 0.098***
(5.19) (2.52) (6.40)
Construction 0.280*** 0.123*** 0.157***
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(5.58) (3.25) (9.33)
Distribution 0.148*** -0.039 -0.016
(3.38) (1.13) (1.06)
Transport & 0.242*** 0.106*** 0 .1 0 0 ***
communication (5.22) (2.93) (6 .12)
Banking & 0.313*** 0.182*** 0 .2 1 2 ***
finance (6.94) (5.23) (13.63)
Public admin 0 .1 2 1 *** 0.032 0.070***
(2 .6 6 ) (0.93) (4.36)
Days illness -0.023** -0.008 -0.025***
(2.38) (0.64) (4.02)
Married 0.037 0 .2 1 2 *** 0.082*** 0.176*** 0.070*** 0 .2 0 1 ***
(1.50) (4.83) (4.91) (2.63) (1 0 .11) (7.02)
Experience 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.032***
(5.02) (8.58) (22.93)
Experience -0.031*** -0.049*** -0.060***
squared/ 10 0 (4.23) (7.98) (20.18)
Degree 0.343*** 0.946*** 0.374*** 0.170* 0.399*** 0.433***
(6.61) (14.09) (1 2 .11) (1.89) (27.63) (1 1 .6 8 )
Other higher 0 .2 0 0 *** 0.860*** 0.166*** 0.013 0.203*** 0.452***
education (3.89) (11.49) (5.20) (0.13) (13.44) (9.58)
A level 0.138*** 0.587*** 0.094*** 0.323*** 0.135*** 0.437***
(3.57) (12.32) (3.68) (4.22) (10.77) (13.19)
0  level 0 .1 2 0 *** 0.620*** 0.039 0.218** 0.066*** 0.481***
(2 .8 8 ) (10.96) (1.42) (2.49) (5.10) (13.66)
Other 0.103*** 0.421*** 0 .0 2 0 0.310*** 0.069*** 0.434***
(2.70) (7.77) (0.70) (3.39) (5.11) (11.27)
Small firm -0 .1 2 0 *** -0.113*** _0 1 4 4 ***
(5.78) (7.27) (21.13)
Part-time -0  1 4 4 *** -0.057** -0.049***
(4.99) (2.09) (4.19)
White 0.016 0.388*** 0.034 0.602*** 0.073*** 0.578***
(0.36) (5.52) (0.96) (5.96) (5.60) (17.36)
Tenure 0 .0 1 2 *** 0 .0 1 1 *** 0 .0 1 1 ***
(4.13) (5.53) (10.96)
Tenure -0.016* -0.013** -0.015***
squared/ 10 0 (1.87) (2.14) (5.03)
Public sector 0.062* -0.006 -0.019*
(1.84) (0.25) (1 .6 8 )
Overtime 0.003** 0.006*** 0.005***
(1.98) (5.60) (1 0 .10)
Social housing -0.088** -0.509*** -0.034 -0.323*** -0.074*** -0.349***
(1.96) (7.89) (1 .0 0 ) (3.19) (5.09) (9.32)
Home owned 0.042 0.028 0.052* -0.305*** 0.017 -0.104***
(1.16) (0.43) (1.74) (3.23) (1.43) (2 .8 8 )
Home mortgaged 0.084** 0.360*** 0.090*** 0.328*** 0.061*** 0.383***
(2.32) (5.81) (3.46) (3.71) (6.18) (12.46)
Age 0.118*** 0.252*** 0.256***
(12.75) (20.62) (51.06)
Age squared/100 -0.160*** -0.299*** -0.314***
(14.64) (20.19) (49.11)
Dependent 0.017 -0.024 -0.034**
children (0.84) (0.67) (2.53)
Other earner 0.462*** 0.500*** 0.345***
(12.40) (9.44) (15.47)
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Lambda 0 .0 1 0
(0.18)
0.041
(0.74)
0.029
(1.16)
Observations 2409 7780 3899 4834 21389 27302
F test 41.47 88.04 533.57
(p-value) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 )
AdjR2 0.447 0.517 0.545
Log Likelihood -3685.03 -1761.43 -10410.35
LR x2 (*) 2258.67 1225.54 7712.18
(p-value) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 )
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.258 0.270
respectively. The x2 statistic is a test that all slope coefficients are zero in the probit model. The F 
statistic performs the same test on the earnings equation. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s measure, defined as 
1 minus the ratio o f the maximised log-likelihood from the regression to that from a regression 
including the optimal constant only (Maddala, 1983).
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Table 3.4. Female Heckman Corrected Earnings Equations, 2003
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ
Constant 1 4 5 4 *** -3.208*** 2.029*** -4.819*** 2.007*** _4 814***
(12.59) (14.80) (27.37) (18.86) (68.85) (50.61)
Summer 0.037* -0.003 0.031* -0.024 0 .0 1 0 -0.035
(1 .6 6 ) (0.06) (1.94) (0.43) (1.38) (1.58)
Autumn 0.025 -0.015 0.045*** 0 .0 0 0 0.026*** -0.033
(1 .1 2) (0.32) (2.76) (0 .0 0 ) (3.75) (1.47)
Winter 0.059*** -0.009 0.048*** -0.030 0.036*** -0.051**
(2.62) (0 .2 0 ) (2.97) (0.53) (5.12) (2.29)
North -0.174*** -0.138** -0.140*** -0.018 -0.164*** 0.093**
(4.86) (1.98) (5.30) (0 .2 0 ) (14.41) (2.56)
Yorkshire& -0.155*** -0.075 -0.115*** 0.114 -0.162*** 0.136***
Humberside (5.33) (1.25) (5.65) (1.60) (17.60) (4.65)
East Midlands -0.150*** -0.052 -0.125*** -0 .0 0 1 -0.152*** q 1 7 9 ***
(4.78) (0.77) (5.26) (0 .0 1 ) (15.01) (5.43)
East Anglia -0.034 -0.176* -0.094*** 0 .2 1 2 * -0 .1 2 1 *** 0.037
(0.72) (1.83) (2 .8 8) (1.76) (8.67) (0 .8 6)
South West -0 .1 2 2 *** 0.003 -0.094*** 0.105 -0.140*** 0.164***
(4.29) (0.04) (4.41) (1.37) (14.82) (5.28)
West Midlands -0.126*** -0.079 -0.103*** 0.073 -0.154*** 0.135***
(4.29) (1.31) (4.65) (0.96) (16.40) (4.55)
North West -0.146*** -0.217*** -0.123*** 0.138* -0.135*** 0.081***
(4.81) (3.63) (5.92) (1 .8 8 ) (14.69) (2.80)
Wales -0.162*** -0.261*** -0.117*** 0.055 -0.156*** 0.123***
(4.23) (3.63) (4.09) (0.55) (12.75) (3.15)
Scotland -0.162*** -0.225*** -0.106*** 0.023 -0.139*** 0.178***
(5.04) (3.61) (4.96) (0.31) (15.22) (5.92)
Professional 0.073* 0.094*** 0.059***
(1.75) (3.35) (5.09)
Associate -0.067* -0.072*** -0.117***
professional (1.84) (2.90) (11.05)
Administrative -0.279*** -0.251*** -0.322***
(8.27) (1 1 .0 2 ) (32.32)
Skilled trades -0.343*** -0.426*** -0.489***
(5.34) (9.16) (22.54)
Personal service -0.385*** -0.427*** -0.477***
(10.41) (16.02) (40.80)
Sales & -0.365*** -0.350*** -0.458***
customer (9.57) (12.82) (38.13)
services
Process, plant & -0.454*** -0.413*** -0.558***
machine (8.23) (9.27) (28.66)
Elementary -0.460*** -0.469*** -0.539***
(12.26) (17.00) (44.45)
Agriculture & 0.156 -0.041 0.037
fishing (1.06) (0.39) (0.84)
Energy & water 0.117 0.256*** 0.233***
(0.93) (3.07) (6.29)
Manufacturing 0.142*** 0.072* 0.153***
(3.00) (1.96) (10.30)
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Construction 0.326*** 0.114** 0  1 4 7 ***
(4.15) (2 .2 1 ) (6.33)
Distribution 0 .0 1 1 -0.097*** -0 .0 1 0
(0.28) (3.09) (0.77)
Transport & 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.170***
communication (3.30) (4.33) (1 0 .10)
Banking & 0.206*** 0.142*** 0.204***
finance (5.10) (4.52) (15.82)
Public admin 0.054 0.013 0.047***
(1.46) (0.46) (3.92)
Days illness -0.035*** -0 .0 1 2 -0.005
(3.93) (1.18) (1.03)
Married -0.004 -0.113*** 0 .0 0 1 -0.235*** 0.005 -0.235***
(0 .2 0 ) (2.84) (0.04) (4.43) (0.79) (1 0 .8 6 )
Experience 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018***
(6.47) (8.27) (20.19)
Experience -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.039***
squared/ 10 0 (6.44) (8.19) (19.43)
Degree 0.483*** 1.030*** 0.338*** 0.722*** 0.327*** 0.720***
(9.25) (15.27) (10.83) (9.19) (24.06) (23.41)
Other higher 0.310*** 0.960*** 0 .2 1 0 *** 0.739*** 0.184*** 0.842***
education (6.44) (15.33) (7.20) (9.12) (13.74) (23.91)
A level 0.207*** 0.763*** 0.047* 0.638*** 0.094*** 0.544***
(4.99) (14.10) (1.83) (9.17) (8.23) (19.24)
O level 0.171*** 0.664*** 0.042* 0.640*** 0.034*** 0.561***
(4.62) (14.02) (1.77) (10.25) (3.20) (21.72)
Other 0.137*** 0.538*** 0.017 0.422*** 0.030*** 0.402***
(3.78) (10.38) (0.73) (6.24) (2.65) (13.69)
Small firm -0.061*** -0.084*** -0.082***
(3.41) (6.33) (14.09)
Part-time -0.036** -0.064*** -0.025***
(2.05) (4.77) (4.29)
White 0.064 0.498*** -0.093*** 0.530*** -0.007 0.515***
(1.52) (7.32) (2 .8 8 ) (6.40) (0.60) (18.49)
Tenure 0.014*** 0 .0 1 2 *** 0.016***
(4.52) (5.68) (15.24)
Tenure -0 . 0 1 2 -0.017** -0.025***
squared/ 1 00 (1.07) (2.23) (6.54)
Public sector 0.103*** 0.045** 0.047***
(4.32) (2.52) (5.93)
Overtime 0.003 0.005*** 0.005***
(1.31) (3.80) (7.75)
Social housing -0.044 _0.441 *** -0.032 -0.096 -0.028** -0 141***
(1.08) (6.92) (1.16) (1 .2 0 ) (2.31) (4.52)
Home owned 0.065* 0.023 0 .0 2 2 -0.077 -0.004 -0.032
(1.90) (0.34) (0.84) (0.93) (0.33) (0.99)
Home 0 .1 1 0 *** 0.319*** 0 .0 2 0 0  4 4 4 *** 0.009 0.405***
mortgaged (3.45) (5.24) (0.85) (6.09) (0.98) (15.36)
Age 0.108*** 0.227*** 0.233***
(1 0 .2 1 ) (17.26) (44.42)
Age squared/100 -0.146*** -0.270*** -0.281***
(10.95) (15.95) (40.10)
Dependent -0.164*** -0.370*** -0.377***
children (8.41) (15.39) (41.03)
Other earner 0.425*** 0.363*** 0.292***
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Lambda 0.156***
(3.00)
(11.14)
-0 .0 2 2
(0.57)
(7.52)
-0.058***
(3.83)
(14.55)
Observations 
F test 
(p-value) 
AdjR2
Log Likelihood 
LR x2 (*) 
(p-value) 
Pseudo R2
2478
45.52
(0 .0 0 )
0.446
7938
-3983.83
1888.56
(0 .0 0 )
0.192
3764
8 6 .6 8
(0 .0 0 )
0.522
5309
-2635.48
1132.30
(0 .0 0 )
0.177
22627
533.63
(0 .0 0 0
0.531
33023
-16575.36
7989.08
(0 .0 0 )
0.194
Notes: See notes to Table 3.3.
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Table 3.5. Decomposition of Employment Probabilities by Disability Status
1997 2003
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Males
Predicted
difference
0.527 -0.018 0.473 -0.023
Difference due 
to characteristics
0.127 (24%) 0.010 (-53%) 0 .1 0 1  (2 1 %) -0.003 (12%)
Difference in 
parameters
0.400 (76%) -0.028 (153%) 0.372 (79%) -0 .0 2 0  (8 8 %)
Females
Predicted
difference
0.404 -0.044 0.372 -0.024
Difference due 
to characteristics
0.063 (16%) -0 .0 0 1  (2 %) 0.046 (12%) -0.020 (83%)
Difference in 
parameters
0.341 (84%) -0.044 (98%) 0.326 (8 8 %) -0.004 (17%)
Notes: Predicted difference calculated using equation (3.9). Difference in characteristics and 
parameters given by equations (3.10) and (3.11) respectively. The non-discriminatory structure is 
formed by pooling the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled ( a P2).
Table 3.6. DeLeire (2001) Decomposition of Employment Probabilities
1997 2003 Change
Males
Predicted difference 0.527 0.473 -0.054
Difference due to observable characteristics 0.127 (24%) 0 .1 0 1  (2 1 %) -0.026
Difference due to unobservable health 
characteristics
0.427 (81%) 0.392 (83%) -0.035
Discrimination -0.028 (-5%) -0.020 (-4%) 0.008
Females
Predicted difference 0.404 0.372 -0.032
Difference due to observable characteristics 0.062 (16%) 0.046 (12%) -0.017
Difference due to unobservable health 
characteristics
0.385 (95%) 0.331 (8 8 %) -0.054
Discrimination -0.044 (-11%) -0.004 (-1%) 0.039
Notes'. Figures relate to the difference between the work-limited disabled and the non-disabled. 
Predicted difference calculated using equation (3.9). Difference in characteristics given by equation
(3.10). Discrimination is given by (PN - P D ) unexp- Unobserved productivity difference is given by 
(PN - P D )unexp- (PN — PD )unexp • The non-discriminatory structure is formed by pooling the non-work- 
limited disabled and the non-disabled ( a P2).
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Table 3.7. Gender Decompositions of Employment Probabilities
1997 2003
Work-limited
Predicted difference -0.007 -0 .0 0 2
Difference due to 
characteristics
-0.036 (542%) -0.038 (2305%)
Difference in parameters 0.029 (-442%) 0.037 (-2205%)
Non-work-limited
Predicted difference 0.090 0.098
Difference due to 
characteristics
0 .0 1 0 (11%) 0.005 (5%)
Difference in parameters 0.080 (89%) 0.093 (95%)
Non-disabled
Predicted difference 0.116 0.099
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.008 (7%) 0.008 (8%)
Difference in parameters 0.108 (93%) 0.090 (92%)
Notes: Predicted difference calculated using equation (3.12). Difference in characteristics and 
parameters given by equations (3.13) and (3.14) respectively. The non-discriminatory structure is 
formed by pooling across genders.
Table 3.8. Timewise Decompositions of Employment Probabilities
Male Female
Work-limited
Predicted difference 0.043 0.038
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.008 (18%) 0.017 (45%)
Difference in parameters 0.036 (82%) 0.021 (55%)
Non-work-limited
Predicted difference -0.006 -0.014
Difference due to 
characteristics
-0.005 (72%) 0.016 (-109%)
Difference in parameters -0.002 (27%) -0.030 (209%)
Non-disabled
Predicted difference -0 .0 1 1 0.006
Difference due to 
characteristics
-0.007 (67%) 0.006 (89%)
Difference in parameters -0.004 (32%) 0 .0 0 1  (1 0%)
Notes: Predicted difference calculated using equation (3.15). Differences in characteristics and 
parameters given by equations (3.16) and (3.17) respectively. The non-discriminatory structure is 
formed by pooling across time periods.
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Table 3.9. Earnings Decompositions by Disability Status
1997 2003
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Males
Predicted
difference
0.278 0.048 0.166 -0.003
Difference due 
to characteristics
0.095 (34%) -0.011 (-23%) 0.080 (48%) -0.017(591%)
Difference in 
parameters
0.184 (6 6 %) 0.059 (123%) 0.086 (52%) 0.014 (-491%)
Females
Predicted
difference
0.155 0.036 0.286 0.035
Difference due 
to characteristics
0.068 (44%) 0.003 (8%) 0.069 (24%) 0.007 (20%)
Difference in 
parameters
0.087 (56%) 0.033 (92%) 0.216(76%) 0.028 (80%)
Notes: Figures relate to decomposition o f selectivity corrected offer wage in equation (3.8). The non- 
discriminatory structure is formed by pooling the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled
(b °P2).
Table 3.10. DeLeire (2001) Earnings Decompositions
1997 2003 Change
Males
Predicted difference 0.278 0.166 -0 .1 1 2
Difference due to
observable
characteristics
0.095 (34%) 0.080 (48%) -0.015
Difference due to 
unobservable health 
characteristics
0.124 (45%) 0.073 (44%) -0.052
Discrimination 0.059 (21%) 0.014(8%) -0.045
Females
Predicted difference 0.155 0.286 0.130
Difference due to
observable
characteristics
0.068 (44%) 0.069 (24%) 0 .0 0 1
Difference due to 
unobservable health 
characteristics
0.054 (35%) 0.189 (6 6 %) 0.135
Discrimination 0.033 (21%) 0.028 (1 0%) -0.006
Notes: Figures relate to the difference between the work-limited disabled and non-disabled. The
contribution o f observable characteristics is given by (XN -  X D )B°2 • Discrimination is given by 
[XN(fi° -  j3°2) + X Di{ B °2 ~Pd )] and the difference due to the unobservable effect o f health on 
productivity is given by - p ° 2) + J ^ ( B° 2 - +
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Table 3.11. Gender Earnings Decompositions
1997 2003
Work-limited
Predicted difference 0.133 0.229
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.159(119.7%) 0.137(41.6%)
Difference in parameters -0.026 (-19.7%) 0.192(58.4%)
Non-work-limited
Predicted difference 0.243 0.247
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.188 (77.1%) 0.178(71.7%)
Difference in parameters 0.056 (22.9%) 0.070 (28.3%)
Non-disabled
Predicted difference 0.256 0 .2 10
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.168 (65.9%) 0.155 (73.9%)
Difference in parameters 0.087 (34.1%) 0.055 (26.1%)
Notes: The non-discriminatory structure is formed by pooling across genders.
Table 3.12. Timewise Earnings Decompositions
Male Female
Work-limited
Predicted difference 0.244 0.047
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.044(18.1%) 0.061 (129.2%)
Difference in parameters 0.200 (81.9%) -0.014 (-29.2%)
Non-work-limited
Predicted difference 0.183 0.179
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.041 (22.4%) 0.047 (26.2%)
Difference in parameters 0,142 (77.6%) 0.132 (73.8%)
Non-disabled
Predicted difference 0.132 0.177
Difference due to 
characteristics
0.031 (23.3%) 0.046 (26.2%)
Difference in parameters 0.101 (76.7%) 0.131 (73.8%)
Notes: The non-discriminatory structure is formed by pooling across time periods.
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Table 3.13. Employment Effects of the Unexplained Earnings Gap
Baldwin and 
Johnson (1992)
Modification of Baldwin and Johnson 
(1992)
Xu Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted
Identification Experience assumed 
to identify
Over-identified Over-identified94
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Work-limited disabled
K 0.259 0.268 0.259 0.268 0.260 0.269
p *
A 0.310
a 0.302 0.346 0.296 0.278
n  s|c
discrimination 0.265 a 0.265 0.275 0.263 0.269
p *1 d  unobserved productivity 0.303 a 0.309 0.338 0.293 0.278
w °A 2 .1 0 1 1.771 2 .1 0 1 1.771 2.105 1.804
w °  *
A
2.184 1.982 2.184 1.982 2.224 2.076
* discrimination 2 .1 1 2 1.793 2 .1 1 2 1.793 2.117 1.819
W° * U A A ■ •rr unobserved productivity 2.173 1.960 2.173 1.960 2 .2 1 2 2.061
Non-work-limited disabled
A 0.871 0.741 0.871 0.741 0.871 0.741
p *
A 0.871 0.745 0.875 0.753 0.874 0.749
w °v y d 2 2.270 2 .0 2 2 2.270 2 .0 2 2 2.262 2.075
w °  *
A 2.280 2.044 2.280 2.044 2.274 2.093
Non-disabled
0.846 0.716 0.846 0.716 0.847 0.718
p *
r N 0.846 0.716 0.845 0.713 0.846 0.716
w °yr N 2.267 2.057 2.267 2.057 2.261 2.114
W °  * 
vr N 2.264 2.051 2.264 2.051 2.259 2.109
Notes: Data relate to 2003. The employment effects are calculated using equation (3.28). In column 1 
and 2 <j : is estimated following Baldwin and Johnson (1992). In columns 3 and 4, a uJ is estimated
using equations (3.34), (3.35) and (3.36). In columns 5 and 6 the sensitivity of the estimates are tested 
to excluding employment related variables from Xy. a Result is not reported since the estimate o f cruj
is negative due to a negative coefficient on experience in the hours o f work equation.
94 Experience and experience squared are assumed to affect the offer but not the reservation wage. 
Their inclusion in the probit model changes the overall specification slightly.
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Table 3.15. Distribution of Health Problems by Type.
a) Males
1997 2003
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Arms, hands 6.91 3.93 5.39 3.41
Legs, feet 12.79 8.77 13.48 8.25
Back, neck 20.61 9.74 19.02 7.7
Difficulty in seeing 2.97 1.81 1.92 1.84
Difficulty in hearing 1.99 5.63 1.67 3.76
Speech impediment 0.37 0.23 0 .21 0 .1 2
Skin
conditions/allergies 1.50 4.84 1.5 4.57
Chest, breathing 
problems 10.44 24.09 8.93 20.23
Heart, blood 
pressure, circulation 13.38 14.83 12.24 23.46
Stomach, kidney, 
liver, digestion 3.38 5.92 4.28 7.26
Diabetes 3.00 8.75 4.27 ■ 7.53
Depression, bad 
nerves 5.40 1.56 6.93 1.74
Epilepsy 2 .1 0 1.5 2.35 1.01
Learning difficulties 2.77 0.71 3.55 1.14
Mental illness, 
phobia, panics 3.82 0.59 3.51 0.29
Progressive illness 3.15 1.16 4.24 1.26
Other 5.24 5.86 5.81 6.06
Notes: Figures relate to estimation samples used.
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b) Females
1997 2003
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Work-limited Non-work-
limited
Arms, hands 9.30 3.96 7.36 3.26
Legs, feet 11.23 6.1 11.43 6.67
Back, neck 23.86 10.05 2 1 .1 8.08
Difficulty in seeing 1.46 1.13 1.54 0.9
Difficulty in hearing 1 .8 6 3.43 1.78 2.35
Speech impediment 0 .2 0 0 .1 1 0.15 0 .0 2
Skin
conditions/allergies 1.99 4.29 1.49 4.69
Chest, breathing 
problems 12.42 28.65 9.27 23.07
Heart, blood 
pressure, circulation 6.98 11.4 6.37 16.24
Stomach, kidney, 
liver, digestion 4.08 6.46 5.10 7.1
Diabetes 2.08 5.27 2.77 5.07
Depression, bad 
nerves 6.77 2.39 9.20 2.92
Epilepsy 2.36 1.98 2.05 1.07
Learning difficulties 1.78 0.33 2.36 0.45
Mental illness, 
phobia, panics 3.26 0.80 4.03 0.40
Progressive illness 3.98 1.92 5.13 1.71
Other 6.18 1 1 .68 8.30 15.46
Notes: Figures relate to estimation samples used.
Table 3.16. Perceptions of Prejudice, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2005.
Non­
disabled
Disabled 
(long-term health problem)
Disabled 
(limiting long-term health 
problem)
A lot 24.67 28.35 37.69
A little 52.31 53.62 43.05
Hardly any 16.57 13.25 13.55
None 6.45 4.78 5.71
Notes: Working age population.
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Table A3.3. Male Heckman Corrected Earnings Equations, 1997
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ
Constant 1.167*** -2.335*** 1 4 4 4 *** -3.967*** 1.515*** _4 4 8 4 ***
(9.04) (11.82) (13.55) (13.69) (45.00) (52.41)
Summer 0.013 0.073 -0.037 0.093 0.015** 0.004
(0.45) (1.55) (1.49) (1.14) (2.06) (0.15)
Autumn 0.077*** 0 .0 2 2 -0.043* 0.028 0.015** 0.014
(2.75) (0.47) (1.77) (0.35) (2 .0 2 ) (0.60)
Winter 0.032 0.025 -0.018 -0.033 0.027*** 0.054**
(1.16) (0.54) (0.75) (0.42) (3.81) (2.25)
North -0.088* -0.371*** -0.224*** -0.091 -0.185*** -0.146***
(1.91) (5.38) (6 .0 1 ) (0.78) (15.20) (3.74)
Yorkshire & -0.072* -0.231*** -0.166*** -0.136 -0 1 9 7 *** -0.072**
Humberside (1.92) (3.83) (4.95) (1.31) (20.04) (2.25)
East Midlands -0.128*** -0 .2 2 1 *** -0.084** 0.053 -0.173*** 0.031
(3.00) (3.15) (2.51) (0.47) (16.39) (0 .8 6 )
East Anglia -0.087* -0.023 -0.168*** -0.095 -0 .1 2 1 *** -0.033
(1.69) (0.26) (3.86) (0.69) (8 .8 8 ) (0.73)
South West -0.113*** 0.049 -0 .1 2 1 *** -0.048 -0.161*** 0.042
(3.11) (0.73) (3.60) (0.42) (16.23) (1.23)
West Midlands -0.172*** -0.077 -0.155*** 0.041 -0.165*** 0.088***
(4.66) (1.23) (4.97) (0.40) (17.65) (2.77)
North West -0.165*** -0.431*** -0.162*** -0.106 -0.206*** -0 1 7 4***
(4.12) (7.45) (5.02) (1.03) (21.89) (5.81)
Wales -0.180*** -0.469*** -0.203*** -0.075 -0 .2 0 1 *** -0.154***
(3.45) (6.40) (4.80) (0.54) (15.58) (3.77)
Scotland -0.097** -0.387*** -0 .2 0 2 *** -0.172* -0.175*** -0.062**
(2.34) (6.25) (6 .12) (1 .6 6 ) (18.43) (1.99)
Professional -0.054 -0.099*** -0.091***
(1.18) (2.89) (8.89)
Associate -0.128*** -0.145*** -0 .1 1 2 ***
professional (2.91) (4.17) (10.74)
Administrative -0.373*** -0.372*** -0.384***
(8.47) (10.08) (33.73)
Skilled trades -0.330*** -0.343*** -0.336***
(8.70) (1 1 .6 8 ) (36.38)
Personal -0.386*** -0 419*** -0.349***
service (8.34) (10.77) (28.49)
Sales & -0.312*** -0.333*** -0.235***
customer (5.59) (7.73) (17.73)
services
Process, plant -0.424*** _0 4 7 4 *** -0.412***
& machine (10.98) (15.04) (41.49)
Elementary -0.469*** -0.522*** -0  4 4 9 ***
(10.54) (12.83) (36.29)
Agriculture & 0.025 -0.158* -0.066**
fishing (0.27) (1.82) (2.48)
Energy & water 0.279*** 0.190** 0 .2 2 0 ***
(3.05) (2.43) (9.79)
Manufacturing 0.108** 0.061 0.118***
(2.07) (1.38) (8.27)
112
Construction 0.136** 0.058 0.082***
(2.31) (1.17) (5.15)
Distribution 0.036 -0.132*** -0.053***
(0.67) (2.85) (3.60)
Transport & 0.094 -0.027 0.078***
communication (1.62) (0.55) (5.08)
Banking & 0.162*** 0.136*** 0.195***
finance (2.95) (2.96) (13.32)
Public admin -0.015 -0.009 0.048***
(0.29) (0 .2 0 ) (3.17)
Days illness -0.017*** -0.025*** -0 .0 1 1 ***
(3.25) (2.98) (3.53)
Married 0.128*** 0.170*** 0 .1 2 2 *** 0.190** 0.080*** 0.359***
(4.62) (3.82) (5.24) (2.39) (11.31) (14.64)
Experience 0 .0 2 1 *** 0.037*** 0.034***
(6.18) (8.96) (28.33)
Experience -0.041*** -0.069*** -0.066***
squared/ 1 00 (5.47) (8.34) (25.42)
Degree 0.596*** 0.885*** 0.424*** 0.124 0.443*** 0  4 1 9 ***
(10.58) (12.29) (10.29) (1.16) (33.87) (12.76)
Other higher 0.382*** 0.671*** 0.267*** 0.140 0.242*** 0.397***
education (6.95) (8.70) (6.34) (1 .10) (18.09) (10.06)
A level 0.271*** 0.512*** 0.144*** 0 .2 2 2 *** 0.165*** 0.338***
(6.96) (11.33) (4.56) (2.59) (15.55) (12.46)
O level 0 .2 0 1 *** 0.570*** 0 1 4 4 *** 0.247** 0.094*** 0.354***
(4.60) (1 0 .0 2 ) (4.16) (2.55) (8.44) (1 2 .2 1 )
Other 0.153*** 0.437*** 0.084** 0.229** 0.059*** 0.344***
(3.83) (8.67) (2.45) (2.40) (5.21) (11.17)
Small firm -0 .2 0 2 *** -0.116*** -0.158***
(8.52) (5.49) (24.54)
Part-time -0.173*** -0.028 -0 .1 0 2 ***
(5.26) (0.79) (8.83)
White 0.166*** 0.213*** 0.045 0.404*** 0.079*** 0.518***
(3.37) (2.82) (0.92) (3.24) (5.92) (16.12)
Tenure 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016***
(5.90) (7.27) (18.04)
Tenure -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.025***
squared/ 10 0 (3.12) (3.81) (8.67)
Public sector 0.096*** 0.042 0.040***
(2.61) (1.30) (3.86)
Overtime 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(2 .8 8 ) (3.11) (9.28)
Social housing -0.063 -0.294*** -0.052 -0.169 -0.084*** -0.154***
(1.38) (4.48) (1 .2 2 ) (1.55) (6.76) (4.97)
Home owned -0.004 0.033 0.070* 0.048 0.016 0.099***
(0.08) (0.47) (1.75) (0.45) (1.36) (3.08)
Home 0 .1 1 0 *** 0.360*** 0  1 4 7 *** 0.524*** 0.073*** 0.520***
mortgaged (2.67) (5.67) (3.99) (5.41) (7.27) (19.45)
Age 0.080*** 0 .2 1 1 *** 0.226***
(9.07) (15.67) (52.50)
Age -0.124*** -0.259*** -0.286***
squared/ 100 (11.78) (15.65) (52.38)
Dependent 0.009 0 .0 1 2 -0.055***
children (0.46) (0.31) (4.95)
Other earner 0.489*** 0.446*** 0.432***
113
Lambda 0 .1 1 1 *
(1.84)
(13.80)
0.261***
(3.34)
(7.35)
0.024
(1.04)
(23.10)
Observations 
F test 
(p-value)
Adj R2
Log Likelihood 
LR (*) 
(p-value) 
Pseudo R2
2254
39.59
(0 .0 0 )
0.451
8446
-3850.36
2098.71
(0 .0 0 )
0.214
2871
52.60
(0 .0 0 )
0.463
3534
-1328.42
755.13
(0 .0 0 )
0 .2 2 1
29129
591.95
(0 .0 0 )
0.4934
36684
-14144.76
9020.94
(0 .0 0 )
0.242
Notes: See notes to Table 3.3.
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Table A3.4. Female Heckman Corrected Earnings Equations, 1997
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ
Constant 1.561*** -2.426*** 1.517*** -4 1 9 9 *** 1.595*** -4.500***
(12.24) (11.18) (17.73) (14.01) (60.05) (53.90)
Summer 0.033 -0.009 0.017 0.027 0 .0 1 0 -0 .0 2 0
(1.25) (0 .2 0 ) (0.77) (0.39) (1.57) (1.04)
Autumn 0.052** 0.090** 0.033 0.035 0.031*** 0.003
(1.99) (1.98) (1.50) (0.50) (4.70) (0.16)
Winter 0.034 0.015 0.043* 0.040 0.036*** -0.035*
(1.29) (0.33) (1.94) (0.56) (5.45) (1.83)
North -0.066 -0.318*** -0.161*** 0.006 -0.178*** 0.053*
(1.46) (4.47) (4.73) (0.06) (16.20) (1.70)
Yorkshire & -0.140*** -0.147** -0.193*** 0.008 -0  1 4 9 *** 0.059**
Humberside (4.06) (2.39) (6.89) (0.09) (16.47) (2.27)
East Midlands -0.082** -0.069 -0.117*** 0.229** -0.142*** 0.061**
(2 .12) (1 .0 1 ) (3.87) (2 .2 2 ) (14.53) (2.16)
East Anglia -0.172*** -0.034 -0.162*** -0.051 -0.136*** 0.031
(3.63) (0.39) (3.99) (0.41) (10.62) (0.85)
South West -0 .1 1 2 *** 0.139** -0.106*** -0 .0 1 1 -0 141*** 0.026
(3.32) (2 .12) (3.70) (0 .12) (15.32) (0.98)
West Midlands -0  1 7 9 *** -0.069 -0.137*** 0.051 -0.151*** 0.037
(5.33) (1.15) (4.68) (0.55) (16.93) (1.46)
North West -0.116*** -0.320*** -0 .1 0 1 *** -0.035 -0.162*** 0.040
(3.20) (5.61) (3.50) (0.38) (18.94) (1.63)
Wales -0.166*** -0.435*** -0.203*** 0.054 -0.143*** 0.076**
(3.48) (6.08) (5.48) (0.46) (12.48) (2.32)
Scotland -0 .1 0 2 *** -0.318*** -0.135*** -0.047 -0.145*** 0.075***
(2.59) (5.19) (4.47) (0.50) (16.71) (2.97)
Professional 0.136*** 0.114*** 0.099***
(2.71) (2.90) (8.34)
Associate -0.073 -0.077** -0.097***
professional (1.58) (2.15) (9.00)
Administrative -0.244*** -0.241*** -0.257***
(6.36) (7.96) (28.31)
Skilled trades -0.553*** -0.472*** -0.467***
(8 .10) (8.03) (24.86)
Personal -0.355*** -0.410*** -0.418***
service
(8.24) (11.85) (39.66)
Sales & -0.382*** -0.374*** -0.350***
customer (8.36) (9.65) (30.53)
services
Process, plant -0.484*** -0.430*** -0.450***
& machine (8.69) (9.19) (29.38)
Elementary -0.461*** -0.478*** -0 471***
(10.16) (12.08) (37.98)
Agriculture & 0.191 0.133 0.065**
fishing (1.60) (1.29) (1.97)
Energy & water 0.270* 0.271* 0.245***
(1 .8 8 ) (1.91) (7.23)
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Manufacturing 0.157*** 0.223*** 0.151***
(2.91) (4.97) (11.07)
Construction 0.188** 0.191** 0.117***
(2.06) (2.39) (5.04)
Distribution 0 .0 1 1 0.064 0 .0 0 2
(0.24) (1.64) (0.17)
Transport & 0.090 0.218*** 0.135***
communication (1.37) (3.88) (8.30)
Banking & 0.180*** 0.234*** 0.206***
finance (3.75) (5.81) (16.68)
Public admin 0.045 0.085** 0.047***
(1 .0 2 ) (2.35) (4.09)
Days illness -0.024*** -0 .0 1 0 -0.008***
(5.12) (1.57) (3.38)
Married -0 .0 0 1 -0.113*** -0.025 -0.215*** -0 .0 0 2 -0.226***
(0.03) (2.78) (1.35) (3.28) (0.37) (11.91)
Experience 0.016*** 0.024*** 0 .0 2 1 ***
(4.79) (8 .8 8 ) (24.31)
Experience -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.046***
squared/ 100 (4.36) (8.40) (23.49)
Degree 0.415*** 0.939*** 0.402*** 0.813*** 0.373*** 0.534***
(7.13) (11.83) (9.71) (7.18) (29.84) (19.19)
Other higher 0.329*** 0.734*** 0.274*** 0.680*** 0.251*** 0.669***
education (6.60) (11.56) (7.39) (6.87) (21.07) (22.81)
A level 0.166*** 0.444*** 0.138*** 0.344*** 0.128*** 0.286***
(4.26) (8.05) (4.40) (3.99) (13.17) (12.06)
O level 0 .1 1 1 *** 0.495*** 0.151*** 0.394*** 0.074*** 0.404***
(3.09) (1 0 .6 6 ) (5.53) (5.38) (8.48) (19.48)
Other 0.052 0.434*** 0.067** 0.335*** 0.043*** 0.276***
(1.47) (9.12) (2.43) (4.35) (4.65) (11.97)
Small firm -0.099*** -0.106*** -0 .1 0 1 ***
(4.72) (5.99) (18.50)
Part-time -0 .0 2 1 -0.053*** -0.049***
(0.95) (2.85) (8.60)
White -0.095* 0.379*** -0.091** 0.453*** -0 .0 1 1 0.459***
(1.83) (5.08) (2 .2 0 ) (4.29) (0.83) (16.74)
Tenure 0.027*** 0.016*** 0 .0 2 0 ***
(7.41) (5.28) (19.27)
Tenure -0.059*** -0.024** -0.035***
squared/ 100 (4.24) (2.17) (8.73)
Public sector 0.073** 0.115*** 0.109***
(2.56) (4.74) (14.12)
Overtime 0.003 0.005*** 0.004***
(1.62) (3.22) (6.51)
Social housing -0.076* -0.218*** -0.037 0.084 -0.036*** -0.013
(1.70) (3.21) (1.08) (0 .8 8 ) (3.21) (0.49)
House owned -0.032 0 .1 1 1 0 .0 1 1 0.064 0.013 0 .1 2 2 ***
(0.72) (1.52) (0.32) (0.63) (1.19) (4.25)
House -0 .0 0 2 0.414*** 0.027 0.499*** 0.030*** 0.475***
mortgaged •
(0.05) (6.31) (0.89) ' (5.82) (3.21) (2 0 .6 6 )
Age 0.074*** 0.214*** 0.227***
(6.94) (13.70) (49.45)
Age -0 .1 1 0 *** -0.265*** -0.286***
squared/ 100 (8 .11) (12.92) (46.67)
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Dependent 
Other earner 
Lambda 0.004
(0.07)
-0.163***
(8.05)
0.446***
(11.83)
0 .0 1 2
(0.25)
-0.448***
(14.93)
0.413***
(7.09)
-0.044***
(3.26)
-0.376***
(48.14)
0.460***
(26.88)
Observations 
F test 
(p-value)
Adj R2
Log Likelihood 
LR X2(k) 
(p-value) 
Pseudo R2
2225
36.79
(0 .0 0 )
0.436
8112
-3970.61
1589.97
(0 .0 0 )
0.167
2634
58.37
(0 .0 0 )
0.511
3640
-1746.28
798.96
(0 .0 0 )
0.186
29551
574.31
(0 .0 0 )
0.482
43533
-22676.7
9302.88
(0 .0 0
0.1702
Notes: See notes to Table 3.3.
117
Table A3.5. Earnings Decomposition by Disability Status - Sensitivity Analysis
(a) Work-limited disabled and non-disabled, 1997
Male Female
Mean prediction non-disabled 1.994 1.739
Mean prediction disabled 1.716 1.584
Raw differential 0.278 0.155
- due to endowments 0.117 0.076
- due to coefficients 0.183 0.087
- due to interaction -0 .0 2 2 -0.008
Q: 0 1 0.5 0.928 0 1 0.5 0.93
Unexplained 0.161 0.183 0.172 0.182 0.079 0.087 0.083 0.087
Explained 0.117 0.095 0.106 0.096 0.076 0.068 0.072 0.069
% unexplained 58.0 65.9 62.0 65.4 51.0 56.2 53.6 55.8
% explained 42.0 34.1 38.0 34.6 49.0 43.8 46.4 44.2
Differential due to selection variable -0 .1 0 0 -0.023
(b) Work-limited disabled and non-disabled, 2003
Male Female
Mean prediction non-disabled 2.267 2.057
Mean prediction disabled 2 .1 0 1 1.771
Raw differential 0.166 0.286
- due to endowments 0.094 0.082
- due to coefficients 0.086 0.216
- due to interaction -0.013 -0.013
Q: 0 1 0.5 0.899 0 1 0.5 0.901
Unexplained 0.072 0.086 0.079 0.084 0.203 0.216 0.21 0.215
Explained 0.094 0.081 0.087 0.082 0.082 0.069 0.076 0.071
% unexplained 43.5 51.4 47.5 50.6 71.1 75.7 73.4 75.3
% explained 56.5 48.6 52.5 49.4 28.9 24.3 26.6 24.7
Differential due to selection variable -0 .0 0 1 -0.165
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(c) Non-work-limited disabled and non-disabled, 1997
Male Female
Mean prediction non-disabled 1.994 1.739
Mean prediction disabled 1.946 1.703
Raw differential 0.048 0.036
- due to endowments -0 .0 1 0 -0 .0 0 1
- due to coefficients 0.065 0.033
- due to interaction -0.007 0.004
Q: 0 1 0.5 0.090 0 1 0.5 0.918
Unexplained 0.058 0.065 0.061 0.059 0.037 0.033 0.035 0.033
Explained -0.010-0.017-0.013-0.011 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
% unexplained 120.7 135.3 128.0 122.0 101.7 91.6 96.7 92.4
% explained -20.7 -35.3 -28.0 -22.0 -1.7 8.4 3.3 7.6
Differential due to selection variable -0.061 -0.023
(d) Non-work-limited disabled and non-disabled, 2003
Male Female
Mean prediction non-disabled 2.267 2.057
Mean prediction disabled 2.270 2 .0 2 2
Raw differential -0.003 0.035
- due to endowments -0.015 0.005
- due to coefficients 0.019 0.028
- due to interaction -0.006 0 .0 0 2
Q: 0 1 0.5 0.154 0 1 0.5 0.857
Unexplained 0.013 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.03 0.028 0.029 0.028
Explained -0.015 -0.021 -0.018-0.016 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.007
% unexplained 449.9 668.4 559.1 483.6 86.1 79.5 82.8 80.4
% explained -549.9 -768.4 -659.1 -583.6 13.9 20.5 17.2 19.6
Differential due to selection variable -0 .0 0 2 -0.016
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Table A3.8. Within Group Heterogeneity Employment Probit Marginal Effects
Male Female
Work-
limited
Non-work-
limited
Work-
limited
Non-work-
limited
Summer 0.041** -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(2.55) (0.35) (0.31) (0.35)
Autumn -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0 .0 0 2
(0.24) (0.28) (0.18) (0 .10)
Winter 0.033** 0.008 -0.003 -0.009
(2.06) (0.55) (0.19) (0.51)
Degree 0.325*** 0.030* 0.371*** 0.190***
(1 1 .8 8 ) (1.80) (14.08) (12.03)
Other higher education 0.309*** 0 .0 0 1 0.345*** q
(10.06) (0.03) (13.90) (12.41)
A level 0.171*** 0.061*** 0.263*** 0 1 7 9 ***
(9.82) (4.26) (12.25) (11.34)
O level 0.193*** 0.041*** 0.217*** 0.187***
(8.72) (2.64) -12.090 (11.77)
Other 0.132*** 0.058*** 0.181*** 0.125***
(6.54) (3.93) (9.09) (7.23)
Age 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.039*** 0.074***
(13.05) (19.75) (11.25) (17.43)
Age squared/100 -0.053*** -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.089***
(14.82) (19.53) (11.72) (16.14)
Married 0.055*** 0.037** -0.054*** -0.075***
(3.92) (2.47) (4.03) (4.48)
North -0.068*** -0.069** -0.027 -0.006
(3.48) (2.36) (1 .2 2 ) (0.19)
Y orkshire&Humberside -0.023 0.003 -0.009 0.037*
(1.18) (0.14) (0.48) (1.70)
East Midlands -0.017 0.015 -0.004 0.003
(0.77) (0.76) (0.19) (0 .11)
East Anglia -0.058** 0 .0 1 2 -0.069*** 0.068**
(2.17) (0.45) (2.60) (2 .0 2 )
South West 0.051** 0.008 0.015 0.035
(2.19) (0.41) (0.71) (1.52)
West Midlands -0 .0 2 2 -0.023 -0 .0 2 1 0.025
(1 .11) (1 .11) (1.11) (1.07)
North West -0.075*** -0.059*** -0.068*** 0.042*
(4.52) (2.75) (3.94) (1.92)
Wales -0.108*** -0.025 -0.062*** 0.017
(5.80) (0.91) (2.98) (0.56)
Scotland -0.046** -0.028 -0.043** 0.009
(2.45) (1.30) (2.26) (0.37)
White 0.123*** 0.168*** 0.150*** 0.196***
(7.70) (4.95) (10.13) (6 .0 2 )
Dependent children -0.004 -0.005 -0.066*** -0 .1 2 0 ***
(0.57) (0.71) (1 0 .2 0 ) (15.46)
Other earner 0.129*** 0 .1 1 1 *** 0 .1 2 2 *** 0.118***
(10.31) (8.62) (9.84) (7.01)
Social housing -0.131*** -0.076*** -0.118*** -0.031
(7.10) (2.77) (6.17) (1.16)
Home owned 0.015 -0.072*** 0.007 -0.027
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(0.70) (3.03) (0.30) (0.99)
Home mortgaged 0.120*** 0.068*** 0.105*** 0.142***
(5.54) (3.44) (4.99) (5.94)
Limbs 0.249*** 0.088*** 0.198*** 0.115***
(12.11) (4.72) (10.49) (3.97)
Sight/hearing 0.269*** 0.085*** 0.226*** 0.120***
(6.83) (4.94) (5.78) (3.53)
Skin, breathing and 0.259*** 0.107*** 0.237*** 0.124***
organs (11.74) (3.71) (10.91) (3.73)
Other 0.107*** 0.072*** 0.114*** 0.085***
(4.05) (3.79) (4.89) (2.78)
Number of health -0.063*** 0.001 -0.053*** -0.013*
problems (17.99) (0.19) (16.02) (1.77)
Notes'. Marginal effects accompany probit models in Table 3.14. , and denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level. The controls for within group differences are highlighted in bold.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISABILITY AND PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT
4.1 Introduction
The existing literature on discrimination against the disabled is dominated by the 
analysis of employment and earnings (see Blackaby et al., 1999 and Kidd et al., 
2000). Whilst these studies identify direct discrimination, marginalisation of the 
disabled may also take the form of restricting opportunities for the disabled, for 
example, in particular sectors or in non-standard forms of employment (see Schur, 
2002, 2003 and Hotchkiss, 2004a for US studies). As in the US, disabled workers in 
the UK are more likely to be employed in several types of non-traditional 
employment, for example, on temporary contracts (see Table 4.1). However, the 
most significant difference is in the prevalence of part-time work among the 
disabled. In 2003, 11 percent of disabled male employees work part-time compared 
to 5 percent of the non-disabled group and 49 percent of disabled females work part- 
time compared to 39 percent of the non-disabled group. While several studies in the 
UK have identified the concentration of females in part-time employment, (see for 
example, Manning and Petrongolo, 2004), these studies have not identified the 
important role it plays for the disabled.
Discrimination is not the only reason the disabled may be concentrated in part-time 
employment. Schur (2002) highlights two alternative explanations for the observed 
concentration of the disabled in non-standard forms of employment in the US. 
Firstly, disabled individuals may use non-standard employment as a way of 
accommodating their disability or as a transitional step to full-time employment and, 
thus, they may have different preferences towards non-standard work. Secondly, 
disability benefits in the US impose a limit on earnings and, therefore, restrict the 
number of hours worked, encouraging part-time, rather than full-time work for 
disabled individuals in receipt of benefit income. The policy implications of this
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depend crucially on whether the reasons underlying the concentration of the disabled 
in part-time employment represent constrained or voluntary choices for the disabled. 
If part-time employment provides the only viable source of employment due to the 
limitations imposed by their health, or, if it provides a path through which the 
disabled move from inactivity to full-time employment, then it may be a mechanism 
to increase employment amongst the disabled. If, in contrast, employers are 
constraining the opportunities of the disabled by limiting them to roles with fewer 
opportunities for progression and lower average earnings, this form of unequal 
treatment should be recognised. It is an examination of this issue that forms the basis 
for the rest of this Chapter.
Data from the LFS in 2003 are used to identify the causes of the higher incidence of 
part-time employment amongst the disabled. Using a bivariate probit model, which 
takes into account selection into employment, it is possible to control for differences 
in the characteristics of disabled workers that may affect their probability of being in 
part-time employment. Predicted conditional part-time employment probabilities can 
then be used to identify the proportion of the part-time employment gap that is 
unexplained between the disability groups; that is, the part that is not due to 
differences in the observable characteristics between the groups. This unexplained 
component is traditionally used to measure unequal treatment in the labour market. 
If, however, disabled individuals have different preferences for part-time work, via 
the role part-time employment plays as a workplace accommodation, this effect will 
be included in the unexplained gap, making it difficult to identify discrimination 
directly. In this Chapter, marginalisation by employers is separated from differences 
in preferences for part-time work by extending the method used by DeLeire (2001) to 
examine wage discrimination. The non-work-limited disabled group, who have a 
long-term health problem that does not affect either the amount or type of work they 
can do, are assumed to have no reason to choose part-time employment as a source 
of accommodation; thus any unexplained component relative to the non-disabled will 
only reflect unequal treatment. In a similar decomposition for the work-limited 
disabled, the unexplained component will reflect both unequal treatment and 
differences in preferences. If, as in DeLeire (2001), unequal treatment is assumed 
constant between the two disabled groups, the importance of part-time employment 
as a way of accommodating disabled workers can be identified.
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The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly considers 
the previous evidence relating to disability and non-standard employment in the US 
and discusses how these effects may differ in the UK. Section 4.3 outlines the data 
and empirical methodology. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results and 
Section 4.5 briefly concludes.
4.2 Background
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several studies in the US document the concentration of 
disabled workers in non-standard forms of employment, including part-time 
employment (Schur 2002, 2003 and Hotchkiss, 2004a). Schur (2002) uses data from 
the CPS and the SIPP to highlight the negative effect of part-time employment on 
both earnings and entitlement to other benefits such as health insurance and pension 
rights. However, she notes that part-time employment can be an intermediate step for 
some who want to go on to full-time work. When examining transitions over a year, 
she found that this effect was no more important for the disabled, with 28 percent of 
the part-time disabled moving to full-time employment compared to 33 percent of 
the non-disabled. Using the same data, Schur (2003) focuses on the reasons for the 
high rates of non-traditional employment among disabled workers and finds little 
evidence to support the influence of discrimination or earnings limits imposed by 
benefits. Instead, she suggests the high rates of part-time employment reflect a 
voluntary choice of the disabled to accommodate their health concerns. Higher rates 
of part-time employment among more severely disabled workers, particularly those 
who make more frequent visits to the doctors or hospital, support the accommodation 
theory. Moreover, despite 27 percent of disabled part-time employees receiving 
disability benefits, an increase in the earnings limit did not increase the earnings of 
disabled workers substantially, which suggests the earnings limits set by benefits are 
not an important consideration.
Hotchkiss (2004a) focuses specifically on part-time employment and identifies not 
only a higher incidence of part-time employment amongst the disabled, but also that 
the incidence of part-time employment among this group has increased from 27 
percent in 1984 to 33 percent in 2000. She suggests the increase in the earnings
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allowance associated with benefit receipt in the 1990s may be a possible cause for 
this increase, but that it is also consistent with employers willing to make 
accommodations in line with the ADA. However, Hotchkiss (2004a) concludes that 
the growth in part-time employment was largely voluntary, finding little evidence to 
support the argument that opportunities are being constrained by employers.
Whilst the theories relating to employer marginalisation and work-place 
accommodation apply in the UK, variations in the benefit regime and legislation 
provide different incentives to undertake part-time employment. In the UK, 
incapacity benefit is intended for those who are unable to work due to sickness or 
disability; however, permitted work can take the form of earnings up to £2 0 . 0 0  a 
week for an unlimited period or earnings of less than £78.00 per week for a 26 week 
period. In a similar manner to the US, therefore, only part-time work is permitted 
whilst in receipt of disability benefit.96 However, while 9.5 percent of people 
claiming SSDI or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are employed in the US 
(Schur, 2003), in the UK the employment rate for incapacity benefit claimants is only
4.3 percent. As expected, a higher proportion of disabled part-time workers are in 
receipt of incapacity benefits than full-time workers (Table 4.1), but the figures are 
far lower than the corresponding rates in the US. The limited evidence that is 
available, therefore, suggests disability benefits may contribute to the choice over 
hours but the dominant effect in the UK is on participation.
The evidence presented in Figure 4.1, unlike in the US, shows the proportion of the 
disabled employed part-time has followed a similar pattern as the non-disabled 
between 1997 and 2003: it is fairly constant for females and increasing slightly for 
males.97 In contrast to the US experience following the ADA, there is no evidence to 
suggest part-time employment of the disabled has increased amongst the work- 
limited disabled relative to the non-disabled since the DDA. Indeed, the implications 
of the DDA on part-time employment are not obvious. Disabled individuals may 
have more freedom to request reductions in hours of work as a reasonable 
accommodation, but, equally, employers may perceive it to be too expensive to make
96 A maximum limit of 16 hours applies.
97 The same also applies if  data from 1994-2003 are considered; however, due to the discontinuity in 
the definition o f disability in the LFS, this is not presented here.
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• 98 * #*physical workplace accommodations for a disabled part-time worker. In addition, 
the role that part-time employment plays as a route into full-time employment 
appears to be quite limited in the UK. Using evidence from the longitudinal element 
of the LFS, 7.8 percent of disabled part-time workers are found to be in full-time 
employment one year later, compared to 1 0 .8  percent of non-disabled part-time 
workers." This Chapter, therefore, focuses on the two dominant explanations in the 
literature, unequal treatment by employers and differences in preferences, which are 
thought to be driven by the need for shorter hours to accommodate a disability. 100
4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 The Data
As in Chapter 3, the data is taken from the LFS and, since the construction of the 
data for 2003 and the definitions of disability status have already been explained in 
Section 3.3.1, such discussion is not repeated here. To a more limited extent, the 
justification bias hypothesis (discussed in Section 2.3) may also extend to the choice 
between full-time and part-time work and, if present, would cause the impact of 
disability on part-time employment to be overestimated. However, data from the 
2003 HSE is used to confirm that the concentration of the disabled in part-time 
employment is not specific to the definition or the dataset used in the analysis and, 
importantly, extends to more objective measures of health, which are far less likely 
to suffer from justification bias. 101
The sample consists of individuals of working age but excludes full-time students, 
the self-employed, those on government training schemes and unpaid family
98 This effect would act in the opposite direction to constraining the disabled into part-time 
employment. However, the Access to Work scheme in the UK should limit the real financial cost 
imposed on employers for accommodation.
99 Data covers annual transitions for four quarterly periods from Spring to Winter 2003-2004. These 
numbers are based on small cell sizes.
100 In the US there is an additional incentive to employ individuals on a part-time rather than full-time 
basis, since part-time workers are often not eligible for benefits such as medical insurance.
101 The concentration in part-time employment is higher amongst those with more specific health 
measures such as taking medicine, experiencing pain, difficulty with mobility, difficulty with self 
care, difficulty with usual activity, anxiety or depression. Physical and mental wellbeing index (EQ-5 
and GHQ12) values also confirm this. For more details about the HSE see Section 6.3.2.
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workers. Since the choice of part-time or full-time employment is only observed for 
those who are employed, who may represent a non-random selection of the 
population, the type of employment is modelled using a bivariate probit model with 
selection (see Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981). This model has been applied 
previously to part-time employment by Hotchkiss (2004a).
4.3.2 The Econometric Model
A bivariate probit model is estimated separately for each of the j  disability groups (/= 
Dj, D2, N) and for each gender. The latent variable determining employment is:
^  (4-1)
and the observed variable Eu is related to E*y as follows:
ll if  E y > 0 
,J 0  otherwise
Those in employment ( ^ = 1 )  are restricted to employees and the non-employed 
( Ey =0) include both the unemployed and the inactive. The part-time employment 
equation is:
P<l = f i jX,  + £, (4.2)
where the variable Ptj, which is only observed if Eij= 1, is related to the latent 
variable P*$ as follows:
/>.= 1 if^ >0 
lJ 0  otherwise
Thus, Py= 1 and P& = 0 indicate part-time and full-time employment respectively 
and, following similar studies, a self-assessed measure of part-time and full-time
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work is used. 102 However, it is reassuring to note the degree of consistency between 
the self-reporting of part-time employment and hours. The percentage of self- 
reported part-time workers, who report total usual hours in the main job equal to or 
less than 30, is 97 percent, compared to 4 percent for those who self-report full-time 
employment.
It is assumed that and £y are distributed as bivariate normal with zero means, unit 
variances and that the correlation between the two errors is P j . Given unobservables 
may affect both equations (for example, ability) the correlation may be non­
zero (pj ^  0 ) and, in this situation, the results from a simple probit model will be 
biased.
The variables that determine employment, Yy , are standard in the literature and
include age, age squared, marital status, ethnicity, educational qualifications, the 
presence of dependent children, housing related variables and a set of regional 
controls. 103 These variables are also included as determinants of part-time
employment, X tj. In this type of model, identification is achieved by including at
least one variable in the selection equation that does not affect the outcome equation. 
As Sartori (2003) notes, the model can be estimated with identical explanatory 
variables, but it then relies on weak identification through the non-linear error term. 
In the current context, it is difficult to find an appropriate identifying variable that 
will affect the employment decision, but not the choice of hours. 104 However, 
identification is achieved in this model by including a variable indicating the length
102 Manning and Petrongolo (2004) discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages o f this type of 
measure, but argue that the differences that arise from using alternative definitions are small.
103 See Table A3.1 for a description of variables that were also included in Chapter 3. In this analysis 
an additional variable is included to capture the influence of childcare on part-time employment. 
Dependent children < 2, denotes the total number o f dependent children in the household aged less 
than 2 if  the respondent is the head of household or spouse, and is zero otherwise. One further variable 
is specific to this Chapter; this is a dummy variable (mover), which indicates the length o f time at the 
present residence is less than 12 months, zero otherwise.
104 In the case o f identical explanatory variables between the selection and outcome equation, Sartori 
(2003) proposes an alternative estimator, which assumes the error terms in the two equations are 
perfectly correlated for a given observation (p  =1 or Pj = - 1 ) .  This estimator is applied to the data;
however, for the majority o f specifications the correlation between the two errors terms violates the 
assumptions required for the technique. Results are therefore are not reported here.
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of time at the present residence was less than 12 months.105 Whilst a change of 
residence may involve a period without employment, it is less likely to change an 
individual’s preference between full and part-time work. 106 Indeed, a short duration 
at the current residence is found to have a negative effect on employment (with the 
exception of disabled men) but does not have a significant effect on the choice of 
hours. 107
Additional variables that are observed only for the employed are included in ^ y ,
such as industry, occupation, firm size and sector. For the disabled, a separate 
specification is estimated that supplements the above model, with controls for the 
type of health problem and the number of health problems, to examine within group 
heterogeneity. Five health groups are identified: namely, main health problem effects 
(i) limbs; (ii) sight and hearing; (iii) skin, breathing and organs; (iv) mental health 
and (v) other.
Since the focus of this Chapter is the part-time employment decision, the estimates 
from the bivariate probit model are used to form the predicted probability of part- 
time employment conditional on employment (P? ). The average probability for the
y'th group, with sample 77^ , is:
pc  _ 1 y 1 ^ 2 ( Pj Xy , 7jYjj, p j )
7 r j j h  <IXyjYy)
where d>2() represents the bivariate normal distribution and 0 () the standard normal 
distribution. An Oaxaca (1973) type decomposition, which was applied to the
105 Variations o f this measure including 3 and 6 months were also tested, but did not improve the 
identification o f the model.
106 It could also be argued the unemployed have more incentive to relocate.
107 Since, for disabled men, the bivariate probit relies on weak identification, the robustness of the 
results is tested using a simple probit model of the second stage (that is, assuming p .  = 0 ). In a
similar manner to equations (4.4) and (4.5), a probit decomposition (Gomulka and Stem, 1990) is 
applied to decompose the probability of part-time employment into explained and unexplained 
components. The sensitivity of the main results are also tested by controlling for unobservable 
characteristics (for example, preferences, motivation) which may contribute to any unexplained 
difference between the groups identified in equations (4.4) and (4.5). The decomposition is computed 
using estimates from a random effects probit model on individuals who enter the LFS in 2003, using 
the 5 quarter longitudinal LFS data.
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bivariate probit model by Mohanty (2002), can be used to isolate the unexplained 
difference in predicted conditional probabilities. This represents the difference in 
part-time employment due to differences in the coefficient structure between the 
groups, conditional on the same employment equation. 108 For the work-limited, the 
unexplained gap is109:
( p c _ p c \  _ 1 N^iN>Pn) 1 ^  Q 2 (f3NX iN>y NYiN, p N)
( A " W i ”d -  »/„ tr  <iXrKr„) 'nNh
(4.4)
For the non-work-limited the unexplained gap is:
( p c _ p c \ _ 1 y ' ^ 2 (PD2X iN, YNYiN, p N) 1 2{ p NX iN, y NYiN, p N)
O, W h in e d  -  £  ^  J
(4.5)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4.4) is the predicted conditional 
probability of being employed part-time, if the non-disabled have the same 
coefficients for the part-time employment equation as the work-limited disabled, 
conditional on their own employment equation and characteristics. Therefore, the 
difference captures the effect of having a different coefficient structure between 
groups only when choosing part-time or full-time employment. Thus, equation (4.4) 
captures the effect of both differences in preferences for accommodation and
108 Note this differs from the total unexplained gap o f a decomposition of equation (4.3) for the work- 
limited disabled and the non-disabled. Equations (4.4) and (4.5) represent the unexplained gap of the 
second choice decision only. The reason for this distinction is that, if  all coefficients are allowed to 
vary, the difference between the work-limited and the non-work-limited in equation (4.4) will be the 
combined influence o f discrimination and unobserved productivity effects in employment and 
marginalisation and accommodation effects in part-time employment. Equation (4.5) will, then, 
identify the combined influence o f discrimination in employment and marginalisation in the part- 
time/full-time decision. However, each of the separate influences cannot be identified. By focusing 
only on the second stage, the influence o f marginalisation and accommodation can both be identified, 
but, o f course, the technique assumes that the influence of discrimination on entry to employment can 
be separated from the marginalisation that may occur in the second stage.
109 The non-disabled have been used as the reference category given their dominance in the 
population. The results are not sensitive to this and are similar if  the pooled coefficient structure is 
used. The results presented in Table 4.8 enable a comparison to be made across each of the three 
alternative base groups.
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discrimination. Isolating each of these effects, therefore, requires a decomposition in 
a similar manner to DeLeire (2001).
The DeLeire (2001) model is modified in order to apply it to the choice of hours. 
Firstly, the non-work-limited disabled are assumed to have no need to accommodate 
their disability in work; thus the unexplained gap, equation (4.5), will only reflect 
unequal treatment in the hours of work equation, since any differences in preferences 
are assumed to be zero. 110 Secondly, if it is also assumed that any form of unequal 
treatment against the non-work-limited disabled, in terms of employers marginalising 
the disabled into part-time employment, is equal to that experienced by the work- 
limited disabled, then the difference between equations (4.4) and (4.5) will measure 
the effect of workplace accommodations. 111 Clearly, this interpretation rests on the 
assumption that all disabled workers are equally discriminated against in the hours 
equation, but this will not hold if discrimination is positively related to the work- 
limiting nature of the disability. In this case, therefore, a lower bound of unequal 
treatment in employment type is identified for the work-limited disabled.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Part-time employment is a more important source of work in the UK than the US, 
representing 24 percent and 13 percent of employment respectively. 112 In both 
countries, part-time employment rates are higher for disabled employees than the 
non-disabled (see Table 4.1 for the UK), although the difference in the UK, where 
part-time employment represents 2 2  percent of employment for the non-disabled and 
30 percent for the disabled, is not as dramatic as in the US, where the rates are 13 
percent and 30 percent respectively (see Schur, 2003 for the US data). Importantly 
for the DeLeire (2001) type approach, it is interesting to note that there is no 
significant difference in the concentration of workers in part-time employment 
between the non-work-limited and the non-disabled and, therefore, the concentration 
in part-time employment is restricted to the work-limited disabled. Figure 4.1
110 Of course, unequal treatment in the employment equation may still exist.
111 This is equivalent to )unexplained evaluated at the non-disabled base.
112 Source: OECD Labour Market Data 2004. Employees aged 15-64.
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confirms this and shows these trends have been a consistent feature of UK data since 
1997. The data in Table 4.1 also show that, as identified in Schur (2002), there is a 
wage penalty for working part-time. Full-time work-limited disabled male workers 
earn 84 percent of the average for full-time non-disabled male workers, 79 percent 
for part-time males, 87 percent for full-time females and 93 percent for part-time 
females. However, relative to full-time workers, average hourly earnings are lower 
for part-time workers and, thus, part-time disabled men only earn 62 percent of the 
non-disabled full-time wage.
Given the aim of this Chapter, it is interesting to examine the reasons for part-time 
employment reported by those currently employed part-time (Table 4.2). Just over 17 
percent of the work-limited disabled report their part-time employment status is due 
to their disability. The corresponding proportion for the non-work-limited disabled is 
significantly lower at 1 percent, which provides some support for the first DeLeire 
(2001) assumption. Importantly, Table 4.2 suggests that there is no significant 
difference in the proportion reporting that they could not find full-time work across 
the disability groups, suggesting a limited role for discrimination. However, it is also 
important to recognise that there may be differences in observable characteristics 
between the groups that contribute to the differences identified in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Table 4.3 presents the mean values of the variables included in the analysis. An 
important feature of these data is the differences in educational attainment achieved 
by each of the disability groups, which may contribute to their varying 
concentrations of part-time employment. The work-limited disabled are less than half 
as likely to have qualifications at degree level and have a higher concentration with 
no qualifications (the omitted group) than the non-disabled. Consistent with this, the 
work-limited disabled are underrepresented in professional occupations, but are 
concentrated in occupations such as personal services, plant and machine operatives
and other elementary occupations, where part-time employment is also more
11  ^ * common. Similarly, in terms of industry, the work-limited disabled are
concentrated in distribution and hotels, an industry which is associated with high
rates of part-time employment. Moreover, the work-limited disabled are, also, more
113 The Duncan and Duncan (1955) index of occupational segregation between part-time and full-time 
workers is relatively similar between disability groups and is greater than the occupational segregation 
that exists between disabled and non-disabled workers, regardless o f employment type.
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likely to be employed in small firms, where part-time employment is also more 
prevalent.
4.4.2 Bivariate Probit Model
Estimates of the bivariate probit models for each of the disability groups are 
presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 for males and females respectively. 114 A likelihood 
ratio test indicates the rho parameter is significant at the 1 0  percent level in all 
specifications. 115 This supports the bivariate probit model adopted here and suggests 
that inferences may be misleading when no correction is made for selection into 
employment. 116 In all specifications the correlation is negative, indicating that 
unobservables that affect employment positively (for example, ability) have a 
negative effect on the probability of part-time employment.
The coefficient estimates from the employment equation are largely in accordance 
with expectations and, since these influences are discussed in Chapter 3, the focus 
here is on the estimates from the part-time employment equation, which are 
qualitatively similar across the disability groups. As expected, many of the variables 
influence part-time employment in the opposite direction to employment. For 
example, part-time employment decreases with age, although at a diminishing rate. 
In contrast, living in social rented accommodation and being a member of an ethnic 
minority both have a positive effect on the probability of part-time employment. To 
reiterate a point mentioned earlier, the identifying variable, having moved residence 
in the last 1 2  months, is negative and significant throughout for females; however, 
for males it is only a significant determinant of employment for the non-disabled. 
Thus, for the two disabled male groups, the model relies on weak identification.
There are some gender specific effects, which may be expected, given the motivation 
behind working part-time may be different for men and women, since it is typically
117 • •the latter that provide the majority of childcare. Consistent with this, being married
114 Marginal effects are presented for males and females in Appendix Tables A4.1 and A4.2 
respectively.
115 The only exception to this is for the work-limited disabled females, where the correlation lies just 
outside the 10 percent significance level.
116 The variables, typically, have a similar qualitative influence in the probit model.
117 It is, o f course, also the case that the results for males are based on a much smaller sample than for 
females, which may be driving some o f the differences observed.
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and having dependent children increases the probability of part-time employment for 
females. For males, whilst marriage has no significant effect, having another earner 
in the household reduces the probability of working part-time. Possessing higher 
qualifications has a consistently strong negative effect on part-time employment for 
females consistent with an increased opportunity cost of non-work activities such as
childcare. Moreover, consistent with the results in Chapter 3, the effect of education
118is greater for work-limited disabled females than the other groups. For work- 
limited disabled males, having medium level qualifications reduces the probability of 
working part-time relative to the base group who have no qualifications. 119 In 
contrast, for the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled groups, having the 
highest level qualifications (such as a degree) has a positive effect on part-time 
employment.
The employment related variables have an important influence on the choice of 
hours, working in a small firm increases the probability of working part-time, 
whereas working in manufacturing, banking and finance, transport and 
communication and, for males only, construction decreases the probability of 
working part-time. Relative to being in a managerial role, all other occupations have 
a positive influence on part-time employment, and the effect is strongest for 
elementary and sales and customer service occupations.
Table 4.6 presents the specifications for the disabled that are supplemented with 
controls for heterogeneity within the disabled group. 120 For the work-limited 
disabled, consistent with previous evidence (Blackaby et al., 1999 and Kidd et al., 
2 0 0 0 ), mental health problems (the omitted group) are found to have the most 
negative effect on employment for both disabled males and females. Similarly, 
individuals with any health problems, other than mental health, have a lower 
probability of being employed part-time, confirming the severe labour difficulties
171 •faced by individuals in this group. The number of health problems, which is 
frequently used to proxy the severity of the disability, has a negative effect on
118 For example, having a degree reduces the probability o f part-time employment by 23 percent for 
disabled females, but only 11 percent for non-disabled females.
119 The effects are only significant for qualifications, up to and including A levels.
120 Marginal effects are presented in Appendix Table A4.3.
121 The ‘otber’ health group is not significantly different to mental health for females.
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employment, as expected. This variable also has a positive effect on part-time 
employment, which is consistent with the workplace accommodation argument. 
Moreover, the number of health problems does not affect the choice of hours for the 
non-work-limited disabled, which lends support to the assumption that their 
disability does not affect their choice of hours.
4.4.3 Conditional Probabilities
The bivariate probit models, presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, are used to estimate the 
conditional part-time employment probabilities for each gender and disability group 
and these results are presented in the Table 4.7. Consistent with the evidence 
presented in Table 4.1, the conditional part-time employment probability is 11 
percent for disabled males, more than double their non-disabled counterparts, and 50 
percent for disabled females, just over 1 0  percentage points higher than the non­
disabled. Table 4.8 shows the effect of changing the coefficients in the part-time 
employment equation on the predicted probabilities, whilst all other components are 
left constant. If non-disabled males behave as the work-limited disabled, their 
predicted conditional probability of part-time employment would rise to nearly 16% 
(row 3, column 1), an 11 percentage point increase over their own conditional 
probability. Similarly for females, the probability rises to 58 percent, nearly 19 
percentage points higher than their own rate. Reassuringly, if the work-limited 
disabled are assumed to have the same part-time employment coefficients as the non­
disabled (row 1, column 3), their predicted conditional probability of part-time 
employment falls relative to their own behaviour. It is clear that, for a given set of 
observable characteristics and selection equation, the part-time employment 
coefficients for the work-limited disabled increase the conditional probability of part- 
time employment.
The unexplained gaps reflect a combination of differences in preferences and 
employer discrimination. If, instead, the coefficients from the non-work-limited 
disabled are imposed on the non-disabled (row 3, column 2), the probability of part- 
time employment rises only slightly, by less than 1 percentage point for males and 
females. Thus, it is the work-limiting nature of the disability that is driving these 
results and, under the assumptions of DeLeire (2001), this means that the majority of 
the part-time employment gap is due to the role of part-time employment as an
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accommodation for a work-limiting disability. The effect of employer 
marginalisation, albeit a lower bound estimate, is very small, accounting for only 7 
percent and 3 percent of the unexplained disability gap in part-time employment for 
work-limited disabled males and females respectively. 122,123
4.5 Conclusion
This Chapter presents evidence which identifies the concentration of disabled 
workers in part-time work in the UK, a feature shared with recent evidence from the 
US. By extending a method proposed by DeLeire (2001), an issue raised in the US 
literature, that is, if  part-time employment is a result of employer restrictions or 
choices made by the disabled, is considered. The conditional probability of part-time 
employment is modelled using a bivariate probit model which controls for non- 
random selection into employment. Holding observable characteristics constant, the 
evidence suggests that the probability of part-time employment for the non-disabled 
would only increase if they behave like the work-limited disabled (and not the non­
work-limited disabled) when choosing hours. This is consistent with the work- 
limiting nature of the disability being the principal determinant of part-time 
employment and, following the assumptions of a DeLeire (2001) type approach, 
provides more support for part-time employment as a workplace accommodation 
than discrimination against the entire disabled group.
These conclusions are consistent with recent evidence in the US, which also supports 
the voluntary nature of the decision (Schur, 2003 and Hotchkiss, 2004a). Moreover, 
given the limitations with respect to identification in the bivariate probit, particularly
122 The decomposition uses the non-disabled group as the base; however, the results are not sensitive 
to this. For example, if  the work-limited disabled are used (Pc -F ^) .. =0.090 and
r  ’ V  D, 1 N  /unexplained
/p c _ p C \  =0.005.
V D2 N  /unexplained
123 For the cross sectional probit decomposition ( /^ -P ^ ) unexplained=0.042 (males) and 0.070 (females)
and (p£  - / ^ ) unexplajned =-0.008 (males) and -0.015 (females). Whilst the values of(p£  - / ^ ) unexplained are
smaller than in the bivariate probit decomposition, the overall conclusions remain the same. 
Workplace accommodation plays a far greater role than discrimination in the choice of part-time 
employment. Indeed, the small negative discrimination effect is consistent with there being no 
discrimination against the disabled in terms o f hours. It is also reassuring to note that these results are 
robust to using the longitudinal data (all who entered the LFS in 2003) and, the results are 
qualitatively similar for females after controlling for random effects. For males, however, the small 
sample sizes precluded this additional estimation.
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for disabled males, it is reassuring to note that the main conclusions are robust to 
estimation using a probit decomposition, and are consistent with the self-reported 
reasons for part-time employment. However, further analysis on the basis of the days 
and times of employment, in addition to the distribution of total hours, may further 
our understanding of how these features facilitate or impede the disabled in accessing 
work.
Heterogeneity within the disabled group is also identified on the basis of the type and 
severity of health problem. Individuals with mental health problems are significantly 
more likely to be employed part-time, in addition to being the least likely to be in 
employment, confirming the particular labour market disadvantage faced by this 
disabled group. Part-time employment also increases with the number of health 
problems, supporting its role in facilitating employment for those that otherwise 
could not work.
Further examination of this issue would naturally be extended to consider the 
dynamic nature of disability and the associated labour market transitions. 
Longitudinal data could be used to examine if transitions into (out from) part-time 
employment are the result of disability onset (exit). Moreover, it may be possible to 
identify if transitions between full and part-time work are associated with a change in 
the nature of employment and/or employer. Movements between full-time and part- 
time work within the same position would provide support for employer provided 
accommodations. Separate examination of the earnings of full-time and part-time 
workers may also provide insights into the relative magnitude of unexplained 
earnings differences and thus, possibly, a further motivation for the choice of hours. 
Equally, future research needs to consider other mechanisms through which the 
disabled may accommodate their disability. Consideration is given to the issue of 
self-employment in Chapter 5, but other features of employment that appear to be 
important and that have received little attention include home working and travel to 
work.
139
Figure 4.1. Proportion of Employees in Part-time Employment, 1997-2003
60
50
40
30
20
10
_  .     *  •-
■- ■   ■    «=-■-k--------------------------------------------------------  *-A--""
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
■ Male non-disabled Female non-disabled
-a— Male non-work-limited disabled -  Female non-work-limited disabled
Male work-limited disabled -  • -  Female work-limited disabled
Notes: The sample is restricted to UK employees of working age and excludes full-time students. Data 
are obtained from the Summer quarter o f the LFS for each year.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Male Female
Work-
limited
disabled
Non-work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non-work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Employment 
rate (%)
37.41*** 87.20*** 88.62 36.02*** 77.30 77.20
Of those in employment
% in part-time 
employment
11.33*** 5.25 5.00 49 4 3 *** 39.17 39.49
% temporary 
contract
5  ^1*** 3.62* 4.12 6.53*** 4.71** 5.48
% flexible 
working hours
9.83 8.96 8.81 13.28 14.30 1 2 .6 8
% shiftwork 22.93 21.54 21.90 16.94 15.64 15.59
Part-time employment
Average hourly 
earnings (£)
7.43** 9.25 9.37 7.33** 7.33*** 7.92
% Incapacity
benefit
claimants
7.76 3.44
Full-time employment
Average hourly 
earnings (£)
1 0 .0 2 *** 11.73 11.94 8.61*** 9 4 9 *** 9.87
% Incapacity 
benefit claimant
1.73 2.27
Notes: Data relate to 2003 and the sample is restricted to UK employees o f working age and excludes 
full-time students. ***,** and * denote differences from the relevant non-disabled comparator group 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
Table 4.2. Reason for Part-time Employment
Work-limited
disabled
Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Student 1 7 7 *** 2 .0 1 *** 4.08
111 or disabled 17 i9*** 1 .2 0 *** 0.25
Could not find full­
time job
9.38 8 .8 6 9.52
Did not want full­
time work
71.67*** 87.93** 86.15
Notes: See notes to Table 4.1. Figures relate to percentage o f valid responses within each group.
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Table 4.3. Variable Means
Males Females
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work
-limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work
-limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Employment 0.370 0.871 0.884 0.357 0.770 0.770
Part-time 0.115 0.053 0.049 0.497 0.394 0.396
Age 47.537 45.792 39.014 44.330 42.401 38.173
Single 0.282 0.240 0.360 0.227 0.241 0.302
Married 0.584 0.678 0.573 0.577 0.629 0.597
Degree 0.079 0.174 0.214 0.071 0.134 0.174
Other higher education 0.058 0.093 0.087 0.080 0.109 0.105
A Level 0.272 0.320 0.282 0.124 0.159 0.161
O level 0.129 0.153 0.177 0.218 0.266 0.277
Other qualifications 0.158 0.138 0.130 0.159 0.159 0.139
Home owned 0.251 0.242 0.176 0.205 0.204 0.159
Home mortgaged 0.347 0.582 0.620 0.382 0.551 0.603
Social housing 0.316 0.107 0.104 0.331 0.164 0.139
Dependent children 0.464 0.529 0.682 0.658 0.704 0.913
Dependent child<2 0.035 0.045 0.075 0.042 0.056 0.098
White 0.933 0.956 0.930 0.921 0.947 0.919
Other earner 0.420 0.632 0 .6 6 6 0.508 0.679 0.718
Small firm 0.274 0.238 0.239 0.318 0.293 0.288
Agriculture & fishing 0.013 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 1 0.004 0.004 0.003
Manufacturing 0.238 0.254 0.238 0.078 0.077 0.087
Construction 0.084 0.092 0 .1 0 0 0 .0 1 2 0.018 0.015
Distribution 0.175 0.153 0.160 0.234 0 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 2
Transport &
communication 0.107 0.103 0 .1 0 1 0.032 0.036 0.039
Banking & finance 0 .1 2 2 0.141 0.152 0 .1 2 2 0.138 0.151
Public admin 0.189 0.180 0.178 0.457 0.471 0.445
Public sector 0 .2 0 1 0.204 0.195 0.373 0.388 0.374
Professional 0.103 0.126 0.142 0.079 0 .1 0 2 0.118
Associate professional 0.118 0.126 0.139 0.127 0.134 0.149
Administrative 0.061 0.053 0.054 0.217 0.253 0.240
Skilled trades 0.176 0.164 0.166 0.023 0.019 0.016
Personal service
occupations 0.034 0.025 0 .0 2 1 0.152 0.138 0.134
Sales & customer service 0.036 0.033 0.038 0.131 0.113 0 .1 1 0
Process, plant & machine 0.160 0.149 0.130 0.039 0.026 0.027
Elementary 0.176 0 .1 2 0 0.113 0.156 0.115 0.104
Mover 0.083 0.073 0 .1 1 0 0.077 0.088 0.113
Limbs 0.390 0.207 0.408 0.185
Sight or hearing 0.039 0.056 0.034 0.034
Skin, breathing & organs 0.321 0.627 0.253 0.561
Mental health 0.129 0.026 0.149 0.034
Other 0 .1 2 2 0.085 0.155 0.187
Number of health
problems 2.582 1.401 2.620 1.463
Notes: Means relate to regression samples
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Table 4.4. Male Part-time Bivariate Probit Estimates
Work-limited
disabled
Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Part Employ Part Employ Part Employ
Constant 1.073 -2 119*** 1.482* -2.620*** 1.520*** -2.420***
( 1 .1 0 ) (9.33) (1.69) (7.89) (3.69) (18.95)
Age -0 .1 1 1 *** 0.079*** -0.186*** q -0.184*** 0.169***
(6.09) (8.45) (7.96) (13.08) (14.18) (31.18)
Age squared/100 0.162*** -0 .1 2 1 *** 0.239*** -0.228*** 0.240*** -0 .2 2 0 ***
(7.33) (11.28) (8.75) (14.42) (14.77) (33.21)
Single 0.272** -0.103* 0.141 -0 .1 1 1 0.089 -0.092**
(2 .1 2) (1 .6 8 ) (0.98) (1 .10) (1.29) (2.03)
Married 0 .0 2 0 0 .1 2 1 ** -0 .0 1 2 0.129 0.006 0 .1 0 2 **
(0.16) (2.30) (0 .10) (1.49) (0 .10) (2.52)
North 0.385*** -0.364*** 0.215 -0.280*** 0.272*** -0.189***
(2.74) (5.41) (1.53) (2.62) (4.27) (4.15)
Yorkshire & 0.035 -0.141** -0 .0 0 1 0.062 0 .1 2 1 ** 0.003
Humberside (0.29) (2.42) (0 .0 1 ) (0.69) (2.32) (0.09)
East Midlands 0.133 -0.108* 0.042 0.029 -0.030 0.037
(1.05) (1.65) (0.33) (0.29) (0.48) (0.85)
East Anglia 0.094 -0.077 -0.103 0.039 0.033 0.025
(0.59) (0 .8 8 ) (0.60) (0.30) (0.41) (0.44)
South West 0 .2 0 1 0.038 -0.060 0.008 0.116** 0.052
(1.63) (0.61) (0.49) (0.09) (2 .11) (1.25)
West Midlands 0.217** -0.086 -0.089 -0.059 0.042 0.086**
(1.97) (1.44) (0.69) (0.65) (0.78) (2 .2 0 )
North West 0.174 -0.264*** -0.064 -0.124 0.013 -0.053
(1.39) (4.66) (0.52) (1.48) (0.25) (1.44)
Wales 0.400*** -0.398*** 0.037 0.025 -0.005 -0 .1 1 2 **
(2.81) (5.77) (0.26) (0 .2 1 ) (0.07) (2.29)
Scotland 0.293** -0.266*** -0.147 -0.158* -0.025 -0.015
(2.53) (4.39) (1.03) (1.75) (0.46) (0.39)
Northern Ireland 0.471** -0.592*** -0.421 -0.332** -0.119 -0.171***
(2.35) (6.92) (1.27) (2.23) (1.37) (3.24)
Degree -0.251 0.841*** 0.368** 0.060 0.243*** 0.308***
(0.90) (13.42) (2.37) (0.70) (3.23) (8.69)
Other higher -0.262 0.781*** 0.192 -0.088 0.156* 0.312***
education (0.99) (11.17) (1.29) (0.93) (1.94) (6 .8 8 )
A level -0.389*** 0.540*** 0.044 0.320*** -0.014 0.391***
(2.62) (12.55) (0.33) (4.34) (0 .2 1 ) (11.97)
O level -0.292* 0.555*** 0 .1 2 0 0.156* -0.065 0.316***
(1.67) (10.59) (0.93) (1.80) (1 .0 2 ) (9.00)
Other -0.285** 0.386*** -0.045 0.263*** -0.108* 0.306***
(2 .2 1 ) (7.85) (0.35) (3.05) (1.72) (8.35)
Home owned 0.309* 0.103 0.634*** -0.286*** 0.262*** -0.208***
(1.90) (1.64) (4.12) (2.83) (4.88) (5.22)
Home mortgaged -0.071 0.439*** 0.129 0.321*** -0.115** 0.229***
(0.38) (7.35) (0.74) (3.27) (2.19) (6.38)
Social housing 0.554*** -0.479*** 0.395** -0.387*** 0.304*** -0.568***
(3.97) (7.92) (2.34) (3.64) (3.97) (14.26)
Dependent 0.099** 0.008 0.054 -0.057 0.107*** -0.052***
children (2.27) (0.40) (1.18) (1.56) (5.89) (3.95)
Dependent child -0.312* 0.074 -0.254 0.045 -0.147** 0.093**
< 2 (1.81) (0 .8 6 ) (1.24) (0.33) (2.31) (2.05)
White -0.450*** 0.316*** -0.311** 0.409*** -0.482*** 0.359***
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(3.84) (4.91) (2 .2 2 ) (3.95) (9.44) (9.99)
Summer -0.055 0.052 -0.142 0.028 0.073* -0.031
(0 .6 8 ) (1.19) (1.59) (0.43) (1 .8 6) (1.08)
Autumn -0.031 -0.009 -0.035 0.062 -0.019 -0.013
(0.37) (0 .2 0 ) (0.40) (0.91) (0.46) (0.48)
Winter -0.089 0.081* -0.155* 0.044 0 .0 2 1 0.023
(1.09) (1.87) (1.72) (0.65) (0.53) (0.80)
Other earner -0.477*** 0 4 9 j *** -0.316*** 0 4 3 4 *** -0.226*** 0 3 8 7 ***
(4.97) (14.39) (3.13) (9.42) (4.98) (17.60)
Small firm 0.447*** 0.311*** 0.371***
(3.89) (3.70) (10.60)
Agriculture & -0 .1 2 0 -0.860** -0.414***
fishing (0.47) (2 .10) (3.33)
Manufacturing -0.490*** -0.670*** -0.684***
(2.94) (3.35) (9.45)
Construction -0.562*** -0.653*** -0.722***
(2.78) (2.90) (8.26)
Distribution 0.062 0.095 -0.015
(0.54) (0.75) (0.27)
Transport & -0.277* -0.273* -0.359***
communication (1.90) (1.85) (5.33)
Banking & -0.368** -0 .1 0 2 -0.423***
finance (2.40) (0.78) (6.47)
Public admin 0.106 0.254* 0.052
(0.83) (1 .8 8) (0.84)
Public sector -0.136 -0.217** -0.046
(1.26) (1.99) (0.90)
Professional 0.290* 0.378** 0.362***
(1.82) (2.52) (5.41)
Associate 0.306** 0.170 0.331***
professional (1.98) (1.19) (4.92)
Administrative 0.658*** 0.593*** 0.718***
(3.20) (3.21) (9.20)
Skilled trades 0.165 0.026 0.233***
(1 .2 1 ) (0.17) (3.31)
Personal service 0.511** 1.077*** 1 .0 1 0 ***
occupations (2.49) (4.24) (10.94)
Sales & 0.720*** 0.724*** 1.068***
customer service (3.21) (3.43) (12.90)
Process, plant & 0.365** 0.534*** 0.611***
machine (2.36) (3.19) (8.44)
Elementary 0.855*** 1 .0 2 2 *** 1.048***
(3.72) (4.60) (13.73)
Mover 0.025 -0.034 -0 .138***
(0.44) (0.37) (4.26)
P
(p-value)
-0.608 
LR (p=0): X2(l) = 
2.95 (p=0,086)
-0.696 
LR (p=0): X2(l) =2.87 
(p=0.090)
-0.402 
LR (p=0): X20)=4.17 
(p=0.041)
Observations 
Censored 
Log Likelihood 
Wald x 2(46) 
(p-value)
8643
5443
-5285.60
634.57
(0 .0 0 )
5813
751
-2546.27
563.73
(0 .0 0 )
32843
3794
14008.66
2214.30
(0 .0 0 )
Notes: Z statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Censored observations are those that are removed at the first (selection) stage. In this case 
they refer to the non-employed.
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Table 4.5. Female Part-time Bivariate Probit Estimates
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Part Employ Part Employ Part Employ
Constant -0.518 -1.625*** 0.500 -3.160*** -1.295*** -2.625***
(0.59) (6.47) (0.83) (9.80) (5.58) (2 1 .6 8 )
Age -0.016 0.054*** -0.132*** 0.172*** -0.059*** 0.157***
(0.80) (4.84) (7.18) (11.62) (7.41) (26.67)
Age squared/100 0.047** -0.090*** 0  jyQ *** -0.216*** 0.096*** -0 .2 0 0 ***
(1.99) (6.61) (8 .11) (11.87) (9.69) (26.58)
Single 0.069 -0.148*** -0.180** -0 .0 2 2 0.078** -0.108***
(0.79) (2.63) (2 .11) (0.28) (2 .2 0 ) (3.16)
Married 0.349*** -0 197*** 0.389*** -0.253*** 0.470*** -0.331***
(5.34) (4.52) (5.98) (3.94) (16.00) (11.26)
North 0.031 -0 .2 2 2 *** -0.116 -0.058 -0.123*** 0.064*
(0.27) (3.29) (1 .2 2 ) (0.65) (3.12) (1.73)
Yorkshire & 0.009 -0.103* -0 .1 0 1 0.135* 0.061* 0.106***
Humberside (0 .11) (1.79) (1.38) (1 .8 6 ) (1.94) (3.52)
East Midlands 0.126 -0.141** -0.043 0.013 -0.008 0.138***
(1.39) (2.17) (0.51) (0.16) (0 .2 1 ) (4.07)
East Anglia 0.025 -0.057 -0 .0 2 0 0.154 0.044 0.136***
(0 .2 1 ) (0.65) (0.17) (1.30) (0.99) (3.14)
South West 0.152* -0.015 -0 .0 0 0 0.060 0.058* 0.099***
(1.84) (0.25) (0 .0 0 ) (0.79) (1.76) (3.11)
West Midlands 0.044 -0.117** -0.218*** 0.057 0 .0 0 2 0.089***
(0.53) (2.03) (2.71) (0.75) (0.05) (2.97)
North West 0 .1 1 2 -0.194*** -0.165** 0.131* -0.126*** 0.145***
(1.32) (3.45) (2.26) (1.80) (4.12) (4.91)
Wales 0.113 -0.299*** -0.123 0.006 -0.160*** 0.166***
(0.99) (4.31) (1.19) (0.06) (3.89) (4.09)
Scotland 0.062 -0.227*** -0.149* 0.045 -0.128*** 0.180***
(0.64) (3.81) (1.94) (0.61) (4.04) (5.74)
Northern Ireland -0.043 -0.409*** -0.403*** 0.237* -0.365*** -0 .0 0 1
(0.26) (5.08) (2.81) (1.67) (7.85) (0 .0 2 )
Degree -0.681*** 1.005*** -0.320*** 0.691*** -0.268*** 0.723***
(4.15) (15.79) (2.97) (8.99) (5.97) (24.29)
Other higher -0.535*** 0.912*** -0.263** 0.689*** -0.193*** 0.817***
education (3.26) (15.45) (2.54) (8.82) (4.23) (24.10)
A level -0.567*** 0.718*** -0.237*** 0.591*** -0.172*** 0.577***
(5.03) (14.05) (2.64) (8.53) (4.48) (2 0 .2 1 )
0  level -0.374*** 0.615*** -0.196** 0.553*** -0.088** 0.508***
(3.23) (13.96) (2.41) (9.23) (2.51) (20.49)
Other -0.331*** 0.518*** -0.262*** 0.362*** -0.171*** 0.366***
(3.06) (10.95) (3.40) (5.67) (4.83) (13.23)
Home owned 0.128 0.095 0.394*** -0.007 0.317*** -0.064*
(1.2 0 ) (1.47) (3.98) (0.08) (8.37) (1.93)
Home mortgaged -0.224** 0.334*** -0.050 0.440*** 0.031 0.364***
(2.32) (5.60) (0.52) (5.80) (0 .8 6) (12.85)
Social housing 0.146 -0.438*** 0.209** -0.142* 0.231*** -0.287***
(1.13) (7.17) (2.15) (1.75) (5.65) (9.00)
Dependent 0.334*** -0.148*** 0.532*** -0.388*** 0.515*** -0.367***
children (1 0 .2 0 ) (7.80) (19.49) (15.97) (45.29) (40.38)
Dependent 0.659*** -0.468*** 0.644*** -0.416*** 0.568*** -0.501***
children < 2 (4.77) (5.35) (6 .2 2 ) (5.13) (16.56) (20.05)
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White 0.090 0.405*** 0.352** 0 430*** 0.338*** 0.400***
(0.56) (6.46) (2.52) (5.28) (7.63) (14.31)
Summer 0.033 -0.039 -0.074 -0.051 0.004 -0.069***
(0.54) (0.91) (1.28) (0.92) (0.15) (3.11)
Autumn 0.047 -0.039 0.016 -0 .0 1 2 -0.039* -0.030
(0.76) (0.91) (0.28) (0 .2 1 ) (1 .6 6 ) (1.34)
Winter 0.025 -0.043 0.050 -0.017 0.008 -0.029
(0.41) (0.98) (0 .8 8 ) (0.31) (0.36) (1.31)
Other earner -0 .2 1 2 ** 0 .435*** -0.056 0 376*** -0.017 0.297***
(2.30) (1 2 .2 1 ) (0 .8 8 ) (8 .0 2 ) (0 .6 8 ) (15.09)
Small firm 0.423*** 0.369*** 0.349***
(5.04) (7.53) (18.04)
Agriculture & -0.196 -0.318 -0.054
fishing (0.58) (0.98) (0.37)
Manufacturing -0.593*** -0.521*** -0.403***
(3.38) (4.05) (8 .2 0 )
Construction -0.156 0.136 -0 .1 0 2
(0.75) (0.82) (1.36)
Distribution -0.044 0.123 0.071*
(0.43) (1.23) (1.71)
Transport & -0.023 -0.316** -0.272***
communication (0.16) (2.28) (4.90)
Banking & -0.247** -0.057 -0.127***
finance (2 .11) (0.56) (3.03)
Public admin -0.019 0.064 0.117***
(0 .2 0 ) (0.69) (3.03)
Public sector 0.035 0.066 -0.008
(0.56) (1.13) (0.31)
Professional 0.586*** 0.303*** 0.365***
(3.59) (2.77) (8.47)
Associate 0.565*** 0.522*** 0.578***
professional (3.72) (5.23) (14.49)
Administrative 0.693*** 0.736*** 0.834***
(4.16) (7.68) (22.14)
Skilled trades 0.781*** 0.604*** 0.718***
(3.57) (3.59) (10.14)
Personal service 0.882*** 0.909*** 0 .8 8 6 ***
occupations (4.65) (8.28) (21.04)
Sales and 1.154*** 1.268*** 1 3 4 9 ***
customer service (4.96) (1 0 .2 0 ) (29.57)
Process, plant 0.691*** 1 .0 1 0 *** 0.778***
and machine (3.66) (5.91) (11.89)
Elementary 1.354*** 1.552*** 1.543***
(4.95) (11.58) (32.50)
Mover 0.107* -0 2 0 1 *** -0.163***
(1.79) (2.91) (6.27)
P
(p-value)
-0.724 
LR (p=0): x2(l) = 2.47 
(p= 0.1159)
-0.611 
LR(p=0): x 2(1 )= 6 .1 2  
(p=0.013)
-0.408 
LR (p=0): X2(l) = 
29.30 (p=0.000)
Observations 
Censored 
Log Likelihood 
Wald x 2(46) 
(p-value)
8631
5553
-6255.624
998.41
(0 .0 0 )
5937
1363
-4999.574
1261.53
(0 .0 0 )
37286
8579
-30845.43
8051.01
(0 .0 0 )
Notes: See notes to Table 4.4.
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Table 4.7. Predicted Conditional Part-time Employment Probabilities
Males Females
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Probability of 
employment
0.3714 0.8708 0.8846 0.3573 0.7703 0.7699
Conditional 
probability of 
part-time
employment ( P ? )
0.1144 0.0530 0.0495 0.4971 0.3935 0.3937
Notes: Predicted probabilities calculated from bivariate probit estimates presented in Tables 4.4 and 
4.5. Probabilities are calculated as follows:
-^ Emp ij ~  Y j^ ij)
4 > (  Tj Y,j )
Table 4.8. Decomposition of Predicted Conditional Part-time Employment
Probabilities
Coefficient vector on part-time employment equation
Males Pdx Pd2 P m
Disabled work-limited 0.1144 0.0295 0.0247
Disabled non-work-limited 0.1722 0.0530 0.0462
Non-disabled 0.1578 0.0573 0.0495
(Pc - P c )V £>, N  / unexplained 0.1083
( p C - P C\
V Z>2 ™ /  unexplained 0.0079
Females P* Pd2 Pn
Disabled work-limited 0.4971 0.2753 0.2639
Disabled non-work-limited 0.6025 0.3935 0.3872
Non-disabled 0.5809 0.3991 0.3937
(Pc - P c )
V D , N  / unexplained 0.1872
(PC ~ P C)v D 2 N  / unexplained 0.0054
Notes: Estimates calculated from equations (4.4) and (4.5) and are based on the estimates in Tables 
4.4 and 4.5.
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Table A4.1. Male Part-time Bivariate Probit Model Marginal Effects
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Part Employ Part Employ Part Employ
Age -0.041*** 0.029*** -0.018* 0.027*** -0.013*** 0.025***
(3.29) (8.46) (1.95) (12.79) (4.39) (30.57)
Age squared/100 0.060*** -0.044*** 0.024** -0.034*** 0.017*** -0.033***
(3.35) (11.31) (1.98) (14.07) (4.42) (32.53)
Single 0.103** -0.037* 0.015 -0.017 0.007 -0.014**
(2.09) (1.70) (0 .8 6 ) (1.05) (1 .2 2 ) (2 .0 0 )
Married 0.007 0.044** -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 0 0.015**
(0.17) (2.31) (0 .10) (1.45) (0 .10) (2.49)
North 0.149** -0 .1 2 2 *** 0.025 -0.050** 0.024*** -0.031***
(2.31) (6 .0 0 ) (1 .11) (2.26) (2.92) (3.72)
Yorkshire & 0.013 -0.050** -0 .0 0 0 0.009 0.009** 0 .0 0 0
Humberside (0.28) (2.49) (0 .0 1 ) (0.71) (2.07) (0.09)
East Midlands 0.050 -0.038* 0.004 0.004 -0 .0 0 2 0.005
(1 .0 0 ) (1 .6 8 ) (0.32) (0.29) (0.49) (0.87)
East Anglia 0.035 -0.027 -0.009 0.006 0 .0 0 2 0.004
(0.58) (0.90) (0.63) (0.30) (0.40) (0.45)
South West 0.076* 0.014 -0.006 0 .0 0 1 0.009* 0.008
(1.77) (0.60) (0.51) (0.09) (1.94) (1.29)
West Midlands 0.083* -0.031 -0.008 -0.009 0.003 0 .0 1 2 **
(1.90) (1.46) (0.75) (0.63) (0.76) (2.32)
North West 0.066 -0.091*** -0.006 -0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 1 -0.008
(1 .2 0 ) (4.95) (0.57) (1.39) (0.24) (1.40)
Wales 0.155** -0.132*** 0.004 0.004 -0 .0 0 0 -0.018**
(2.36) (6.49) (0.26) (0 .2 1 ) (0.07) (2.14)
Scotland 0.113** -0.091*** -0.013 -0.026 -0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 2
(2.13) (4.68) (1.26) (1.61) (0.47) (0.38)
Northern Ireland 0.184** -0.183*** -0.030** -0.062* -0.008 -0.028***
(2.03) (8.65) (2.09) (1 .8 6 ) (1.58) (2.93)
Degree -0.089 0.325*** 0.044** 0.009 0 .0 2 0 *** 0.040***
(0.76) (13.85) (2 .2 2 ) (0.72) (3.51) (9.84)
Other higher -0.092 0.303*** 0 .0 2 2 -0.014 0.013* 0.038***
education (0.83) (11.42) (1.04) (0.89) (1.96) (8.41)
A level -0.138* 0.203*** 0.004 0.044*** -0 .0 0 1 0.051***
(1.67) (12.41) (0.35) (4.68) (13.36)
O level -0.103 0.213*** 0.013 0 .0 2 2 * -0.004 0.040***
(1.23) (10.39) (0.96) (1.95) (0.96) (10.42)
Other -0 .1 0 1 0.146*** -0.004 0.034*** -0.007 0.038***
(1.56) (7.65) (0.34) (3.51) (1.57) (9.88)
Home owned 0.117** 0.038 0.083** -0.048** 0 .0 2 2 *** -0.034***
(2.27) (1.63) (2.33) (2.56) (3.29) (4.77)
Home mortgaged -0.026 0.162*** 0 .0 1 2 0.050*** -0.008* 0.035***
(0.36) (7.27) (0.87) (3.15) (1.80) (6.15)
Social housing 0 .2 1 0 *** -0.166*** 0.050 -0.071*** 0.027** -0.113***
(2 .8 6 ) (8.44) (1.37) (3.04) (2.35) (1 1 .2 0 )
Dependent 0.037*** 0.003 0.005 -0.009 0.008*** -0.008***
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children (2.69) (0.40) (1 .0 2 ) (1.56) (4.08) (3.95)
Dependent -0.116* 0.027 -0.025 0.007 -0 .0 1 0 ** 0.014**
children < 2 (1 .8 6 ) (0 .8 6 ) (1.17) (0.33) (2.13) (2.05)
White -0.175*** 0.107*** -0.039 0.078*** -0.050*** 0.065***
(3.35) (5.35) (1.31) (3.23) (4.21) (8.37)
Summer -0 .0 2 0 0.019 -0.013 0.004 0.005* -0.005
(0.67) (1.18) (1.53) (0.43) (1.72) (1.07)
Autumn -0 .0 1 1 -0.003 -0.003 0.009 -0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 0 2
(0.38) (0 .2 0 ) (0.40) (0.93) (0.46) (0.47)
Winter -0.033 0.030* -0.014 0.006 0 .0 0 2 0.003
(1.04) (1 .8 6 ) (1.61) (0 .6 6 ) (0.53) (0.80)
Other earner -0.173** 0.180*** -0.034 0.080*** -0.017*** 0.063***
(2.47) (14.43) (1.41) (8.60) (2.84) (16.10)
Small firm 0.166*** 0.031*** 0.026***
(7.35) (2.92) (6.51)
Agriculture & fishing -0.044 -0.085** -0.030***
(0.48) (2.04) (3.05)
Manufacturing -0.182*** -0.066*** -0.049***
(4.00) (3.39) (6.47)
Construction -0.209*** -0.064*** -0.052***
(3.54) (2.81) (6.03)
Distribution 0.023 0.009 -0 .0 0 1
(0.54) (0.75) (0.27)
Transport & -0.103** -0.027* -0.026***
communication (2.09) (1.75) (4.47)
Banking & finance -0.137*** -0 .0 1 0 -0.030***
(2.85) (0.78) (5.09)
Public admin 0.039 0.025* 0.004
(0.84) (1.77) (0.83)
Public sector -0.050 -0 .0 2 1 * -0.003
(1.31) (1.91) (0.89)
Professional 0.108** 0.037** 0.026***
(2 .0 0 ) (2.42) (4.58)
Associate 0.113** 0.017 0.024***
professional (2 .2 2 ) (1 .2 0 ) (4.27)
Administrative 0.244*** 0.058*** 0.051***
(4.54) (2.99) (6.34)
Skilled trades 0.061 0.003 0.017***
(1.24) (0.17) (3.06)
Personal service 0.189*** 0.106*** 0.072***
occupations (3.07) (3.49) (6 .6 6 )
Sales&customer 0.267*** 0.071*** 0.076***
service (4.59) (3.14) (6.97)
Process, plant & 0.135*** 0.053*** 0.044***
machine (2.81) (3.04) (6.03)
Elementary 0.317*** 0 .1 0 1 *** 0.075***
(7.33) (3.72) (7.31)
Mover 0.009 -0.005 -0 .0 2 2 ***
(0.44) (0.36) (3.97)
Notes: Marginal effects relate to coefficients in Table 4.4. See notes to Table 4.4. The marginal effects relate 
to the probability of a positive outcome in the part-time equation and in the selection equation.
153
Table A4.2. Female Part-time Bivariate Probit Model Marginal Effects
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Part Employ Part Employ Part Employ
Age -0.004 0.019*** -0.053*** 0.047*** -0.023*** 0.043***
(0.87) (4.84) (7.09) (1 1 .6 8 ) (7.30) (26.76)
Age squared/100 0.013* -0.032*** 0.071*** -0.059*** 0.038*** -0.054***
(2.37) (6.62) (8 .0 1 ) ■ (11.94) (9.50) (26.69)
Single 0.019 -0.052*** -0.072** -0.006 0.031** -0.030***
(0.83) (2.69) (2.13) (0.28) (2 .2 0 ) (3.11)
Married 0.099*** -0.071*** 0.154*** -0.067*** 0.184*** -0.088***
(3.31) (4.51) (6.07) (4.07) (16.15) (11.63)
North 0.009 -0.076*** -0.046 -0.016 -0.048*** 0.017*
(0.29) (3.49) (1.23) (0.63) (3.15) (1.77)
Yorkshire & 0.003 -0.036* -0.040 0.035** 0.024* 0.028***
Humberside (0 .11) (1.83) (1.39) (1.96) (1.94) (3.66)
East Midlands 0.034 -0.049** -0.017 0.004 -0.003 0.036***
(1.44) (2.25) (0.51) (0.16) (0 .2 1 ) (4.31)
East Anglia 0.007 -0 .0 2 0 -0.008 0.040 0.018 0.035***
(0 .2 1 ) (0.65) (0.17) (1.39) (0.99) (3.33)
South West 0.040* -0.005 -0 .0 0 0 0.016 0.023* 0.026***
(1 .6 6 ) (0.25) (0 .0 0 ) (0.80) (1.76) (3.23)
West Midlands 0 .0 1 2 -0.041** -0.086*** 0.015 0 .0 0 1 0.023***
(0.54) (2.08) (2.75) (0.77) (0.05) (3.07)
North West 0.030 -0.067*** -0.065** 0.034* -0.050*** 0.037***
(1.47) (3.60) (2.28) (1.89) (4.15) (5.18)
Wales 0.030 -0.099*** -0.049 0 .0 0 2 -0.063*** 0.042***
(1.13) (4.70) (1 .2 0 ) (0.06) (3.94) (4.40)
Scotland 0.017 -0.077*** -0.059** 0 .0 1 2 -0.050*** 0.046***
(0.70) (4.03) (1.96) (0.62) (4.07) (6.16)
Northern Ireland -0 .0 1 2 -0.131*** -0.155*** 0.059* -0.139*** -0 .0 0 0
(0.24) (5.82) (2.98) ( 1.8 8 ) (8.37) (0 .0 2 )
Degree -0.230*** 0.384*** -0.125*** 0.148*** -0.105*** 0.156***
(5.43) (16.92) (3.00) (1 2 .0 2 ) (5.99) (31.44)
Other higher -0  1 7 4 *** 0.350*** -0.103** 0.145*** -0.076*** 0.161***
education (4.30) (16.05) (2.56) (1 2 .10) (4.24) (35.71)
A level -0.183*** 0.275*** -0.094*** 0.134*** -0.068*** 0.130***
(6.42) (13.95) (2.64) (10.61) (4.48) (24.86)
0  level -0.113*** 0.231*** -0.078** 0.135*** -0.035** 0.125***
(4.56) (13.75) (2.40) (10.47) (2.51) (22.78)
Other -0 .1 0 1 *** 0.196*** -0.103*** 0.089*** -0.067*** 0.088***
(3.89) (10.67) (3.43) (6.42) (4.85) (15.13)
Home owned 0.035 0.034 0.156*** -0 .0 0 2 0.126*** -0.018*
(1.08) (1.45) (4.04) (0.08) (8.43) (1.89)
Home -0.064*** 0 .1 2 1 *** -0 .0 2 0 0.123*** 0 .0 1 2 0 .1 0 2 ***
mortgaged (2.62) (5.54) (0.52) (5.74) (0 .8 6 ) (12.54)
Social housing 0.040 -0.150*** 0.083** -0.041* 0.092*** -0.085***
(1.36) (7.58) (2.16) (1.69) (5.65) (8.35)
Dependent 0.093*** -0.053*** 0 .2 1 2 *** -0.106*** 0.204*** -0 .1 0 0 ***
children (3.67) (7.82) (19.19) (16.07) (41.84) (40.50)
Dependent 0.183*** -0.167*** 0.257*** -0 114*** 0.225*** -0.136***
children < 2 (3.32) (5.35) (6 .2 2 ) (5.12) (16.23) (19.94)
White 0.026 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.124***
(0.50) (7.31) (2.69) (4.72) (8.26) (12.90)
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Summer 0.009 -0.014 -0.029 -0.014 0 .0 0 1 -0.019***
(0.54) (0.91) (1.28) (0.91) (0.15) (3.06)
Autumn 0.013 -0.014 0.006 -0.003 -0.015* -0.008
(0.75) (0.91) (0.28) (0 .2 1 ) (1 .6 6 ) (1.33)
Winter 0.007 -0.015 0 .0 2 0 -0.005 0.003 -0.008
(0.42) (0.99) (0 .8 8 ) (0.31) (0.36) (1.30)
Other earner -0.059*** 0.154*** -0 .0 2 2 0.109*** -0.007 0.085***
(3.50) (12.42) (0.87) (7.64) (0 .6 8 ) (14.35)
Small firm 0.118** 0.147*** 0.138***
(2.56) (7.60) (18.28)
Agriculture & -0.054 -0.127 -0 .0 2 2
fishing (0.57) (0.98) (0.37)
Manufacturing -0.165** -0.208*** -0.160***
(2.14) (4.07) (8 .2 2 )
Construction -0.043 0.054 -0.041
(0.73) (0.82) (1.36)
Distribution -0 .0 1 2 0.049 0.028*
(0.42) (1.23) (1.71)
Transport & -0.006 -0.126** -0.108***
communication (0.16) (2.28) (4.90)
Banking & -0.069* -0.023 -0.050***
finance (1.67) (0.56) (3.03)
Public admin -0.005 0.025 0.046***
(0.19) (0.69) (3.03)
Public sector 0 .0 1 0 0.026 -0.003
(0.55) (1.13) (0.31)
Professional 0.163** 0 .1 2 1 *** 0.145***
(2 .2 1 ) (2.78) (8.50)
Associate 0.157** 0.208*** 0.229***
professional (2.23) (5.26) (14.65)
Administrative 0.193** 0.293*** 0.330***
(2.32) (7.77) (22.70)
Skilled trades 0.217** 0.241*** 0.284***
(2 .2 0 ) (3.60) (1 0 .2 0 )
Personal service 0.245** 0.362*** 0.351***
occupations (2.44) (8.40) (21.51)
Sales& 0.321** 0.505*** 0.535***
customer service (2.49) (10.42) (30.81)
Process, plant & 0.192** 0.402*** 0.308***
machine (2.28) (5.96) (11.97)
Elementary 0.377** 0.619*** 0.611***
(2.47) (11.89) (34.25)
Mover -0.038* -0.059*** -0.047***
(1.84) (2.74) (5.97)
Notes: Marginal effects relate to coefficients in Table 4.5. See notes to Table 4.4.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISABILITY AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT
5.1 Introduction
The emphasis on employer discrimination in the literature on disability has meant 
that empirical analysis is dominated by studies which constrain their sample to 
employees only, as is the case in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. However, this means a 
significant proportion of disabled workers and an alternative source of paid 
employment, self-employment, have largely been ignored in the literature (with the 
important exceptions of Blanck et al., 2000 for the US and Boylan and Burchardt, 
2002 for the UK). Moreover, in the UK, self-employment is a more important source 
of work for the disabled than the non-disabled, with 2 1  percent of work-limited 
disabled men in employment being self-employed, compared to 17 percent of the 
non-disabled, while the corresponding figures for females are 9 percent and 7 percent 
respectively (see Table 5.1) . 124
Following the same arguments to that for ethnic minorities (see, for example, Clark 
and Drinkwater, 1998), over-representation of the disabled in self-employment may 
be a rational response to the presence of employer discrimination in the salaried 
sector. However, in the absence of enclave effects, it is possible that consumer 
discrimination will affect the returns to self-employment (Boijas and Bronars, 1989). 
Whilst the incentives to enter self-employment depend on the relative strengths of 
these two sources of discrimination, other features of self-employment may provide 
alternative benefits for the disabled relative to the non-disabled group. In particular,
124 It is implied throughout that the causation runs in this direction. However, given the nature o f self- 
employment may be different from paid employment, it is possible that the causation may ran in the 
opposite direction. However, 2003 LFS data on whether an individual had an accident at work in the 
previous 12 months show no significant difference between the self-employed and employees 
(conditional on them currently being employed). Equally, it may be argued that the self-employed 
may be more likely to suffer from stress related mental health problems. However, among the work- 
limited disabled group there is a significantly lower concentration o f mental health problems for the 
self-employed compared to paid employees.
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the work-limited disabled may be better able to accommodate their disability by 
being able to choose duties, hours and location.125 The latter influence can be 
expected to act as a pull factor that might encourage a disabled individual to be self-
1 9 f \employed.
In a similar manner to Chapter 4, this empirical analysis investigates the alternative 
explanations for the higher incidence of self-employment among the disabled. 
Predicted conditional self-employment probabilities are calculated from bivariate 
probit estimates which control for the possibility of selection effects; probability 
differentials between disability groups are decomposed to identify the contribution of 
differences in coefficients -  the ‘unexplained’ gap. While traditionally interpreted as 
a measure of discrimination, this gap also captures differences in preferences for self- 
employment among disability groups and, hence, potentially conflates these two 
effects. However, using similar modifications of the DeLeire (2001) decomposition 
to that in Chapter 4, the unexplained gap can then be apportioned between these two 
elements by separating the disabled into those who report their disability limits the 
amount and/or type of work they can perform, and those who state that their 
disability is not work-limiting. Specifically, if it is assumed that the latter have no 
need to enter self-employment in order to accommodate their disability, then the 
unexplained component (relative to the non-disabled) reflects only the relative 
influence of discrimination. For the work-limited disabled, however, both effects are 
present. Making a further assumption, in a similar manner to DeLeire (2001), that the 
overall discrimination effect is the same for the work-limited and non-work-limited 
disabled, it is then possible to isolate the role of self-employment in accommodating 
disability.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 briefly reviews 
the small number of existing studies relating to disability and self-employment. 
Section 5.3 extends the theoretical model of Clark and Drinkwater (1998) to the 
disabled and investigates the influence of discrimination and accommodation factors.
125 The flexibility of hours has previously been found to be of importance in the context of female 
self-employment, a feature that is argued to reflect family responsibilities (see for example, Carr, 1996 
and Boden, 1999).
126 The ability to accommodate a disability could act to increase the relative return to self-employment 
in two ways: accommodation could increase an individual’s productivity in self-employment relative 
to salaried employment, or could reduce the costs associated with work differentially by sector.
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The data and methodology are briefly considered in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents 
and interprets the main empirical findings. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Background
A small number of studies have identified the importance of self-employment 
amongst the disabled and examine the possible reasons for this. For example, Blanck 
et al. (2000) investigate Iowa’s Entrepreneurs with Disabilities Program and 
highlight that discrimination (either perceived or actual), particularly in relation to 
hiring and firing, is a major motivation for disabled persons starting their own 
business. Discrimination is also found by Schur (2003) to be more important as an 
explanation of higher self-employment rates among the disabled than for the other 
non-standard forms of employment that this group may enter. In contrast, an RTC 
Rural Research Report (2001), summarising the findings of a national survey of 
disabled entrepreneurs and/or disabled persons seeking help from state Vocational 
Rehabilitation (VR) agencies, notes that the need to create one’s own job, and to 
accommodate a disability, were cited by respondents almost as frequently as wanting 
to work for oneself, owning one’s own business, making more money and 
identification of a market opportunity. Only in a much smaller proportion of cases 
did respondents state that other jobs were unavailable. The absence of job 
opportunities is identified as a key factor underpinning the greater use of self- 
employment as a potential vocational rehabilitation tool by state VR counsellors in 
Arnold et al. (1995).
In the UK, an early study by Prescott-Clarke (1990) using primary data from her own 
survey on economically active persons with health problems, highlights the 
differences between disabled employees and self-employed workers. Several of 
Prescott-Clarke’s findings point to the role of disability/health as a contributory 
factor in the self-employment decision, many of them consistent with the 
accommodation hypothesis. For example, 19 percent of the self-employed reported 
that they had to work at home due to their condition, compared with just 1 percent of 
employees. In many instances, the accommodation of the disability related to a 
greater flexibility of work patterns/schedules. Around twice as many of the self- 
employed (40 percent) say they are unable to work a standard week compared to
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those in waged employment (19 percent), while the corresponding percentages for 
those reporting having to take breaks regularly due to health are 48 percent and 23 
percent respectively. Accordingly, a higher average work handicap score was 
reported for the self-employed (compared to employees). Among those who were 
currently disabled and self-employed, half suggested their decision to become self- 
employed was affected by their health problem, leading Prescott-Clarke (1990, p.69) 
to conclude that “There is a clear implication in the data that their self-employment 
status is at least in part a result of their health problem”.
More recently, in commissioned research undertaken for the Small Business Service, 
Boylan and Burchardt (2002) identify a number of empirical regularities using 
nationally representative data from the LFS and the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES). Foremost among these is that the disabled127 are more likely to be self- 
employed than their non-disabled counterparts. However, further investigation 
reveals that, for men at least, this is explicable in terms of the different age profiles. 
Among the self-employed, disabled persons were less likely than the non-disabled to 
cite positive reasons, such as the desire for independence or exploiting a market 
opportunity, as reasons for becoming self-employed. Instead, for some disabled 
persons (and, most notably, those with low levels of educational attainment), the 
decision to enter self-employment appeared to be a consequence of push factors, and, 
in particular, the lack of alternative opportunities.
It is important to note that the concentration of the disabled in self-employment has 
been relatively stable across time (see Figure 5.1) and, therefore, this feature of the 
data is not unique to a specific year and does not appear to be a temporary
1 -no
phenomenon. Moreover, there seems little reason to suggest that this concentration 
is a result of any recent policy initiative or change in legislation. Policy initiatives 
aimed at increasing the employment of the disabled, such as Disabled Persons Tax 
Credit (now replaced by Working Tax Credit) and the Access to Work scheme, also 
apply to self-employment. More generally, because many of the existing enterprise 
schemes cover both the disabled and the non-disabled, there is little reason to
127 As defined by the DDA.
128 The same conclusion can be made if  the data are traced from 1994, but since the definition changes 
over time this is not presented here.
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suppose that these schemes are directly responsible for the higher self-employment 
incidence among the disabled population who work. 129 Also, as noted by Boylan and 
Burchardt (2002), the DDA’s employment provisions do not impact directly on the 
self-employment of disabled persons, although any reduction in employer 
discrimination against the disabled may reduce the impact of the push into self- 
employment occasioned by such discrimination. There are, however, other sections 
of the DDA that may affect the self-employment decision. Firstly, the DDA makes it 
unlawful for service providers to discriminate against buyers of a good or service on 
the basis of disability, including in the provision of services to those seeking to 
become self-employed, and, secondly, self-employed persons who work under 
contract are covered by the DDA, potentially including the requirement for 
reasonable adjustments.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
Clark and Drinkwater (1998) use a variant of the framework outlined by Coate and 
Tennyson (1992) to model the self-employment decision of ethnic minorities. By 
modifying their original analysis to consider the disabled, it is possible to examine 
the implications of discrimination and accommodating features on the incentive to 
become self-employed. Following the notation in Clark and Drinkwater (1998), it is 
assumed that rewards in self-employment are a function of profits ( tt) and 
entrepreneurial talent (9 )  (which is assumed to be randomly drawn and private 
information). If e denotes earnings in the salaried sector, then a risk neutral 
individual will enter self-employment if the return to self-employment (trO) is 
greater than the return from salaried employment. This implies there is a critical 
value of entrepreneurial talent (6  *) such that, if the probability of success in self- 
employment exceeds the critical value, the individual will become self-employed. 
This critical value is given by:
e* = — (5.i)
K
129 The main exception to this is the NDDP pilot schemes (see Boylan and Burchardt, 2002 for an 
account o f these).
164
Profit depends on consumer valuation of a given good or service, where the actual 
value is given by z . However, a consumer’s own evaluation is affected by the ability 
of the entrepreneur; since ability is private information, consumers must form an 
expectation of ability:
E(0 \0 >  0*) (5.2)
which is increasing in 0*. It follows that the profit of an entrepreneur can be shown 
to be:
7T = V(0*,Z) (5.3)
which is increasing in both 0*  and z . As Clark and Drinkwater (1998) show, the 
reduced forms for equations 5.1 and 5.3 can be expressed as:
k = n{e, z) and 0* = 0 * (e, z) (5.4)
Assuming both the disabled and non-disabled have the same distribution of 
ability F (0),  employer wage discrimination against the disabled, which implies
e D < e N>  result in a lower value of 0 * (the critical level of ability) for the
disabled. 130 Since 0 *D < 0 *N a larger proportion of disabled workers will enter self-
employment.
However, while the enclave effects considered by Clark and Drinkwater (1998) are 
appropriate for ethnicity, their influence on disability seems less justified. Instead, it 
seems important to consider the influence of consumer discrimination, highlighted in 
this context by Boijas and Bronars (1989). Consumer discrimination occurs when a 
buyer of a good or service of given quality values it differently because it is
130 If consumers can observe the disability status of the seller, consumers will also expect the quality 
of a disabled sellers’ good to be lower since E(GN \ 0N > 0 * N) >  E (9 D \0 D > 0 * D) ■ Hence, it also
follows that the rewards to self-employment will be lower for the disabled; however, the absence of  
earnings data for the self-employed means this hypothesis is not tested.
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purchased from a disabled or non-disabled individual. 131 As such, goods of the same 
quality have a different value on the basis of the supplier, independent of ability, 
hence an individual’s valuation if the seller is disabled is where d
represents the extent to which the goods or service are devalued in a similar manner
80*  . . . .to Becker’s (1971) taste for discrimination. S ince < 0 , consumer discrimination
dz
will increase the size of 9 *, the critical level of ability for the disabled and, hence, 
reduce their concentration in self-employment. Essentially, the two influences will 
work in opposite directions, so the relative value of 6*  between the disabled and 
non-disabled depends on the relative magnitude of these two sources of 
discrimination. In the empirical analysis, it is the balance of these two discrimination 
effects that will be estimated in the model and referred to as discrimination.
Clark and Drinkwater (1998) implicitly assume that the cost of working in each 
sector is equal across ethnic minority groups. To account for the possibility of 
workplace accommodations that make it more accessible for a disabled individual 
with given ability to work in self-employment rather than paid employment, it is, 
instead, assumed that individuals maximise the net benefit of employment (rather 
than earnings). The net benefit of employment in a given sector is a function of 
earnings minus the cost of working in a given sector j ,  y j , which can be thought of 
as the value of job disamenities. 132 As such, equation (5.1) can be expressed as:
e - y  + y
G* = ----   — (5.5)
K
and the critical level of ability depends on the relative costs of participating in each 
sector. If the workplace accommodation argument is true, then y eD > y sD and 0 *D 
will fall, increasing the proportion of the disabled in self-employment. In the absence
131 Clearly, not all disabled self-employed individuals will actually be accurately identified as such by 
consumers, but this analysis demonstrates the potential effect. Moreover, not all self-employed 
individuals will have direct contact with consumers. Indeed, if consumer discrimination is important, 
the disabled self-employed are likely to select certain types of self-employment to minimise the 
discrimination they face.
132 If both groups have the same cost o f working in a given sector the results are identical to Clark and 
Drinkwater (1998).
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of either form of discrimination, for a higher concentration of the disabled in self- 
employment relative to the non-disabled, the following must hold:
r D - r ’D > r « - r 'u  (5-6)
That is, self-employment provides a greater workplace accommodation for the 
disabled than the non-disabled. Thus, even in the absence of any form of 
discrimination, accommodation influences may pull disabled individuals into self- 
employment.
An alternative way of considering the same influence is to allow returns in each 
sector to vary by productivity. Consistent with the above analysis, a concentration in 
self-employment would arise if the negative effect of disability on productivity is 
greater in paid employment than in self-employment, due to the accommodation 
effect. However, if  disability can affect productivity in self-employment then it may 
also be important to consider the validity of the assumption of constant ability in 
self-employment across the disability groups. Clark and Drinkwater (1998) argue 
ethnic minorities may be ‘more entrepreneurial’ through mechanisms such as inter- 
generational transmission; however, the precise mechanism through which disability 
would affect 6 is not obvious. The disabled may be less enterprising if, for example, 
they become more risk averse following disability onset. Following Clark and 
Drinkwater (1998), if the disabled are assumed to be less enterprising than the non­
disabled, their distribution of ability can be denoted G{6) ,  where F{6) first-order 
stochastically dominates G{6) . For a given value of 6 *, G(0*) > F(0*) and hence 
a greater concentration of the non-disabled will be observed in self-employment. 
Even if, through the mechanisms of accommodation or employer discrimination 
discussed above, 0 *D < 0 *N, this does not now imply a greater concentration of the
disabled in self-employment, since the difference in ability between the groups may 
be sufficient to offset these effects. Therefore, if the disabled have lower ability in 
self-employment, this will reduce their incentive to become self-employed and act 
against the accommodation and discrimination influences discussed above.
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5.4 Data and Methodology
The description of the data and the methodology presented in Section 4.3 also largely 
applies to the current analysis and so is not repeated here. The main exception to this 
is that the self-employed are included within the sample and therefore the employed 
group ( E y = l )  includes both paid employees and the self-employed. A dummy
variable S y  replaces P tj in equation 4.2 where S t j, which is observed only for the
employed, identifies self-employment ( S y  =1) and paid employment ( S y  =0).
Importantly, the bivariate probit model accounts for the potential non-random 
selection into employment that may otherwise render estimates inconsistent. This 
issue has largely been ignored in the self-employment literature, but, in the context of 
disability, where the employment rate, is less than half the non-disabled rate, this 
issue is more likely to be important. 133
The variables that determine employment Yy will largely be the same as those that
determine self-employment Xy.  Thus, both vectors include standard controls for
age, education, ethnicity, marital status, housing tenure, the presence of another 
income earner in the household and region. 134 In the self-employment equation, the 
presence of another income earner in the household and housing tenure are, 
essentially, proxies for access to financial capital and, hence, for capital constraints
1 -ic
in this decision, factors which cannot be controlled for directly in the LFS.
133 An exception to this is Pagan’s (2002) examination o f gender differences in participation and self- 
employment in rural Guatemala, where selectivity effects were found to be o f considerable 
significance for females.
134 See Table A3.1 for details o f the variables already introduced in Chapter 3. Variables not 
previously defined include Dependent children < 5, which denotes the total number o f dependent 
children in the household aged less than 5 if  the respondent is the head o f household or spouse, and is 
zero otherwise. Given the established influence o f ethnicity, an additional variable, immigrant, is 
included. Immigrant is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if  the respondent was bom  
outside the UK and zero otherwise. Dummy variables relating to age bands also replace age (and age 
squared) in the regressions. Aged 25-34 is a dummy variable which indicates the respondent is aged 
between 25 and 34, 0 otherwise. Aged 35-44 is a dummy variable which indicates the respondent is 
aged between 35 and 44, 0 otherwise. Aged 45-54 is a dummy variable which indicates the respondent 
is aged between 45 and 54, 0 otherwise. Aged 55+ is a dummy variable which indicates the 
respondent is aged between 55 and standard retirement age, 0 otherwise; Those aged between 16 and 
24 form the omitted group.
135 While the set o f controls is relatively comprehensive, there are a couple o f more obvious 
omissions, such as psychological factors and family background which are unavailable in the LFS. 
See Le (1999) for a review of the empirical work in this area. Moreover, the absence of longitudinal 
data means it is not possible to control for unobservable factors that determine employment choice
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One issue that does arise with the above, however, concerns identification, which 
requires at least one variable in the selection (employment) equation (in YtJ) that
does not appear in the final outcome (self-employment) equation (in X {J). As is true
in many contexts, however, finding suitable identifying restrictions is far from 
straightforward, since almost any regressor that determines whether an individual 
works could conceivably also impact on the decision to be self-employed. The 
identifying restriction adopted here is the number of dependent children of pre­
school age -  with the exception of disabled males, this variable is a significant factor 
in determining whether an individual works, but in no case does it impact on the 
decision to be self-employed, and as such appears a reasonable choice. In addition,
136since X i} is observed for the employed, it also contains a set of industry dummies .
As in Chapters 3 and 4, an additional specification is also estimated for the disabled 
which includes controls for the type and severity of the health problem, to examine 
the influence of within group heterogeneity on self-employment.
In a similar manner to part-time employment, the average predicted conditional 
probability of self-employment for they'th group, with sample size rjj, is:
oc 1
J Vj t !  ® ( r A )
For the work-limited disabled, the unexplained gap is the difference between the 
predicted conditional probability of self-employment for the non-disabled, evaluated 
at the work-limited disabled self-employment coefficient vector, and their predicted 
own conditional probability, that is:
(for example, preferences for risk). However, the sample sizes in longitudinal surveys like the BHPS 
are likely to be insufficient to examine the self-employment decision amongst the disabled.
136 Note that occupational dummies are not included in the second stage due to the likely endogeneity 
with •self-employment status (for example, being a manager).
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N  /u n e x p la in e d
1 ,y NYiN > Pn)  1 y^ ^ 2{PNX iN,YNYiNip N>)
tjn ,=i O (yNYiN) tIn /=i ®(rNYiN)
(5.8)
while, for the non-work-limited disabled, the corresponding gap is:
N  /  unexplained
1 \n’YN^iNi Pn') 1 Q^<£>2(/3NX iN,y'NYiN, p N)
I n m  ®(yNYiN)
(5.9)
Thus, equation (5.8) represents the difference in the conditional self-employment 
probability of a non-disabled individual if they behave like a work-limited disabled 
worker in choosing between salaried and self-employment, while equation (5.9) 
denotes the change if the non-work-limited disabled coefficient vector is instead 
applied at the second stage. Thus the approach applies different coefficient vectors to 
the same (non-disabled) characteristics throughout.
Equation (5.8), which performs the comparison between the work-limited disabled 
and the non-disabled, therefore incorporates the influence of both preferences 
(including the need to accommodate) and of differences in discrimination between 
those that are self-employment and those that work in the salaried sector. Following 
a similar logic to Chapter 4, the DeLeire (2001) method is modified to separate the 
influence of accommodation from discrimination. It is assumed that there is no 
difference in the need for accommodation between the non-work-limited disabled 
and the non-disabled, since they have stated that their disability does not affect the 
type or amount of work they can do. Equation (5.9), therefore, relates solely to the 
influence of discrimination. If discrimination in the salaried sector exceeds that in 
self-employment, then this will act to increase the probability of self-employment 
and equation (5.9) will be positive. By assuming this balance of discrimination is 
equal across the disabled groups, the estimate from equation (5.9) can be used with 
equation (5.8) to identify a residual term. The difference between equations (5.8) and
(5.9) is, therefore, the estimate of accommodation as a driver of the self-employment 
decision of the work-limited disabled. Unlike Chapter 4, the measure of
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discrimination relates to the outcome of two sources of discrimination, namely 
employer and consumer discrimination. Consequently, if the balance of 
discrimination is unequal between the two groups, that is, the second assumption 
fails to hold, it is no longer true that a lower bound on discrimination against the 
disabled will necessarily be identified. This is because, even if discrimination is 
positively related to the work-limiting nature of the disability, it does not imply the 
same relationship for the balance of discrimination.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 shows that regardless of gender, for those in employment, the work-limited 
disabled are significantly more likely to be self-employed than the non-disabled. 
Whilst for men there is no significant difference in the self-employment rates 
between the non-work-limited and the non-disabled, for women the difference is 
actually negative. Moreover, Figure 5.1 shows that these trends have been evident 
since 1997 and reinforces the argument that the work-limited disabled are different 
from the other two groups.
For males, the self-employed with a disability are more likely to work from home 
and live and work in the same Local Authority District (LAD). Since the difficulties 
disabled individuals face in getting to work may be an incentive to undertake self- 
employment, which provides greater opportunities to work from home or locally,
137 • •there is some support for a workplace accommodation effect here. Consistent with 
the evidence in Chapter 3, the disabled work significantly fewer hours than the non­
disabled, whether in paid work or self-employment. Overall, those whose disability 
is not work-limiting appear more similar in almost all respects to those without any 
form of disability. This anecdotal evidence supports the assumption of the modified 
DeLeire (2001) approach used here, namely that those who have a disability that is 
work-limiting are fundamentally different to the non-work-limited disabled.
137 The same influence is observed for females, although the proportion working from home is not 
significantly different from the non-disabled.
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The type of self-employment is fairly similar among the disability groups. However, 
the work-limited disabled, in particular, are more likely than the other disability 
groups to class themselves as working for self and, for men, less likely to be a partner 
in a professional practice or a sole director of a limited company. Consistent with 
this, the proportion of the work-limited disabled male self-employed employing 
others is significantly lower, with nearly 80 percent having no employees compared 
to 74 percent of non-disabled and non-work-limited disabled men. The evidence 
relating to the reasons for self-employment, in Table 5.2, also fails to support the 
idea that the disabled are inherently more enterprising, as there is no significant 
difference in the proportion of disabled and non-disabled respondents reporting they 
entered self-employment to be more independent or because they wanted more 
money. For males, the work-limited disabled are significantly more likely to report 
that no jobs available locally and other reasons, which could include their health. 
Thus, there is some evidence to support unequal access to employment as a push 
factor for the disabled.
The means of the variables used in the regression analysis are presented for each of 
the six sub-groups in Table 5.3. Since the key features have already been identified 
in Chapters 3 and 4, they are not discussed again here.
5.5.2 Bivariate Probit Model
The results of estimating the bivariate probit models for each of the six sub-groups 
are presented in Tables 5.4 (males) and 5.5 (females) . 138 The parameter p is 
consistently negative for males and, as indicated by a Likelihood Ratio test, it is 
significant for both the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled. In contrast, 
p is positive but insignificant for females. Therefore, for men, unobservables that 
exert a positive effect on employment impact negatively on self-employment, which 
suggests that, for men, the choice of self-employment is occasioned, at least in part, 
by a lack of other employment opportunities.
Since the employment decision is investigated in Chapter 3, the emphasis of the 
discussion here is the type of employment choice. However, one feature of the
138 The marginal effects are presented in Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2 for males and females 
respectively.
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employment equation is important. The impact of young children on employment is 
generally weak for males, so, in the absence of more plausible identifying 
restrictions, the disabled male equations rely on weak identification. In contrast, for 
females, the number of pre-school age children, both significantly and consistently, 
reduces the probability that an individual will be in work.
For all disability groups and both genders, there is a positive relationship between 
age and self-employment. However, for other variables, there are considerable 
differences by gender. In terms of qualifications, for males, the general relationship 
for each of the disability groups is one in which the probability of being in 
employment is generally higher for individuals with qualifications, while the 
converse applies when considering the choice between self- and waged employment. 
In contrast, for females, qualifications (and, in particular, higher qualifications, such 
as having a degree) increase both the probability of being in work and of being self- 
employed. 139 This suggests that there are important differences in the motivation for 
self-employment across genders, which are likely to reflect real or perceived 
differences in the relative opportunities between paid and self-employment at 
different levels of education.
A further interesting feature of the results concerns the roles of ethnicity and 
immigrant status. For males, the data indicate that non-whites and immigrants are 
less likely to be in work, but, where they are, they are more likely to be in self- 
employment. For females, in contrast, the pattern which emerges is one in which 
those from ethnic minorities are less likely to work and (conditionally) to be self- 
employed, while for immigrants, participation and self-employment are both the 
more likely outcome. 140 Thus the results for men are entirely in accordance with 
those previous studies, both for the UK and elsewhere, which suggest that among 
ethnic minorities, self-employment is, at least in part, a response to discrimination in 
the labour market (for example, Clark and Drinkwater, 1998).
139 This pattern is robust to the inclusion o f occupational controls, which also have little impact on the 
relative accommodation and discrimination components o f the decompositions reported. This is also 
consistent with the gender differences in the sign of p.
140 Blackaby et al., (2002) and Clark and Drinkwater (1998), amongst others, have shown that there is 
also substantial variation on the basis o f individual ethnic groups which comprise the non-white group 
in terms o f employment and self-employment, which is ignored here.
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Household characteristics, such as the presence of children, and marital status also 
appear to exhibit differential patterns by gender. For both men and women, however, 
having dependent children in the household is consistently and positively related to 
the probability of being in self-employment for each of the disability sub-groups. 
While the precise mechanism underlying this result for men is unclear, for women it 
presumably derives from the fact that self-employment offers the greater flexibility 
some women require in order to combine work and child-rearing responsibilities.
Of the variables included as (crude) controls for access to capital, living in social 
housing has a negative effect on self-employment, particularly for females, whilst 
home ownership has a positive influence on self-employment for males. It should be 
noted that there is a powerful role for the industry group in the self-employment 
equation. As might be expected, self-employment is more likely among workers in 
agriculture and fishing, and, for males, also in construction, relative to the base group 
(‘Other’), and, generally, less likely in other sectors such as public administration, 
education and health.
The specifications for disabled males and females are supplemented with controls for 
the type and number of health problems in Table 5.6, to consider if there are 
differences in the probability of self-employment within the disabled group. 141 After 
controlling for characteristics, with the exception of the ‘other’ group for work- 
limited disabled females, none of the within group differences is significant. Self- 
employment is not positively related to severity, at least as measured by the number 
of health problems; neither is it related to the type of disability. Thus, the higher 
incidence of self-employment is reflected fairly equally among the disabled, 
regardless of their particular type of disability. The absence of a severity effect may 
serve to limit the arguments made in terms of accommodation for the work-limited 
disabled. However, consumer discrimination is likely to be sensitive to the visibility 
of the disability, which may be partly a function of the type and severity of the 
disability. It may, therefore, be that any ‘pull’ that stems from the influence of
141 Marginal effects are presented in Appendix Table A5.3.
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accommodation for the more severely disabled is more than offset by the influence of 
increased consumer discrimination. 142
5.5.3 Conditional Probabilities
Elements on the leading diagonal of Table 5.7 are the conditional self-employment 
predictions for each group on the basis of their own coefficients. Thus, the estimated 
self-employment rate for work-limited disabled males in employment is 2 1 . 2  percent, 
while it is approximately 17 percent for both the non-work-limited disabled and the 
non-disabled. Among females the corresponding rates are 9.3 percent, 6.3 percent 
and 7.3 percent respectively.
The remaining elements of Table 5.7 indicate how these probabilities would change 
were alternative coefficient vectors applied to the self-employment equation, holding 
all other components constant, and, in particular, the employment probabilities. For 
example, a non-disabled male has a self-employment probability of 17.4 percent 
evaluated at their own coefficients, but applying the work-limited disabled self- 
employment coefficients (PD ) increases the probability of self-employment to 24.3
percent. For the same employment probability, the conditional self-employment 
probability evaluated at the non-work-limited disabled self-employment coefficients 
{pDi) is just 15.1 percent and, importantly, is lower than their own conditional
probability. Similar comparisons can be made using other groups as the base; for 
example, for the work-limited disabled characteristics and selection equation, 
behaving as non-disabled reduces the conditional probability of self-employment, 
and this is even more so if they behave as the non-work-limited disabled.
These predicted conditional probabilities can, as described above, be used to isolate 
the contributions of discrimination and accommodation to the unexplained gap 
between the conditional self-employment probabilities. For males, the impact of 
discrimination is found to be negative, suggesting that discrimination is actually 
greater in the self-employment sector, or that the entire disabled group has 
preferences favouring waged employment (for example, due to the security of
142 More accurately, the balance of discrimination between paid employment and self-employment 
must deteriorate sufficiently for the more severely disabled, since employer discrimination may also 
be sensitive to severity and type.
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sickness pay); self-employment rates for the non-disabled evaluated at the non-work- 
limiting disabled self-employment coefficients would actually be approximately 2.3 
percentage points lower. 143 More importantly, however, there is clear evidence of a 
substantial increase in the probability of self-employment (nearly 7 percentage 
points) if the non-disabled behaved like the work-limited disabled when entering 
employment type. Therefore, the influence of differences in preferences, which 
represents the difference between the two figures, amounts to 9 percentage points 
and supports the presence of accommodating features of self-employment for the 
work-limited disabled. In the case of females, the same pattern emerges, but the 
extent of the differences is much smaller in magnitude. Therefore, the unexplained 
gaps are similarly signed to the case for males, but both are very small (around 1 
percentage point), and suggest that discrimination and accommodation factors are 
much weaker for women. 144
5.6 Conclusion
This Chapter investigates the reasons why, for those in work, self-employment rates 
are higher for those with work-limiting disabilities than for the non-disabled. 
Previous survey based evidence suggests two possible explanations for the 
concentration of the disabled in self-employment, namely the influence of wage 
discrimination and accommodation. The impact of both of these features are 
considered using the theoretical framework of Clark and Drinkwater (1998), which 
confirms that a concentration in self-employment may result from wage 
discrimination in the salaried sector or self-employment having greater 
accommodating features for the disabled. However, this model also confirms that 
consumer discrimination will reduce the incentive to become self-employed.
Data from the UK LFS and a model which modifies the DeLeire (2001) assumptions 
are used to consider these alternative explanations empirically. For a non-disabled 
individual with their own characteristics and selection equation, the conditional
143 Table 5.7 can be used to compute the decomposition at any base. The results are not sensitive to the 
change o f base.
144 When pooling across disability groups as the basis for comparison, (St, 0.051 and
(S% -S% ^ unexplained ="0-042 for males, while for females, they are both again effectively zero.
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probability of self-employment increases when behaving like a work-limited disabled 
in the self-employment decision, but falls slightly when behaving like the non-work- 
limited disabled. Since this latter negative effect is the measure of the balance of 
discrimination, there is some evidence that consumer discrimination is important 
against the disabled. Moreover, since discrimination cannot explain the more 
extensive increase in the conditional probability for the work-limited disabled, the 
accommodation effect is actually more important. For men at least, there seems to be 
evidence that the preferences for self-employment are different for the work-limited 
disabled, which may be driven by the need to choose location, duties and hours.
Unlike the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, there is no evidence of differences within the 
disabled group in relation to their propensity to become self-employed. Having a 
greater number of disabilities, or having a particular type of disability, has no 
significant effect relative to the rest of the disabled group. Thus, the concentration in 
self-employment appears to exist more generally among those self-reporting work- 
limiting disability.
Whilst the influence of preferences identified by the empirical analysis is consistent 
with arguments put forward in the literature and the predictions of the theoretical 
framework, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis. Finding an 
appropriate identifying variable in this context is difficult and the model is forced to 
rely on weak identification for disabled men. Moreover, due to the nature of data in 
the LFS, the specification of the model fails to control for several factors previously 
identified as important determinants of self-employment. The decision to enter self- 
employment is likely to be determined in part by parental self-employment, risk 
aversion, access to finance and an individuals own perception of the opportunities 
and his/her own ability. Although some of these factors are difficult to control for in 
any study, and some will have a similar influence across disability groups, further 
investigation is needed to test if, for example, disability affects preference for risk, 
which may contribute to the observed difference in self-employment.
In a similar manner to Chapter 4, a natural extension to this analysis would be to 
consider analysis of transitions between self-employment and paid employment, and 
disability onset. Furthermore, more specific analysis of the disabled in self­
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employment is required to identify which features provide accommodation for the 
disabled. It would also be interesting to examine the relative welfare of the disabled 
in self-employment, through, for example, comparisons of the relative earnings and 
other measures of success in self-employment.
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Figure 5.1. Proportion of Workers in Self-employment, 1997-2003
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Notes: Data are obtained from the Summer quarter o f the LFS for each year.
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Male Female
Work-
limited
disabled
Non-
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Employment rate 
(%)
43.16*** 89.08*** 90.41 38.29 78.42 78.51
Self-employment 
rate (as % of all 
employed)
21.28*** 16.56 17.41 9.29 6.28 7.33
Employed
Work from home 
(%)
5.73 6.39* 5.80 4.47** 3.52 3.61
Work in same LAD 
as residence (%) 57.41*** 51.31 50.47 68.17***
_ _ _ * + * 66.04 63.61
Average tenure 
(months) 108.58*** 124.44*** 99.35 88.72***
_ _ _ .+*+ 98.64 82.20
Average hours 41.33*’* 43.48 43.46 29.77’** 32.52 32.43
Self-employed
Work from home 
(%) 65.24*** 58.52 56.35 62.93 60.70 60.00
Work in same LAD 
as residence (%) 88.18*** 82.36 80.70 88.64** 85.16 84.23
Average tenure 
(months) 155.80*** 167.10*** 138.05 108.14* 105.15 97.32
Average hours 42.21*** 45.56** 46.62 28.89** 31.71 31.60
Type of self-employment (%)
Paid by agency 1.25** 1.78 2.44 1.57 2.26 2.97
Sole director of 
limited liability 
business
5.33* 5.63 6.82 2.52 1.94 3.72
Running
professional practice 23.04 25.27 24.20 21.70 27.10 24.63
Partner in
professional practice 8.97*** 10.46** 12.96 16.04 18.71 16.23
Working for self 53.01*** 48.08** 44.31 52.52’* 43.87 45.93
Sub contractor 6 .0 2 5.82 7.02 1.89 1.29 1.97
Freelance work 2.38 2.96 2.25 3.77 4.84 4.55
Without employees 79.14*** 73.81 73.56 79.57 77.32 76.64
Notes: Data from 2003, sample excludes unpaid family workers and government trainees. LAD 
denotes local authority district. , and denote differences from the relevant non-disabled 
comparator group at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
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Table 5.2. Reasons for Becoming Self-employed
Males Females
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non-
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
To be more 
independent 28.03 28.63 29.78 18.18 26.22 22.19
Wanted more 
money 7.74 7.84 8.56 2.84 6 .1 0 5.27
For better 
conditions of 
work
1.88 1.76 1.94 1.70 1 .2 2 1.57
Family
commitments 1.46 0.59 1.30 15.90 14.02 17.54
Capital, space,
equipment,
opportunities
6.49 9.61 8.01 6.82 4.27* 8.26
Saw demand 2.92 4.12 2.95 2.84 3.05 3.78
Joined the family 
business 5.44 5.09 5.79 8.52 9.15* 5.43
Nature of 
occupation 13.18 12.75 16.35 2 1 .0 2 17.07 18.72
No jobs available 
locally 4.81*** 3.33 2.28 1.70 1 .22 0.87
Made redundant 11.08 10.59 9.15 2.27 3.66 2.75
Other reasons 12.97** 11.37 9.31 13.07 11.58 10.77
No reason given 3.97 4.31 4.54 5.11 2.44 2.83
Notes: Sample is the self-employed o f working age and figures relate to first response. LFS data refer 
to Spring 2001. , and denote differences from the relevant non-disabled comparator group at the
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Figures represent the percentage o f valid responses.
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Table 5.3. Variable Means
Males Females
Variable
Work-
limited
disabled
Non­
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Work-
limited
disabled
Non-
work-
limited
disabled
Non­
disabled
Aged 25-34 0.118 0.131 0.231 0.142 0.174 0.262
Aged 35-44 0.190 0.209 0.279 0.251 0.262 0.304
Aged 45-54 0.260 0.276 0.215 0.316 0.292 0 .2 2 1
Aged 55+ 0.375 0.322 0.145 0.229 0.188 0.091
Single 0.271 0.228 0.474 0.225 0.237 0.296
Married 0.597 0.687 0.592 0.582 0.635 0.604
North 0.070 0.054 0.050 0.067 0.054 0.052
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 0.096 0.099 0.091 0.092 0 .1 0 1 0.090
East Midlands 0.071 0.075 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.069
East Anglia 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.032 0.032 0.038
South West 0.078 0.087 0.082 0.078 0.091 0.082
West Midlands 0.089 0.084 0.090 0.094 0.082 0.088
North West 0.114 0 .1 0 2 0.096 0.106 0 .1 0 0 0.098
Wales 0.066 0.046 0.046 0.064 0.046 0.047
Scotland 0.094 0.084 0.087 0.092 0.091 0.088
Northern Ireland 0.045 0.024 0.039 0.048 0 .0 2 2 0.039
Degree 0.083 0.175 0.208 0.074 0.137 0.178
Other higher 
education 0.058 0.091 0.084 0.083 0.108 0.106
A levels 0.281 0.325 0.290 0.127 0.161 0.164
O levels 0.128 0.148 0.173 0.218 0.264 0.272
Other qualification 0.158 0.135 0.130 0.158 0.158 0.138
Home owned 0.256 0.251 0.186 0.207 0.203 0.162
Home mortgaged 0.363 0.581 0.620 0.389 0.555 0.606
Social housing 0.295 0 .1 0 0 0.097 0.321 0.160 0.134
Dependent children 0.477 0.542 0.714 0.660 0.707 0.915
Dependent 
children< 5 0.095 0 .1 2 0 0.193 0.123 0.158 0.247
White 0.934 0.955 0.929 0.921 0.948 0.920
Immigrant 0.083 0.063 0.093 0.095 0.080 0.106
Other earner 0.439 0.634 0 .6 6 8 0.519 0.685 0.723
Agriculture & 
fishing
Manufacturing
0.026 0.018 0 .0 2 0 0.007 0.005 0.005
0.199 0.223 0.209 0.078 0.077 0.084
Construction 0.128 0 .1 2 1 0.139 0 . 0 1 2 0.019 0.016
Distribution 0.175 0.153 0.159 0.237 0 .2 0 1 0 .2 0 1
Transport & 
communication 0 .1 1 0 0 .1 0 2 0.098 0.031 0.036 0.038
Banking & finance 0.127 0.156 0.159 0.130 0.142 0.155
Public
administration
0.158 0.158 0.155 0.429 0.456 0.429
Notes: Means relate to regression samples.
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Table 5.4. Male Self-employment Bivariate Probit Estimates
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limiteddisabled Non-disabled
Self Employ Self Employ Self Employ
Constant -0.224 -0.773*** -0.898*** 0.328* -1.075*** 0.303***
(0.42) (6.14) (3.17) (1.65) (8.42) (4.06)
Aged 25-34 0.248 0 .2 0 1 *** 0.258* 0.517*** 0.389*** 0.549***
(1.53) (2.71) (1 .6 6 ) (4.89) (6.63) (16.77)
Aged 35-44 0.432*** 0.157** 0.504*** 0.587*** 0.610*** 0.603***
(2.61) (2.13) (3.09) (5.40) (9.53) (16.26)
Aged 45-54 0.703*** -0.067 0.684*** 0.660*** 0.763*** 0.514***
(4.49) (0.89) (4.02) (5.93) (11.78) (12.81)
Aged 55+ 0.976*** -0.511*** 0.948*** -0.071 1.056*** -0.084**
(6.54) (6.61) (6.35) (0.65) (19.55) (2 .0 0 )
Single -0.234** -0.109* -0.038 -0.178* 0 .0 1 2 -0.126***
(2 .11) (1.95) (0.43) (1.87) (0.31) (2.97)
Married -0.166** 0.098** -0.118 0.005 -0.017 0.060
(2.07) (2.03) (1.62) (0.07) (0.50) (1.59)
North -0.040 -0.407*** -0.117 -0.266*** -0 .1 1 0 ** -0.224***
(0.27) (6.47) (1.15) (2.64) (2.50) (5.17)
Yorkshire & 0.014 -0.181*** -0.153** -0.031 -0.160*** -0.049
Humberside (0.14) (3.32) (2.03) (0.36) (4.86) (1.35)
East Midlands -0.078 -0.157** -0.036 0.018 -0.133*** -0.027
(0.72) (2.57) (0.45) (0.19) (3.74) (0.67)
East Anglia -0.019 -0.089 -0.321*** -0.043 -0.070 -0 .0 2 1
(0.16) (1 .10) (2.63) (0.34) (1.55) (0.40)
South West -0.069 -0.019 0.042 -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 0 0.019
(0.79) (0.33) (0.56) (0 .0 2 ) (0.31) (0.48)
West Midlands -0.065 -0.123** -0.094 -0 .1 1 1 -0.086*** 0.036
(0.70) (2.19) (1.19) (1.28) (2.70) (0.97)
North West 0.051 -0.296*** -0.093 -0.163** -0.130*** -0.088**
(0.48) (5.61) (1.23) (2.04) (4.03) (2.52)
Wales -0.058 -0.422*** -0.219** -0.067 -0.053 -0.153***
(0.37) (6.59) (2.07) (0.60) (1.23) (3.32)
Scotland -0.190 -0.297*** -0.118 -0.190** -0.175*** -0.056
(1.39) (5.21) (1.39) (2.23) (5.24) (1.49)
Northern 0.192 -0.472*** 0.018 -0.383*** 0.044 -0.157***
Ireland (1.23) (6.23) (0.13) (2.73) (1 .0 0 ) (3.14)
Degree -0.071 0.841*** -0 . 0 2 2 0.140* -0 .1 2 2 *** 0.302***
(0.34) (14.40) (0.28) (1.72) (3.60) (9.03)
Other higher -0.345** 0.718*** -0.108 -0.084 -0.209*** 0.296***
education (2 .0 1 ) (10.90) (1.18) (0.94) (5.25) (6.84)
A levels -0.172 0.524*** -0.125* 0.315*** -0.123*** 0.378***
(1.30) (13.33) (1.84) (4.58) (3.83) (12.41)
O levels -0.205 0.516*** -0.164** 0.171** -0.131*** 0.281***
(1.47) (10.48) (2.09) (2.08) (3.84) (8.49)
Other -0.191* 0.365*** -0.207*** 0.240*** -0 .2 0 1 *** 0.281***
(1.70) (8 .0 2 ) (2.64) (2.94) (5.71) (8.15)
Home owned 0 .1 1 1 0.080 0.225** -0.347*** 0.186*** -0.185***
(1.13) (1.43) (2.46) (3.67) (5.33) (5.05)
Home -0.141 0.398*** -0.072 0.267*** -0.042 0.240***
mortgaged (1.23) (7.36) (0.84) (2.87) (1.32) (7.19)
Social housing 0 .0 2 1 -0.552*** -0 .1 1 2 -0.487*** -0.114* -0.588***
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(0 .11) (9.90) (0.91) (4.79) (1.94) (15.67)
White x -0 .1 1 1 0.239*** -0.219* 0.373*** -0.150*** 0.279***
(0.85) (3.13) (1 .8 6 ) (3.11) (3.68) (6.93)
Summer -0.037 - 0.026 0.005 0.018 0.058** -0.031
(0.56) (0.65) (0.09) (0.28) (2.47) (1.16)
Autumn -0.005 -0.029 0.033 0.080 0.025 -0.015
(0.08) (0.73) (0.57) (1.23) (1.05) (0.54)
Winter -0.060 0.050 0.017 0 .0 2 1 0.025 0.023
(0.94) (1.25) (0.31) (0.33) (1.07) (0.84)
Immigrant 0.249** -0.127* 0.028 0 .0 0 1 0.146*** -0 .1 1 2 ***
(2.30) (1.80) (0.29) (0 .0 1 ) (4.21) (2.92)
Other earner -0.218** 0.513*** -0.148** 0.523*** -0.090*** 0.391***
(1.99) (16.05) (2.54) (10.81) (3.74) (18.73)
Agriculture & 0.907*** 0.856*** 0.931***
fishing (5.38) (6.08) (15.71)
Manufacturing -0.856*** -0.740*** -0.713***
(6.29) (7.63) (17.30)
Construction 0.560*** 0.520*** 0.637***
(5.20) (6.08) (17.12)
Distribution -0.207** -0.016 -0.041
(2.29) (0.19) (1.13)
Transport & -0.132 -0.123 -0.232***
communication (1.38) (1.35) (5.77)
Banking & -0.078 0.140* 0.024
finance (0.84) (1.72) (0 .6 8 )
Public admin -1.023*** -0.730*** -0.780***
(6.54) (7.09) (17.78)
Dependent 0 . 0 1 2 0.031 0.086*** 0.015 0.090*** 0.003
children (0.40) (1.57) (3.50) (0.38) (9.69) (0.24)
Dependent 0.060 0.027 0.054**
children <5 (1.2 1 ) (0.32) (1.99)
P
(p-value)
-0.482 
LR(p=0): X2(l) = 1-77 
(p=0.184)
-0.304 
LR(p=0): x2(1) = 4.68 
(p=0.031)
-0.492 
LR(p=0): x2(l) -  
11.37 (p=0.001)
Observations 
Censored 
Log Likelihood 
Wald x2(38) 
(p-value)
9558
5445
-6860.12
733.75
(0 .0 0 )
6891
751
-4290.35
725.89
(0 .0 0 )
39554
3795
-24412.92
4177.46
(0 .0 0 )
Notes-. Z statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. Censored observations are those that are removed at the first (selection) stage. In 
this case they refer to the non-employed.
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Table 5.5. Female Self-employment Bivariate Probit Estimates
Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Self Employ Self Employ Self Employ
Constant -2.151*** -0.703*** -2.430*** -0.350** -1.770*** -0.041
(3.75) (5.52) (4.23) (2.13) (14.10) (0 .6 8 )
Aged 25-34 1.063*** 0.072 0.450* 0.561*** 0.462*** 0  4 4 4 ***
(4.19) (0.96) (1.94) (6.47) (7.46) (14.97)
Aged 35-44 1.050*** -0.033 0.831*** 0.702*** 0.703*** 0.539***
(4.10) (0.44) (3.20) (7.68) (10.69) (16.47)
Aged 45-54 1.303*** -0 .2 1 1 *** 0.883*** 0.566*** 0.822*** 0.397***
(4.95) (2.73) (3.49) (6.03) (12.33) (11.33)
Aged 55+ 1 4 5 9 *** -0.495*** 1.035*** 0.164 0.897*** -0.006
(4.89) (5.99) (4.43) (1.63) (12.17) (0.15)
Single 0.096 -0 .1 2 2 ** 0.133 -0.030 0.032 -0.148***
(0.71) (2.23) (1.03) (0.39) (0.65) (4.44)
Married 0.103 -0.175*** 0.192* -0.213*** 0.129*** -0.282***
(0.90) (4.10) (1.71) (3.37) (3.08) (9.73)
North -0.042 -0.244*** -0.248 -0.093 -0.380*** -0 .0 0 2
(0.27) (3.70) (1.48) (1.05) (5.86) (0.06)
Yorkshire & -0.241* -0.149*** -0.091 0.088 -0.209*** 0.049
Humberside (1.82) (2.61) (0.80) (1 .2 2 ) (4.54) (1.64)
East Midlands -0.170 -0.166*** -0.023 -0.027 -0.083* 0.103***
(1.18) (2.63) (0.19) (0.33) (1.76) (3.08)
East Anglia -0.322 -0.104 -0.281 0 .1 1 0 -0.044 0.113***
(1.54) (1.2 0 ) (1.36) (0.94) (0.74) (2.63)
South West -0.173 -0.044 0.130 0.034 0.072* 0.074**
(1.41) (0.74) (1.26) (0.46) (1.79) (2.35)
West Midlands -0.065 -0.154*** -0.094 0.026 -0 .2 1 1 *** 0.036
(0.51) (2.72) (0.76) (0.35) (4.51) (1 .2 1 )
North West -0.187 -0.226*** -0.089 0.113 -0.163*** 0.104***
(1.41) (4.10) (0.77) (1.56) (3.73) (3.54)
Wales 0.114 -0.308*** 0.174 0.003 -0 .1 1 2 ** 0 .1 2 0 ***
(0.70) (4.60) (1.29) (0.03) (1.97) (3.01)
Scotland -0.136 -0.258*** -0.199* 0 .0 0 2 -0.282*** 0.131***
(0.96) (4.41) (1.65) (0.03) (6 .0 2 ) (4.23)
Northern Ireland -0.247 -0.451*** 0.162 0.215 -0 199*** -0.047
(1.05) (5.74) (0.84) (1.55) (2.92) (1.16)
Degree 0.629** 1.048*** 0.299 0.713*** 0.467*** 0.776***
(2.37) (16.97) (1.63) (9.43) (8.91) (26.61)
Other higher 0.676*** 0.942*** -0.079 0.682*** 0.333*** 0.828***
education (2.73) (16.47) (0.41) (8.84) (5.79) (24.78)
A levels 0.522** 0.756*** 0.087 0.585*** 0.338*** 0.592***
(2.45) (15.28) (0.53) (8.59) (6.63) (21.13)
O levels 0.248 0.630*** -0.082 0.535*** 0.114** 0.496***
(1.24) (14.66) (0.53) (9.08) (2.34) (20.28)
Other 0.208 0.542*** -0 . 1 0 2 0.366*** 0.113** 0.394***
(1 .12) (11.71) (0.72) (5.79) (2.17) (14.37)
Home owned -0.119 0.070 -0.127 -0.034 0.072 -0.051
(0.90) (1.15) (0 .8 8 ) (0.42) (1.44) (1.60)
Home -0.150 0.309*** -0.025 0.445*** -0.032 0.376***
mortgaged (1.08) (5.47) (0.17) (6.05) (0.73) (13.77)
Social housing -0.333* -0  4 7 7 *** -0 .0 1 1 -0.143* -0.320*** -0.299***
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(1.73) (8 .12) (0.07) (1.80) (4.96) (9.67)
White -0.057 0.254*** 0.486** 0.277*** 0.130** 0.285***
(0.31) (3.29) (2.18) (2 .8 6 ) (2.31) (8.90)
Summer -0.095 -0.045 0.114 -0.050 -0.019 -0.071***
(1.06) (1.08) (1.38) (0.92) (0.59) (3.26)
Autumn -0.204** -0.055 0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 2 2 -0.019
(2.25) (1.32) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .2 1 ) (0.69) (0 .8 8 )
Winter -0.173* -0.062 -0.035 -0.019 -0 .0 2 2 -0 .0 2 1
(1.8 6 ) (1.45) (0.41) (0.34) (0.67) (0.97)
Immigrant 0 .1 1 1 -0  191*** 0.281** -0.281*** 0.226*** -0 .2 1 1 ***
(0.72) (2.70) (2.03) (3.43) (5.18) (7.11)
Other earner 0.269** 0.459*** 0.089 0.379*** 0.028 0.295***
(2.03) (13.14) (0.82) (8 .2 0 ) (0 .8 8 ) (15.23)
Agriculture & 0.630** 0.332 0.507***
fishing (2.31) (1.13) (4.78)
Manufacturing -0.702*** -0.590*** -1.023***
(4.89) (4.41) (18.95)
Construction -0.793*** -0.467** -0.662***
(2.71) (2.27) (7.66)
Distribution -0.605*** -0.597*** -0  7 4 9 ***
(5.52) (5.54) (18.91)
Transport & -0.829*** -0.675*** -0.889***
communication (3.91) (3.64) (13.09)
Banking & -0.493*** -0.501*** -0.683***
finance (4.18) (4.50) (17.12)
Public admin -1.374*** -1.036*** -1.232***
(11.59) (1 0 .2 0 ) (32.45)
Dependent 0.109** -0.086*** 0 .1 1 1 -0.286*** 0.098*** -0.248***
children (2.15) (4.44) (1.48) (11.31) (5.77) (26.72)
Dependent -0.331*** -0.399*** -0.485***
children <5 (6 .8 6 ) (8.40) (30.30)
P
(p-value)
0.134 
LR (p=0): x2 (l) = 
0.12 (p=0.727)
0.026 
LR (p=0): x2 (1) = 
0.00 (p=0.961)
0.157 
LR (p=0): x2 (l) = 
2.69 (p=0.101)
Observations 
Censored 
Log Likelihood 
Wald x2(38) 
(p-value)
8988
5553
-5706.42
273.75
(0 .0 0 )
6277
1363
-3752.76
205.08
(0 .0 0 )
39866
8580
-23789.18
1831.42
(0 .0 0 )
Notes: See notes to Table 5.4.
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Table 5.7. Decomposition of Predicted Conditional Self-employment
Probabilities
Coefficient vector on self-employment equation
Males Pdx Pd2 PN
Disabled work-limited 0 .2 1 2 0.115 0.137
Disabled non-work- limited 0.274 0.165 0.189
Non-disabled 0.243 0.151 0.174
(S Dl ^N /^unexplained 0.069
( ^ D2 Sn ^ u n exp la in ed -0.023
Females A* Pd2 P n
Disabled work- limited 0.093 0.074 0.083
Disabled non-work- limited 0.079 0.063 0.070
Non-disabled 0.085 0.065 0.073
(  ^ D x ^N /^unexplained 0 .0 1 2
(  ^ D 2 /^unexplained -0.008
Notes: Calculated from equations (5.8) and (5.9) and based on estimates in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
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Table A5.1. Male Self-employment Bivariate Probit Model Marginal Effects
Marginal Effects
Work-limited
disabled
Non-work-limited
disabled
Non-disabled
Self Employ Self Employ Self Employ
Aged 25-34 0.094 0.079*** 0.071 0.051*** 0.105*** 0.057***
(1.60) (2.69) (1.61) (6.61) (7.10) (20.44)
Aged 35-44 0.165*** 0.062** 0 1 4 4 *** 0.060*** 0.169*** 0.064***
(2.85) (2 .12) (3.06) (6.91) (10.73) (19.24)
Aged 45-54 0.268*** -0.026 0.195*** 0.070*** 0.224*** 0.053***
(4.91) (0.90) (4.13) (7.15) (12.94) (15.77)
Aged 55+ 0.362*** -0.193*** 0.272*** -0.009 0.340*** -0 .0 1 1 *
(5.52) (6.87) (6.36) (0.64) (19.79) (1.92)
Single -0.084** -0.042** -0.009 -0.025* 0.003 -0.017***
(2.47) (1.97) (0.43) (1.75) (0.31) (2 .8 8 )
Married -0.061** 0.038** -0.030 0 .0 0 1 -0.004 0.008
(1.97) (2.04) (1.59) (0.07) (0.50) (1.57)
North -0.015 -0 149*** -0.028 -0.041** -0.026*** -0.033***
(0.28) (7.04) (1.24) (2.26) (2.70) (4.52)
Yorkshire& 0.005 -0.069*** -0.036** -0.004 -0.037*** -0.006
Humberside (0.14) (3.41) (2.17) (0.36) (5.29) (1.31)
East Midlands -0.028 -0.060*** -0.009 0 .0 0 2 -0.031*** -0.004
(0.77) (2.63) (0.46) (0.19) (3.99) (0 .6 6 )
East Anglia -0.007 -0.034 -0.069*** -0.006 -0.017 -0.003
(0.16) (1 .11) (3.16) (0.33) (1.60) (0.39)
South West -0.025 -0.007 0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2
(0.81) (0.33) (0.56) (0 .0 2 ) (0.31) (0.49)
West Midlands -0.024 -0.047** -0.023 -0.016 -0 .0 2 0 *** 0.005
(0.73) (2.23) (1.25) (1 .2 0 ) (2.78) (0.99)
North West 0.019 -0 .1 1 1 *** -0 .0 2 2 -0.023* -0.030*** -0 .0 1 2 **
(0.45) (5.88) (1.30) (1.87) (4.35) (2.39)
Wales -0 .0 2 1 -0.154*** -0.050** -0.009 -0.013 -0 .0 2 2 ***
(0.40) (7.22) (2.32) (0.57) (1.27) (3.02)
Scotland -0.068* -0 .1 1 1 *** -0.028 -0.028** -0.040*** -0.007
(1.74) (5.47) (1.50) (2 .0 0 ) (5.78) (1.44)
Northern 0.073 -0.169*** 0.005 -0.065** 0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 2 2 ***
Ireland (1 .11) (6.98) (0.13) (2 .2 0 ) (0.98) (2.85)
Degree -0.026 0.324*** -0.005 0.017* -0.029*** 0.034***
(0.33) (15.94) (0.28) (1.85) (3.56) (10.30)
Other higher -0.118 0.279*** -0.026 -0 .0 1 1 -0.047*** 0.031***
education (1.58) (11.71) (1.25) (0.89) (5.42) (8.38)
A levels -0.063 0.206*** -0.031* 0.038*** -0.029*** 0.043***
(1 .11) (13.48) (1.81) (4.93) (3.67) (13.79)
O levels -0.073 0.204*** -0.039** 0 .0 2 0 ** -0.031*** 0.031***
(1.24) (10.65) (2.18) (2.28) (3.80) (9.76)
Other -0.068 0 1 4 4 *** -0.048*** 0.028*** -0.046*** 0.031***
(1.42) (8 .0 2 ) (2.74) (3.37) (5.68) (9.59)
Home owned 0.041 0.031 0.060** -0.052*** 0.048*** -0.026***
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(1.16) (1.42) (2.24) (3.24) (4.88) (4.64)
Hom e mortgaged -0.052 0.155*** -0.018 0.036*** -0.010 0.032***
(1.09) (7.38) (0.82) (2.78) (1.29) (6.89)
Social housing 0.008 -0.205*** -0.027 -0.084*** -0.027** -0.106***
(0.11) (10.55) (0.98) (3.80) (2.14) (11.94)
W hite -0.042 0.090*** -0.060* 0.062** -0.039*** 0.043***
(0.80) (3.25) (1.67) (2.54) (3.36) (5.92)
Summer -0.013 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.014** -0.004
(0.56) (0.65) (0.09) (0.28) (2.43) (1.15)
Autumn -0.002 -0.011 0.008 0.010 0.006 -0.002
(0.08) (0.73) (0.57) (1.27) (1.05) (0.54)
Winter -0.022 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.93) (1.25) (0.30) (0.33) (1.06) (0.85)
Immigrant 0.095** -0.049* 0.007 0.000 0.038*** -0.015***
(2.14) (1.83) (0.29) (0.01) (3.95) (2.74)
Other earner -0.080 q 199*** -0.038** 0.077*** -0.023*** 0.056***
(1.56) (16.29) (2.22) (9.72) (3.38) (17.00)
Agriculture 0.335*** 0.215*** 0.229***
& fishing (6.15) (6.14) (15.86)
Manufacturing -0.316*** -0.186*** -0.175***
(8.59) (8.57) (18.49)
Construction 0.207*** 0.131*** 0.156***
(6.03) (6.15) (17.05)
Distribution -0.076** -0.004 -0.010
(2.34) (0.19) (1.13)
Transport& -0.049 -0.031 -0.057***
com m unication (1.40) (1.36) (5.82)
Banking & finance -0.029 0.035* 0.006
(0.84) (1.71) (0.68)
Public admin -0.378*** -0.183*** -0.192***
(9.10) (7.92) (18.73)
Dependent 0.004 0.012 0.021*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.000
children (0.41) (1.57) (3.54) (0.38) (9.84) (0.24)
Dependent 0.023 0.004 0.007**
children<5 (1.21) (0.32) (1.99)
Notes: Marginal effects relate to coefficient estimates in Table 5.4. See notes to Table 5.4.
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Table A5.2. Female Self-employment Bivariate Probit Model Marginal Effects
Marginal Effects
Work-limited Disabled Non-work-limited
Disabled
Non-disabled
S elf Employ Self Employ S elf Employ
Aged 25-34 0.166* 0.027 0.054* 0.123*** 0.053*** 0.103***
(1.65) (0.95) (1.70) (7.98) (6.38) (16.77)
Aged 35-44 0.140 -0.012 0.111*** 0.157*** 0.086*** 0.125***
(1.61) (0.44) (2.95) (9.20) (9.09) (18.40)
Aged 45-54 0.173 -0.077*** 0.116*** 0.133*** 0.116*** 0.092***
(1.63) (2.78) (3.06) (6.82) (9.44) (12.76)
Aged 55+ 0.239 -0.171*** 0.165*** 0.041* 0.152*** -0.002
(1.59) (6.53) (2.79) (1.72) (8.04) (0.15)
Single 0.008 -0.044** 0.013 -0.008 0.003 -0.039***
(0.58) (2.27) (0.92) (0.38) (0.65) (4.32)
Married 0.008 -0.065*** 0.017 -0.055*** 0.012*** -0.071***
(0.67) (4.09) (1.35) (3.47) (3.03) (10.02)
North -0.003 -0.086*** -0.019 -0.025 -0.027*** -0.001
(0.29) (3.92) (1.64) (1.02) (7.55) (0.06)
Yorkshire& -0.017 -0.054*** -0.008 0.022 -0.017*** 0.012*
Humberside (1.35) (2.68) (0.79) (1.26) (5.10) (1.67)
East Midlands -0.012 -0.060*** -0.002 -0.007 -0.007* 0.026***
(1.12) (2.73) (0.19) (0.33) (1.86) (3.22)
East Anglia -0.020 -0.038 -0.021 0.028 -0.004 0.028***
(1.23) (1.22) (1.42) (0.99) (0.77) (2.77)
South West -0.012 -0.016 0.013 0.009 0.007* 0.018**
(1.13) (0.75) (1.12) (0.47) (1.70) (2.42)
West Midlands -0.005 -0.055*** -0.008 0.007 -0.017*** 0.009
(0.55) (2.81) (0.79) (0.36) (5.08) (1.23)
North West -0.013 -0.080*** -0.008 0.029 -0.014*** 0.026***
(1.36) (4.29) (0.76) (1.63) (4.06) (3.69)
Wales 0.010 -0.107*** 0.019 0.001 -0.010** 0.029***
(0.52) (4.98) (1.08) (0.03) (2.13) (3.18)
Scotland -0.010 -0.091*** -0.016 0.001 -0.022*** 0.032***
(1.07) (4.67) (1.61) (0.03) (6.82) (4.46)
Northern -0.017 -0.150*** 0.017 0.051* -0.016*** -0.012
Ireland (1.26) (6.60) (0.76) (1.73) (3.42) (1.13)
Degree 0.082*** 0.399*** 0.034* 0.145*** 0.058*** 0.155***
(3.41) (19.07) (1.89) (12.82) (7.90) (35.49)
Other higher 0.090*** 0.363*** -0.007 0.137*** 0.040*** 0.152***
education (3.64) (17.76) (0.39) (12.22) (5.15) (37.54)
A  levels 0.060*** 0.293*** 0.009 0.127*** 0.039*** 0.125***
(3.20) (15.58) (0.56) (10.71) (5.99) (26.40)
O levels 0.023* 0.242*** -0.007 0.125*** 0.011** 0.115***
(1.89) (14.64) (0.49) (10.31) (2.32) (22.69)
Other 0.019 0.209*** -0.009 0.086*** 0.012** 0.088***
(1.48) (11.58) (0.66) (6.60) (2.08) (16.79)
Home owned -0.009 0.026 -0.011 -0.009 0.007 -0.013
(0.77) (1.14) (0.93) (0.42) (1.38) (1.58)
Home mortgaged -0.012 0.115*** -0.002 0.120*** -0.003 0.101***
(0.74) (5.44) (0.16) (5.96) (0.72) (13.37)
Social housing -0.025* -0.169*** -0.001 -0.039* -0.025*** -0.085***
(1.91) (8.61) (0.07) (1.73) (6.34) (8.88)
White -0.005 0.089*** 0.031*** 0.081*** 0.011*** 0.082***
(0.28) (3.49) (2.67) (2.61) (2.59) (8.13)
Summer -0.007 -0.017 0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.019***
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(0.94) (1.08) (1.19) (0.91) (0.59) (3.21)
Autumn -0.015 -0.020 0.000 -0.003 0.002 -0.005
(1.33) . (1.33) (0.01) (0.21) (0.69) (0.87)
Winter -0.013 -0.023 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006
(1.30) (1.46) (0.41) (0.34) (0.68) (0.96)
Immigrant 0.010 -0.068*** 0.032 -0.082*** 0.025*** -0.059***
(0.56) (2.81) (1.33) (3.15) (4.29) (6.65)
Other earner 0.022** 0.168*** 0.008 0.106*** 0.003 0.081***
(2.44) (13.42) (1.01) (7.78) (0.90) (14.43)
Agriculture& 0.052 0.031 0.048***
fishing (1.24) (1.07) (4.63)
Manufacturing -0.058 -0.055*** -0.098***
(1.42) (2.58) (13.86)
Construction -0.065 -0.044* -0.063***
(1.32) (1.85) (7.15)
Distribution -0.050 -0.056*** -0.071***
(1.43) (2.76) (13.64)
Transport& -0.068 -0.063** -0.085***
communication (1.38) (2.46) (10.94)
Banking & -0.040 -0.047*** -0.065***
finance (1.40) (2.62) (13.03)
Public admin -0.113 -0.097*** -0.118***
(1.48) (3.06) (17.14)
Dependent 0.009 -0.032*** 0.010 -0.075*** 0.009*** -0.064***
children (1.00) (4.44) (1.04) (11.36) (4.85) (26.79)
Dependent -0.122*** -0.105*** -0.125***
children<5 (6.86) (8.36) (30.08)
Notes: Marginal effects relate to coefficient estimates in Table 5.5. See notes to Table 5.4.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE BIAS ASSOCIATED WITH SELF-REPORTED DISABILITY
6.1 Introduction
The growth in interest and empirical evidence relating to the impact of disability on 
labour market outcomes in the UK is documented in Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2. 
However, these studies utilise, almost exclusively, self-reported infortnation from 
surveys such as the LFS (Kidd et al., 2000 and Jones et al., 2006b), BHPS (Bell and 
Heitmueller, 2005), GHS (Blackaby et al., 1999) and the FRS (Madden, 2004).145 
While there are obvious advantages in using information from these large scale 
surveys, it has meant that the current UK evidence is conditional on the assumption 
that ‘global’ self-reported measures of disability coincide with true disability. This 
appears controversial, given the literature that exists on the potential bias associated 
with the use of ‘global’ self-reported health information to analyse the retirement 
decision (see Section 2.3). Indeed, there are no obvious reasons why the empirical 
concerns formalised by Bound (1991), in relation to either the subjective individual 
nature of reporting (measurement error) or the influence of labour market status on 
reporting (justification bias), should only relate to individuals nearing the age of 
retirement. Moreover, the only other known UK study to consider this issue, 
O’Donnell (1998), using data from the 1985 OPCS survey, rejects the accuracy of 
self-reported information for working age men.
This Chapter, by using detailed information on health available in the HSE, is able to 
consider the potential bias associated with self-reported disability when estimating 
the impact of disability on labour market participation for the entire working age
145 In practice, nearly all these studies split the population by disability status, but the problem of 
endogeneity may transfer to sample selection bias in this situation. Only Madden (2004) considers 
this.
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population. 146 In addition to providing evidence for England, the extensive range of 
health information can be used to investigate important issues raised in recent 
analysis of this issue. These include consideration of the suitability of alternative 
instruments for disability, given the concerns that self-reported, more objective, 
health information also suffers from justification bias (Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 
2002 and Baker et al., 2004) and that endogeneity between work and disability may 
result from a direct relationship (Ettner, 2000). More specifically, this analysis uses a 
range of variables, depending on the assumptions imposed on the form of 
endogeneity, to instrument global self-reported health in a labour market 
participation equation. In doing so, it tests the accuracy of current estimates of the 
impact of disability on participation in England.
Since the empirical issues in measuring disability are discussed in Chapter 2, a brief 
summary focusing on the current context is included in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 
outlines the data from the HSE and discusses the econometric approach employed 
here. Section 6.4 presents and analyses the key results and the final section (6.5) 
briefly concludes.
6.2 Measurement of Disability
Although the sources of bias relating to self-reported health are extensive (see 
Deschryvere 2005), the two main issues were formalised by Bound (1991). An 
individual’s assessment of disability is likely to be subjective and, as such, self- 
reported responses may differ between individuals who have the same ‘true’ 
disability status. This measurement error in self-reported disability will cause a 
downward bias on the estimate of disability on participation. However, there is an 
additional source of bias. The justification hypothesis suggests that there are 
additional incentives for those who are not in work to report a disability, for 
example, to justify their economic status. This creates a positive correlation between 
the errors in a labour force participation equation and in a self-reported health 
equation, which Bound (1991) shows will cause an upward bias on the influence of 
self-reported health on participation. As such, estimates based on self-reported
146 The Health Surveys in the UK are undertaken independently by country and, as such, samples, 
questions and time periods differ. The analysis is thus restricted to England.
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disability may over or underestimate the impact of ‘true’ disability, depending on the 
relative influence of these two sources of bias. However, what Bound (1991) also 
shows is that authors who tried to resolve these issues by replacing self-reported 
information with more objective measures (see, for example, Parsons, 1980, 1982) 
are also subject to bias. This bias arises from an alternative source of measurement 
error because objective measures are less than perfectly correlated with work 
capacity. Objective health measures will, therefore, underestimate the effect of ‘true’ 
disability on labour market participation.
Empirical studies examining this issue have generally proceeded in two main ways. 
Firstly, both self-reported and more objective measures have been applied to identify 
upper and lower bounds of the impact of health on labour market outcomes (see, for 
example, Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999). More frequently, however, more objective 
health measures have been used to instrument self-reported health (Stem, 1989, 
Bound et al. 1999, Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999 and Au et al., 2005). As Bound (1991) 
shows, using more objective information to instmment self-reported health will lead 
to a correct estimate of health on participation, but may tend to underestimate the 
impact of economic influences. Examples of instmments in this literature include 
parental health and mortality (Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999), weight/height ratio or 
BMI (Campolieti, 2002) and, medical conditions and functional limitations 
(Campolieti, 2002 and Au et al. 2005). Alternatively, studies have used comparisons 
between workers’ (who are assumed to have unbiased reports) and non-workers’ 
objective and subjective health information to identify the self-reporting bias (for 
example, Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002). Despite a growing number of studies, the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. Several studies find that the non-employed tend 
to over-report disability (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995, O’Donnell, 1998, 
Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002 and Kreider and Pepper, 2007) whilst others find 
that self-reported disability is an unbiased measure o f tme disability (Stem 1989, 
Dwyer and Mitchell 1999, Benitez-Silva et al. 2004 and Larsen and Datta Gupta, 
2004).
There is a debate over what constitutes an appropriate instmment for disability. The 
majority of instmments relate to ‘more objective’ measures of health; however this 
covers a range of measures, some of which are self-reported (see Section 2.3 for a
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discussion). Bound et al. (1995) and Au et al. (2005), amongst others, argue that 
more specific self-reported conditions are the less likely they are to suffer from 
justification bias. Instruments used in this type of analysis have, therefore, included 
self-reported information on the presence of medical conditions and/or the ability to 
perform certain tasks (Bound et al. 1999, Disney et al., 2006), health indices (Au et 
al., 2005) and health risk factors (for example, BMI) (Campolieti, 2002). The 
objectivity of these more objective instruments may vary considerably. Measures 
which make reference to outside standards, such as the ability to perform a set task, 
or that make use of information provided by a third party, such as the presence of a 
medical condition, would seem to be less susceptible to individual misreporting. 
However, Baker et al. (2004) find that self-reported information on specific 
conditions also suffers from justification bias. In this case, therefore, self-reported 
health information is correlated with participation and becomes inappropriate to use 
as an instrument. As such, it is preferable to use true objective information such as 
physician reported conditions or measurements (see Stem, 1989, Bound et al., 1995 
and Campolieti, 2002), subsequent mortality rates (Bound, 1991) and medical 
records (Baker et al. 2004).
Whilst these objective measures will not suffer from justification bias, there are 
other, more traditional, mechanisms through which disability and work may be 
endogenous. Deschryvere (2005) refers to these forms of endogeneity as Type I and 
treats them as distinct from endogeneity associated with measurement which is 
referred to as Type II. Firstly, there may be common unobservables which affect both 
disability and work, and, secondly, there may be a direct relationship between 
working and health. Under these circumstances even objective health measures 
become endogenous. As a result, Ettner (2000) advocates instmments relating to 
genetic and environmental influences, such as parental health, previous health 
assessments and regional health indicators, as instmments for any self-reported 
measure of disability.
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6.3. Data and Methodology
6.3.1. The Econometric Model
The econometric model follows Campolieti (2002) closely, which adopts a similar 
framework to Bound et al. (1995), amongst others. The first equation models the 
decision to participate in the labour market147:
p*i=y Yi + Arji+Si (6 .1)
wherep*i is the latent variable determining labour market participation, ^  includes
exogenous controls for personal and household characteristics and 77,. is the
continuous measure of ‘true’ disability which is unobserved. The second equation 
models true disability status as:
t7,. = p  Yi + a Z .  + vt (6.2)
where Z( includes various controls for health status, which are assumed to be 
exogenous and, therefore, uncorrelated with /?*,-. Finally, the third equation models 
observed self-reported disability status as:
d*i = (/>Yi + y/rii+jLii (6.3)
where d*i is a global self-reported measure of disability which depends on true 
disability and personal and household characteristics.
As Campolieti (2002) shows, by substituting equation (6.2) into equation (6.3), the 
disability reporting equation can be expressed as ( y/ = 1 ):
= ($£ + /?) Y. + a  Zj + tui (6.4)
* *where mi = + p i . Equation (6.4) can be used to predict dt which is used to
instrument 77. in equation (6 .1) as follows:
147 The participation, rather than employment,, decision has been the focus o f this literature, and, 
therefore, the analysis differs slightly from previous Chapters.
202
+ K * *
P i = 7 Y: + A,dj +£; (6.5)
As Bound (1991) notes, whilst the estimate of X is consistent, if the self-reported
In practice, the latent variables are not observed. Instead, binary variables are
Therefore, the participation equation has a binary dependent variable and an 
endogenous binary variable. In this situation, Campolieti (2002) estimates equations 
(6.4) and (6.5) as probit models and uses the predicted probability of disability in a 
two step probit estimator (2SPM). However, Maddala (1983), Wooldridge (2002) 
and Bhattacharya et al. (2006) show that, unlike for continuous variables, the 
application of this two stage procedure for two dichotomous variables does not, in 
general, produce consistent estimates of the structural parameters required. Maddala 
(1983) shows the estimates are only consistent if equation (6.5) is actually specified 
in terms of dt, where dt is the probability that d * > 0 . Otherwise, the most
appropriate method to estimate the model is a bivariate probit model, which is 
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation of a recursive simultaneous equation 
model for dichotomous choice (see Maddala, 1983, Greene, 1998 and Bhattacharya 
et al. 2006). As such, equation (6.4) is estimated jointly with (6.5), using a bivariate 
probit, where disability replaces its predicted value in equation (6.5) as follows:150
of disability.
149 The use of binary measures to replace the unobserved continuous measures will give rise to an 
additional source of measurement error (Bound, 1991).
150 See Brown et al. (2005) for an application of this model to the endogeneity between diabetes and 
employment.
A • • 148information depends on the exogenous characteristics, y  will be a biased estimate.
observed, which are related to the latent variables as follows: 149
p i =y'Yi +A'di + s i
(6 .6 )
dt =/3'Yi +cc'Zi +m
148 As in previous analysis, this issue is not explored here, since the focus of the Chapter is the impact
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Moreover, Knapp and Seaks (1998) show that a likelihood ratio test for the
t ft
significance of p  (where corr (gj(. s i ) = p )  is a simple test for the exogeneity of 
self-reported disability. 151
Despite the absence of continuous variables, other studies have continued to use the 
two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure applied to a linear probability model 
(LPM) (see Au et al., 2005), which is supported by Angrist (2001). The sensitivity of 
the bivariate probit results is tested, therefore, by estimating both 2SLS and the 
2SPM models. As discussed above, there is no consensus on which variables are the 
most appropriate instruments for disability. A suitable instrument is correlated with 
disability but not with participation. The application of 2SLS, while ignoring the 
binary nature of the dependent variable, facilitates the examination of the 
appropriateness of instruments (see Evans and Schwab, 1995 and Conway and 
Kutinova, 2006 for application to the LPM). Correlation between the instrument and 
disability is examined using an F test for the joint significance of the instruments in 
the disability equation. 152 Since the models contain more instruments than 
endogenous variables, the Sargan test for over-identification is used to examine if the 
instruments are correlated with the errors in the participation equation.
6.3.2 The Health Survey for England
The HSE is a nationally representative annual cross sectional survey commissioned by 
the Department of Health. 153 The aim of the survey is to provide detailed information 
on the health of the adult population, aged 16 and over, living in private households in 
England. The survey contains a set of ‘core’ questions and, each year, additional 
modules are included in the survey, which focus on particular aspects of ill-health or 
groups in the population (for example, ethnic minorities). Data from 2003 are chosen 
for this analysis since, in this year, the entire sample is from the general population. 
The data contains core self-reported and objective information on health status,
151 Fabbri et al. (forthcoming) compare the finite sample properties o f a range o f alternative statistics 
and support the use o f a likelihood ratio test.
152 Typically, a value o f 10 or more provides evidence that the group o f instruments is correlated with 
disability.
153 The survey is carried out by the Joint Survey Unit o f the National Centre o f Social Research and 
the Department o f Epidemiology and Public Health at University College London. Data are accessed 
from the Data Archive www. data-archive.ac.uk.
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including information collected from a nurse visit. However, in 2003, the survey also 
contains detailed information on cardiovascular disease and the behavioural risk 
factors associated with cardiovascular disease such as drinking, smoking and eating 
habits.
Whilst this data source, unlike many surveys that focus on labour market outcomes, 
provides the necessary objective health information to instrument self-reported health, 
it has more limited labour market information. 154 In particular, there is no information 
on an individual’s labour market earnings and the cross sectional nature of the data 
precludes the analysis of changes in health stock (see, for example, Bound et al. 1999 
and Disney et al., 2006). This analysis is, therefore, restricted to the decision to 
participate (as described above) and, in this respect, follows more closely the work of 
Stem (1989), Bound et al. (1995) and Campolieti (2002) . 155
In contrast to the above studies, which focus on older workers, the sample consists of 
working age individuals. An individual is classed as disabled if they answer positively 
to:
Do you have any long-standing illness, disability or infirmity? By long-standing I  
mean anything that has troubled you over a period o f  time, or that is likely to affect 
you over a period o f  time?
and
Does this illness or disability/do any o f these illnesses or disabilities limit your 
activities in any way?
This longstanding limiting definition of disability represents the global measure ( d t). 
Participation (/?.) is defined using activity status in the last week and the active 
population includes the employed and the unemployed. The exogenous variables ( f )  
are standard in the literature and include personal characteristics (age, marital status,
154 As a result, the survey has had relatively limited use in labour market analysis, with the exceptions 
of MacDonald and Shields (2004) and Morris (2007).
155 The endogeneity o f  health and earnings in the UK is considered by Contoyannis and Rice (2001), 
using data from the BHPS.
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ethnicity, educational qualifications), household measures (housing tenure, number of 
children, household size), a set of regional controls and a rural/urban area indicator. 156
The more objective health information, which is used to instrument disability, is 
separated into three tiers on the basis of potential endogeneity. Information in Tier 1 
includes more specific self-reported information on physical and mental wellbeing. 
Consistent with Au et al. (2005), composite index measures are used which capture 
multiple aspects of the restriction and, thus, reduce measurement error. 157 The two 
measures are EQ-5D, which captures the incidence and severity of specific capacities 
such as mobility and self care, and the general health questionnaire (GHQ12) score, 
which contains information about psychological wellbeing derived from questions 
about levels of anxiety and depression. 158
Instruments in Tier 2 contain more objective information which, while still being 
self-reported, relates more closely to outside standards or information provided by a 
third party. Variables in this group include information on physician prescribed 
medication, physician diagnosed conditions and physical measurements provided by 
an independent third party. In contrast to the previous literature, controls for BMI 
have not been included since they are also potentially endogenous with labour 
market activity. 159,160 Instruments in Tier 3 contain information that does not capture 
individual health directly, but genetic and regional controls correlated with individual 
health. Even if work and health are related by Type I and Type II endogeneity, these 
variables should remain uncorrelated with participation. Instruments that relate to 
genetic influences include variables indicating a family history of cardiovascular
156 Full details o f all variables are included in Table 6.1.
157 Au et al. (2005) use Health Utilities Index Mark 3.
158 The EQ-5D index value is based on self-completion on five dimensions o f health, namely mobility, 
self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, anxiety/depression. Severity is also monitored for each 
dimension. More information about this measure is available from http://www.euroqol.org/. There is a 
substantial clinical literature which identifies the validity o f EQ-5D across a range of different patient 
groups (see, for example, Pickard et al., 2007). The questions are still largely subjective, for example, 
individuals are asked to rate their pain/discomfort as no pain, moderate pain or extreme pain. The 
GHQ12 value reflects responses to 12 questions about general level o f happiness, depression, anxiety 
and sleep disturbance over the past four weeks. Individuals are asked to respond using one of the four 
options: not at all, no more than usual, rather more than usual, much more than usual.
159 Whilst the HSE contains measurements from blood samples, for example, cholesterol and 
fibrinogen, the sample size is restricted considerably for these measures and, therefore, they are not 
used.
160 Whilst the influence of disability on participation from a specification which uses measures 
relating to BMI, diet, smoking and physical activity as instruments is o f similar magnitude to the 
results presented here, they fail the Sargan test o f instrument validity and are, therefore, not reported.
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disease (CVD) and parental mortality. 161 A variable relating to whether the 
respondents’ mother smoked during their childhood provides a control for 
environmental factors. Regional health measures from the NHS performance 
indicators, such as density of medical provision and rates of death from cancer, 
accidents and suicides, were mapped into the HSE to control for current 
environment. 162 However, these variables were not strongly correlated with 
individual disability status. Instead, information at a more disaggregate geographic 
level on relative deprivation, measured by the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD), is included to capture the influence of the immediate environment. The IMD 
is made up of 7 domains including health deprivation and disability; education, skills 
and training; housing and services; the living environment; crime; income and 
employment. The final two domains, which, in part, reflect labour market outcomes, 
may be correlated with individual activity. However, the controls for the relative 
position of the local area, in terms of overall deprivation used here, are not a
• * 1 6 3significant determinant of individual activity in a simple probit model.
6.4. Results
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Just over 20 percent of the working age population are classified as disabled, using 
the activity-limiting definition in the HSE. Consistent with previous evidence from 
labour market surveys, the participation gap is substantial, with the disabled 
participation rate being less than 65 percent of the non-disabled. The mean values of 
the personal and household characteristics (Table 6.1) confirm that the disabled, on 
average, are older and are less likely to hold formal qualifications. As expected, 
average index values indicate lower physical (EQ-5D) and mental (GHQ12) health 
for the disabled. 164 The more specific medical information, such as diagnosed 
conditions, also confirms the relationship between ill-health and disability. For 
example, the disabled are more likely to have been diagnosed with high blood 
pressure or diabetes. Interestingly, the data also suggest that the mean values of
161 As Ettner (2000) notes, the presence o f informal care may result in correlation between parental 
health and own labour market outcomes.
162 Regional health information is available from NHS performance indicators at the Health Authority 
Level. See http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/nhsperformanceindicators/2002/hangp_d.html.
163 All the models are also estimated without the IMD controls and the same conclusions hold.
regional and genetic indicators differ by disability status. The disabled are less likely 
to live in areas with low levels of relative deprivation, are more likely to report a 
family history of CVD, to have lost their natural mother or father, and to have had a 
mother who smoked during their childhood.
6.4.2 Participation Equations
Tables 6.2-6.4 present the results for the participation equation for each of the 
estimation strategies, namely, using 2SLS, a 2SPM and the bivariate probit model. 165 
The first column in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 represents a naive model of labour force 
participation which assumes self-reported disability is exogenous. As is well 
established in the literature, the ‘global’ measure of disability has a significant 
negative effect on participation in both models, with the marginal effect indicating 
disability reduces participation by about 25 percent. 166 The controls for personal, 
household and regional characteristics conform to their usual patterns, with age, 
education, ethnicity, housing tenure, region of residence and the presence of 
dependent children all having a significant effect on participation.
Columns 2-4 in Table 6.2 represent the 2SLS procedure using instrument Tiers 1-3 
respectively. For each specification the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is able to reject the 
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of disability and, therefore, supports the use of an 
IV procedure relative to the estimates in column 1. In all cases, the F tests indicate 
the instruments are jointly significant in the first stage regression (the coefficient 
estimates from the first stage are presented in appendix Table A6.1). As is expected, 
measures of ill-health have a positive association with disability, and, in the Tier 3 
specification, a family history of CVD, having a mother who smoked during 
childhood and living in relative deprivation all increase the probability of disability. 
Controlling for the EQ-5D value in the Tier 1 specification reduces the influence of
164 EQ-5D is measured continuously in the range -0.59 to 1. The maximum value (1) indicates full 
health, whereas 0 represents death. Negative values (which only represent 1 percent o f the sample) are 
thought to indicate a health state worse than death. GHQ12 is measured on a scale from 0 to 12. A 
higher value is consistent with greater psychological distress.
165 Since information relating to some of the instruments is only collected for those who accept the 
nurse visit, the samples change between specifications. However, if  the same models are estimated on 
a constant (smaller) sample, the key results still hold. Therefore, it is the change in specification and 
not sample that is driving the main results.
166 As would be expected, given the broader definition of disability than either the work-limited or 
DDA definitions in the LFS, the marginal effect o f disability on participation in the HSE is lower than 
estimates from the LFS.
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personal and regional characteristics on disability; however, in the specifications for 
Tier 2 and Tier 3, these characteristics have their typical influence; for example, 
disability is positively associated with age and negatively associated with education.
Table 6.2 also reports the Sargan over-identification test for instrument validity. In 
all cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level, indicating they 
are uncorrelated with participation. 167 Using Tier 1 variables as instruments for 
disability increases the (absolute) impact of disability on participation to -0.54. 
Estimation using Tier 2 instruments further increases the impact of disability to -0.59 
and with Tier 3 instruments the estimate is -0.51, although this final estimate is less 
precise with a far greater standard error. 168 However, the influence of personal and 
household characteristics on participation is relatively unaffected by the introduction 
of an IV strategy.
Table 6.3 presents the estimates and the marginal effects from the 2SPM. Again, the 
marginal effect of disability on participation increases substantially when using an IV 
strategy. The marginal effect of disability rises from -0.25 in the probit model to over 
-0.43 in the 2SPM. The marginal effects for disability with Tier 1 and Tier 2 
instruments are of slightly smaller magnitude to the LPM, although for Tier 3 the 
marginal effect rises to -0.75.
Table 6.4 presents the preferred set of estimates from the bivariate probit model 
which jointly estimates disability and participation equations. The influence of the 
instruments in the disability equation is consistent with the discussion for the LPM 
and the 2SPM. The marginal effects relate to the probability of a positive outcome in 
the activity equation. 169 The impact of disability on participation is of a similar 
magnitude to the previous equations and increases from -0.53 to -0.65 with the 
change in instruments from Tier 1 to Tier 3. The significance of p  in the bivariate 
probit model confirms the endogeneity of self-reported disability, identified above. 
The positive correlation would suggest that, after controlling for the direct effect of
167 The Tier 2 instruments do reject the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level.
168 Excluding the IMD variables from this specification increases the influence o f disability (to -0.71).
169 The marginal effects are more complicated in a recursive bivariate probit model than for a simple 
probit since the variables may have a direct effect on activity and an indirect effect through their 
influence on the probability that disability equals 1 (see Greene, 1998). The marginal effects are 
calculated using the method presented in Kassouf and Hoffmann (2006).
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disability on participation, unobservables that affect disability positively also have a 
positive effect on activity. 170
The evidence suggests that failing to instrument disability actually leads to an 
underestimate of the impact of disability on labour market participation amongst the 
working age population in England. This key result is independent of which of the 
three proposed methods or groups of instruments is chosen. The results are consistent
• * 171with the evidence for Canada, from Campolieti (2002) and Au et al. (2005). In 
contrast to expectations, it suggests that previous evidence in the UK may have 
actually underestimated the impact of disability. In the context of the discussion by 
Bound (1991), the results are consistent with the bias caused by measurement error 
outweighing the influence of justification bias.
It is worth briefly considering how the magnitude of the estimates from England 
compare to estimates of the impact of disability in other countries. The estimates 
from Canada indicate the marginal effect of disability on participation increases from 
-0.38 to -0.46 after instrumenting. Moreover, using an alternative model, the 
marginal effect of disability in the US (-0.53) is found to be less than a comparable 
estimate from Canada (-0.60). Campolieti (2002) highlights the potential role of free 
healthcare and the structure of disability benefits as possible contributing factors to 
the difference observed between the US and Canada. The above analysis, using the 
HSE, is repeated for males aged between 45 and 64 to make the sample more 
comparable with Campolieti (2002). The marginal effect from the simple probit 
model on the sample of older workers (-0.34) is greater than the estimate for the 
entire sample, as would be expected. Similarly, instrumenting disability using the 
2SPM (applied by Campolieti, 2002) increases the influence of disability on 
participation to (a maximum) -0.58 when using Tier 2 instruments. Since the 
specification differs somewhat from Campolieti (2002), it is not appropriate to 
compare these results directly; however, they are broadly similar.
170 The positive correlation is a result o f the model specification; it is, more intuitively, negative and 
significant if  disability is not directly controlled for in the activity equation.
171 Au et a l  (2005), who use self assessed health rather than disability, find that the IV estimates of 
the impact o f health on employment in Canada are about twice original estimates. Ettner (2000) finds 
instrumenting health increases the effect on employment only slightly. Larsen and Datta Gupta (2004) 
also find the panel IV estimates are greater than the random effects estimates.
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6.5 Conclusion
Using data from the HSE, this Chapter examines disability measurement issues 
amongst the entire working age population in a country where, despite having a large 
disabled population of working age, the endogeneity of disability and work has 
received limited empirical attention.
The econometric methodology follows previous analysis, but is modified to take into 
account recent contributions to the literature (Ettner, 2000, Baker et al. 2004, Au et 
al. 2005); as such, a range of instruments is used to examine the sensitivity of the 
results to considering different forms of endogeneity. There is evidence to suggest 
disability is endogenous to labour market participation, but accounting for this does 
not remove the strong negative influence of disability on participation. Regardless of 
the choice of instruments or the precise methodology applied, the influence of 
disability on participation is found to be underestimated when using ‘global’ self- 
reported measures. This result is consistent with evidence from Campoleiti (2002) 
and Au et al. (2005) in Canada and, following the arguments of Bound (1991), would 
suggest that the impact of measurement error in self-reported information outweighs 
any effect of justification bias.
Given the widespread concern of the overestimation of the impact of disability on 
labour market outcomes in the UK by academics and policymakers, this result is 
important. This study, therefore, reinforces the importance of disability as a 
determinant of labour market participation amongst the entire working age 
population in England.
Future research needs to test the robustness of these conclusions to different data 
sources, instruments and methodologies. While the HSE is an excellent source of 
more objective information, and the results are consistent across groups of 
instruments, when Type I endogeneity is considered, the availability of instruments 
becomes severely restricted. It is also not possible to consider two issues in the recent 
literature using data from the HSE, namely the dynamic effect of disability and the 
influence of financial incentives in the model. Further research could explore these 
issues using data from English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) on a restricted
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sample of older workers and, potentially in the future, using the proposed inclusion 
of more detailed health measures in the UK Household Longitudinal Study 
(UKHLS). Moreover, the design of these studies may also facilitate important 
international comparisons of the influence of disability on labour market outcomes.
212
Ta
bl
e 
6.1
. 
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s
GP i3 S 3
G
Pcd o
S  -a
Gtp
g
Q
cdG
<u
1
>
G
oo
r - '
■"tcn
m
oo
r"~
G
3o
o
GG
G43
OG
Oo
g
co
cd
£
I dG
G
GG
p
cd
Ph
G
G
I
CN
f "
G
©
oo
r "
^ r©
CO
i n
oo
o s
CO
cd
CO
p
o
a
g
£
co
I dG
G
GG
G43+->
O
O
£Id
BU-I
CN
CN
©
CO■'Cj-
oo
Os
G_o
'-t—>
cd
o
3IdGcr
g
cdG
G
;s>
GG
cdG
G00<
<L>
G
fcbG
Q
o
CN
i no
G
G
feb
G
G
£
O
13
P>
Go
1->
cd
oG
G
G
l-lG4300
G
O
VP
cd
o
3
I dG
G-
G4300
cdG
G
G
G
G
O
’-P
cd
GG
GG
l-i
G
cn
n
co
,d-
Gj u
I d
_>
3cr
G
13
>G
h-l
<
w
u
o
CO
O '
G
_o
-*->
cd
G
<P
3Gcr
G4300
cdG
G
GG
> > -a
CN
OO
CN
O
r "in
CN
C"
r -
CN
©
GO
I d
>• rHGcr
G
13>G
I-)o
w
U
a
CNo
G
O
cd
G
|P
3Gcr
G4300
cdG
G
;g
GG
CN
SO©
©
COino
Os
CO
CN
CN
CN
OO
CN
CN
G
3o
o
G43
G
O
‘-P
cdG
IP
I dGa-
G4300
cdG
G
;£
GG
o l-lG43
O43G
coG
O43
G
43
O43GcoG
O43
G43
+
'sO
1—^
G
G00
cd
C/3i->
3
G
cd
i~iG-G
CN
G
G00
cd
g
3G
<+H
0
ViG
1
£
g
43
3
u
AOo
CN
©
o o o
o o
o o
o43
G
C/3G
O43
G43
CN
giG
o
GG00
cd
¥
3G
l4-io
ViG
sG
C/3 ' r - i
C/3
ino
o o
G
3o
o
cd
W
o
£
G43
>> >>
oo
cd
W
'Po
*  ^  
.8  ‘2 
3  G
I IO G
^  ffi
CO
CN
0.
08
9 o
© 0.1
23
0.
14
2
0.0
95
0.9
45
0.
95
2
0.
52
4
0.
02
9
0.
15
2 '■5J-oo
©
vnoo
© 0.0
03 vn©
© 0.
02
2
0.0
33 oo©©
© 16
8.8
41
0.7
71
6Z90 0.
08
9 ©
© 0.
22
4
0.
20
8
0.
19
7
m
o
9ZV0
o
© 0.
11
2 oooo
© 0.6
71
069'Z 2.
12
4
0.
03
8
0.
28
4
0.
04
3 0900
0.
02
2
0.
05
0
0.
04
9
0.
09
4
0.
04
2
16
7.8
83
0.
62
9
0.
44
7
0.
14
7
0.
47
7
0.
16
7
0.
17
5
0.
18
2
OSo
o
ooo
©
oo
© 0.
13
6 2:600 0.
89
0
1.3
00
0.
84
9
0.0
31
0.
15
9
0.
01
2 VO
o
©
r-"©©
© 0.
02
3
0.
02
8
0.
04
5
0.
01
5
16
8.6
47
0.
74
2
0.
59
2 ooro 0.
42
4
0.2
13 ©<N
© 0.
19
4
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
res
ide
nt 
in 
Ea
st 
M
id
lan
ds
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
res
ide
nt 
in 
W
es
t 
M
id
lan
ds
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
res
ide
nt 
in 
the
 E
ast
 o
f 
En
gla
nd
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
res
ide
nt 
in 
Lo
nd
on
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
res
ide
nt 
in 
the
 S
ou
th 
W
es
t, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Tie
r 
1
EQ
-5D
 
so
cia
l 
pr
efe
ren
ce
 w
eig
ht
GH
Q 
sco
re 
(12
 
po
int
 s
ca
le)
Tie
r 
2
Nu
mb
er 
of 
me
dic
ine
s 
cu
rre
ntl
y 
pr
es
cri
be
d 
by 
do
cto
r, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
ind
iv
id
ua
l 
has
 b
rok
en
 
a b
on
e 
in 
the
 l
ast
 y
ea
r, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 h
igh
 b
loo
d 
pr
es
su
re,
 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
.
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 h
ea
rt 
att
ac
k, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 
an
gin
a, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 
str
ok
e, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 
di
ab
ete
s, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 h
ea
rt 
mu
rm
ur
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 i
rre
gu
lar
 h
ea
rt 
rh
yth
m,
 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
do
cto
r 
dia
gn
os
ed
 o
the
r 
he
art
 c
on
di
tio
n, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Va
lid
 h
eig
ht 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
in 
ce
nt
im
etr
es Tie
r 
3
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
na
tur
al 
mo
the
r 
ali
ve
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
na
tur
al 
fat
he
r 
ali
ve
, 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
fam
ily
 
his
tor
y 
of 
CV
D,
 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
mo
the
r 
sm
ok
ed
 
wh
en 
inf
or
ma
nt 
wa
s 
a c
hil
d, 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
Su
pe
r 
Ou
tpu
t 
Ar
ea 
(S
OA
) 
of 
res
ide
nc
e 
is 
in 
the
 l
ea
st 
de
pri
ve
d 
qu
int
ile
 o
f 
the
 2
00
4I
M
D,
 0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
SO
A 
of 
res
ide
nc
e 
is 
in 
the
 s
eco
nd
 l
ea
st 
de
pri
ve
d 
qu
int
ile
 o
f 
the
 2
00
4 
IM
D,
 
0 
ot
he
rw
ise
Du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 e
qu
als
 1 
if 
SO
A 
of 
res
ide
nc
e 
is 
in 
the
 t
hir
d 
lea
st 
de
pri
ve
d 
qu
int
ile
 o
f 
the
 2
00
4 
IM
D,
 0
 
ot
he
rw
ise
Ea
st 
M
id
lan
ds
W
es
t 
M
id
lan
ds
Ea
st 
of 
En
gl
an
d
Lo
nd
on
So
uth
 
W
es
t
aw G
HQ
12
(Nr~
~<D
<D
Bo
ne
Bl
oo
d 
Pr
es
su
re
He
art
 A
tta
ck
An
gi
na
St
ro
ke
Di
ab
ete
s
M
ur
m
ur
Irr
eg
ul
ar
Ot
he
r 
he
ar
t
He
ig
ht
M
ot
he
r
Fa
th
er
Fa
mi
ly 
CV
D
M
oth
er 
sm
ok
e
i qiaii
za
m
IM
D3
8 -
do
. 1k
Th
is 
va
ria
bl
e 
is 
co
lle
ct
ed
 
fro
m 
a 
nu
rse
 
vi
sit
. 
Si
nc
e 
so
m
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
re
fu
se
 
the
 
nu
rse
 
vi
sit
, 
the
 
sa
m
pl
e 
siz
e 
for
 t
his
 
va
ria
bl
e 
is 
sm
al
le
r.
21
4
Table 6.2. Labour Market Participation Linear Probability Model
LPM 2SLS
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
Constant 0.017 0 .1 0 2 ** 0.052 0.095*
(0.36) (2 .0 0 ) (0.89) (1.71)
Disabled -0.242*** -0.539*** -0.592*** -0.509***
(26.98) (27.90) (18.84) (3.41)
Male 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.108***
(15.05) (13.35) (11.33) (13.82)
Age 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(16.73) (15.95) (14.74) (14.77)
Age Squared/100 -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.045***
(18.57) (16.85) (15.28) (16.54)
Degree 0.175*** 0 1 3 6 *** 0.134*** 0.143***
(14.47) (10.19) (8.75) (7.06)
Higher education 0.165*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.133***
(12.17) (9.02) (8.09) (6.76)
A level 0.141*** 0 .1 1 1 *** 0.124*** 0 .1 1 1 ***
(10.82) (7.83) (7.69) (6.26)
O level 0 .1 2 2 *** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0 .1 0 0 ***
(11.03) (7.87) (7.15) (6.48)
NVQ 1 0 .1 1 0 *** 0.094*** 0.087*** 0.091***
(6.33) (4.92) (4.04) (4.64)
Other 0.090*** 0.062*** 0.047* 0.058**
(4.21) (2.62) (1.78) (2.23)
White 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.056***
(4.27) (3.43) (3.35) (3.98)
Single -0.027* -0.041** -0.031* .0.044***
(1.80) (2.49) (1.65) (2.67)
Married 0 .0 1 2 -0.008 -0 .0 1 1 -0.014
(0.95) (0.56) (0.72) (0.89)
Children -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(13.38) (12.51) (10.97) (12.61)
Infants -0.143*** -0.153*** -0.168*** -0.151***
(10.93) (10.65) (10.05) (10.07)
Adults 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(4.05) (2 .8 6) (3.20) (2.95)
House owned 0.058*** 0.024* 0 .0 2 1 0 .0 2 2
(4.90) (1.85) (1.35) (1.07)
House mortgaged 0.145*** 0 .1 0 2 *** 0.104*** 0.113***
(16.05) (10.18) (8.77) (5.67)
North East -0.073*** -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.055***
(4.35) (3.49) (3.39) (2.80)
North West -0.043*** -0.034** -0.038** -0.034**
(3.33) (2.41) (2.50) (2.43)
Yorkshire & Humberside -0.025* -0.014 -0 .0 2 0 -0 .0 1 1
(1.72) (0.90) (1.17) (0.65)
East Midlands -0.008 0.009 0.004 0 .0 1 0
(0.52) (0.57)' (0 .2 1 ) (0.54)
West Midlands -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 0 -0.005 0.009
(0.85) (0 .0 0 ) (0.28) (0.51)
East of England 0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 0 0 -0.009 -0 .0 0 1
(0.05) (0 .0 1 ) (0.57) (0.07)
London -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.068***
215
South West 
Rural
(4.77)
-0.029**
(1.98)
-0 .0 1 0
(1.16)
(4.52)
-0.036**
(2.28)
-0.018*
(1.91)
(3.61)
-0.038**
(2 .2 0 )
-0.013
(1.28)
(4.62)
-0.026
(1.60)
-0 .0 1 2
(1 .2 1 )
Observations 10951 10243 8198 10237
AdjR2 0 .2 2 0 0 .1 2 0 0.085 0.150
F test (slopes zero) 115.86 98.34 70.36 73.86
(p-value) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 )
Sargan N*R2 %2 (k) 
(p-value)
F (instruments in first stage) 
(p-value)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman %2 test 
(p-value)
0.879
(0.348)
1752.42
(0 .0 0 )
383.204
(0 .0 0 )
17.078
(0.073)
102.71
(0 .0 0 )
191.203
(0 .0 0 )
6.812
(0.339)
6.18
(0 .0 0 )
3.537
(0.06)
Notes: Z statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. The influence o f disability is highlighted in bold.
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CHAPTER SIX 
APPENDIX
Table A6.1. Disability Linear Probability Model
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
Constant 0.997*** -0.087 0.184***
(20.63) (0.75) (3.45)
Male 0.005 0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 1 1
(0.80) (0.05) (1.41)
Age 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 1 *** 0.005**
(1 .10) (4.55) (2 .0 1 )
Age Squared/100 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 1 0 *** 0 .0 0 2
(0.67) (3.27) (0.81)
Degree -0.015 -0.064*** -0.085***
(1.25) (4.44) (6.29)
Higher education -0 .0 0 2 -0.052*** -0.075***
(0.13) (3.34) (5.00)
A level -0.006 -0.032** -0.061***
(0.48) (2 .12) (4.23)
O level -0.007 -0.028** -0.057***
(0.67) (2.18) (4.64)
NVQ1 0.016 -0.019 -0.032*
(0.96) (0.92) (1 .6 8 )
Other -0.047** -0.050** -0.072***
(2.26) (2 .0 2 ) (3.05)
White 0.023* 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 2 1
(1.74) (0.64) (1.43)
Single -0 .0 1 0 -0.004 -0 .0 2 0
(0.70) (0.23) (1 .2 1 )
Married -0.031*** -0.033** -0.055***
(2.61) (2.23) (3.97)
Children -0 .0 0 0 0.008 -0.003
(0 .0 2 ) (1.64) (0.59)
Infants -0.015 -0.030* -0.035**
(1.17) (1.92) (2.43)
Adults -0.003 -0.005 -0 .0 1 0 **
(0 .8 8 ) (1 .0 1 ) (2.15)
House owned -0.046*** -0.074*** -0.098***
(4.03) (5.31) (7.46)
House mortgaged -0.051*** -0.090*** -0.106***
(5.97) (8.43) (10.61)
North East 0.008 0.049** 0.034*
(0.48) (2.51) (1.83)
North West -0.006 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 1
(0.47) (0.85) (0.07)
Yorkshire & 0.013 0.027* 0.023
Humberside (0.96) (1 .6 6 ) (1.46)
East Midlands 0.042*** 0.040** 0.052***
(3.06) (2.45) (3.24)
West Midlands 0.025* 0.041** 0.041***
(1.93) (2.57) (2 .6 8 )
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East of England -0.007 -0.005 -0.003
(0.55) (0.30) (0.18)
London -0.013 0.003 -0.023
(1 .0 0 ) (0.18) (1.48)
South West -0.014 -0.019 -0.032*
(1 .0 1 ) (1 .2 0 ) (1.95)
Rural -0.009 -0.013 -0.004
(1.15) (1.30) (0.44)
EQ -0.975***
(50.28)
GHQ12 0.006***
(4.27)
Medicine 0.081***
(27.21)
Bone 0.017
(0.73)
Angina 0 .1 0 2 ***
(2.65)
Blood Pressure -0.009
(0.83)
Heart Attack -0.004
(0.09)
Stroke 0 .1 1 2 **
(2.32)
Diabetes -0.052*
(1.83)
Murmur 0.058**
(2.29)
Irregular 0.076***
(3.76)
Other heart 0.055
(1.54)
Height 0 .0 0 0
(0.54)
Family CVD 0.035***
(2.58)
Mother -0.008
(0.74)
Father -0.005
(0.49)
Mother smoke 0.016**
(2.06)
IMD1 -0.057***
(4.83)
IMD2 -0.042***
(3.73)
IMD3 -0.030***
(2.69)
Observations 10243 8198 10237
F-test (slopes zero) 165.48 49.62 28.48
(p-value) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 )
Adj R2 | 0.3102 0.1800 0.0814
Notes: Z statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively.
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Table A6.2. Disability Probit Model
Coefficients
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
Constant 1 7 9 7 *** -2.308*** -1.320***
(7.16) (4.74) (6.24)
Male 0.023 -0 .0 0 1 -0.046
(0.69) (0.03) (1.52)
Age 0 .0 2 1 ** 0.054*** 0.031***
(2.15) (5.17) (3.50)
Age Squared/100 -0.006 -0.051*** -0.009
(0.53) (3.97) (0.82)
Degree -0.031 -0.234*** -0.275***
(0.54) (3.92) (5.38)
Higher education 0 .0 2 0 -0.176*** -0 .2 2 0 ***
(0.33) (2.71) (3.92)
A level 0.004 -0.105 -0.182***
(0.07) (1.64) (3.29)
O level -0.017 -0.084 -0.157***
(0.34) (1.61) (3.49)
NVQ1 0.073 -0.040 -0.063
(0.91) (0.48) (0.89)
Other -0.169* -0.155 -0 .2 1 0 **
(1.65) (1.52) (2.41)
White 0.126* 0.042 0.061
(1 .8 6 ) (0.59) (1.05)
Single -0 .0 2 0 -0 .0 0 2 -0.034
(0.29) (0.03) (0.55)
Married -0 .1 2 1 ** -0.095 -0 147***
(2.16) (1.62) (2.95)
Children 0.005 0.031 -0.006
(0.24) (1.60) (0.36)
Infants -0 .1 0 0 -0.168** -0.204***
(1.43) (2.24) (3.17)
Adults -0.015 -0 .0 2 2 -0.039**
(0.73) (1.04) (2.17)
House owned -0 .2 1 1 *** -0.287*** -0.342***
(3.84) (5.00) (6.95)
House mortgaged -0.241*** -0.365*** -0.396***
(5.64) (8 .2 0 ) (10.33)
North East 0.028 0.191** 0.114
(0.35) (2.39) (1.62)
North West -0.048 0.038 -0.007
(0.78) (0.60) (0.13)
Yorkshire & 0.057 0.103 0.079
Humberside (0.85) (1.51) (1.27)
East Midlands 0.183*** 0.167** q 197***
(2.78) (2.44) (3.21)
West Midlands 0.104 0.170** 0.153***
(1.62) (2.53) (2.60)
East of England -0.047 -0 .0 2 1 -0.019
(0.73) (0.30) (0.32)
London -0.077 0.014 -0.093
(1.16) (0 .2 0 ) (1.52)
225
South West -0.089 -0.083 -0.126*
(1.28) (1.17) (1.95)
Rural -0.037 -0.057 -0.017
(0.91) (1.35) (0.45)
EQ -3.789***
(34.36)
GHQ12 0.026***
(3.80)
Medicine 0.278***
(22.08)
Bone 0.075
(0.78)
Angina 0.360**
(2.30)
Blood Pressure -0.048
(1.03)
Heart Attack 0.050
(0.28)
Stroke 0.408**
(2 .12)
Diabetes -0.206*
(1 .8 8 )
Murmur 0.247**
(2.45)
Irregular 0.270***
(3.42)
Other heart 0.243*
(1.70)
Height 0 .0 0 2
(0.57)
Family CVD 0.107**
(2 .2 0 )
Mother -0.015
(0.38)
Father -0.023
(0.58)
Mother smoke 0.071**
(2.32)
IMD1 -0.208***
(4.45)
IMD2 -0.150***
(3.39)
IMD 3 -0.099**
(2.33)
Observations 10243 8198 10237
LR x 1 (k) (p-value) 2949.97 (0.00) 1372.80 (0.00) 855.51 (0.00)
LR x 2 (instruments) 793.79 (0.00) 387.32 (0.00) 25.39 (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.2875 0.1660 0.0834
Log Likelihood -3655.3491 -3449.5008 -4699.8535
Notes: See notes to Table A6.1.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECT OF THE DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION ACT
7.1 Introduction
Section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2 highlights the ongoing research into the impact of the 
ADA. Despite the positive aims of the legislation, there has been no evidence of a 
positive impact on labour market outcomes of the disabled, rather the consensus 
appears to be that the impact was negative. The introduction of the DDA in the UK 
in 1995 shares many features with the ADA and, despite research on its impact being 
far more limited, the first study to evaluate its employment effects finds no evidence 
of a positive effect (Bell and Heitmueller, 2005). In contrast, the evidence presented 
in Chapter 3, albeit using a different methodology, dataset and geographical 
coverage, is more supportive of an influence of the DDA, especially in terms of 
employment. As such, the aim of this Chapter is to reconsider this issue using data 
from the HSE and, thus, contribute to the limited body of evidence concerning the 
impact of the DDA in the UK . 173
This analysis not only uses a different dataset from the earlier investigation, but, 
unlike Chapter 3, the availability of information before and after the DDA facilitates 
the application of a difference in difference methodology, which has been central to 
this literature and has been applied in this context by, amongst others, Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) and Bell and Heitmueller (2005). Moreover, since studies in the US 
continue to highlight the sensitivity of the earlier findings to factors including the 
definition of disability, benefit income and business cycles, it is also important that 
these factors are considered in the UK. Two issues, in particular, are considered
173 Whilst similar surveys are undertaken in other parts of the UK, they are not consistent in terms of 
questionnaire design, sampling methods and periodicity. The analysis is thus restricted to the HSE, 
since it is updated annually and provides the longest time period for the evaluation o f the DDA.
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during this analysis. Firstly, in response to the sensitivity identified by Kruse and 
Schur (2003), the robustness of the results to changes in reporting and in the 
composition of the disabled, post-DDA, is tested. Indeed, the main advantage of the 
HSE, relative to more detailed labour market surveys, is the availability of more 
objective health information, where reporting is likely to be less sensitive to changes 
in legislation. The second main sensitivity analysis follows Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2001) and uses the inclusion of the small firm exemption in the DDA (1996-2004) 
to test if  the employment effects are consistent with the coverage of the legislation. If 
the employment change is greater in (larger) firms, who are covered by the DDA, 
this provides evidence to distinguish the policy effect from a more general trend 
amongst the disabled.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 briefly 
summarises the key evidence and estimation issues identified in previous economic 
analysis of the ADA and DDA. Section 7.3 outlines the data and methodology used 
in the present study. The main results are discussed in Section 7.4 and the final 
section, 7.5, concludes.
7.2 Background
Prior to the introduction of the DDA in the UK, the Disabled Persons Employment 
Act of 1944 made it the duty of employers with over 20 employees to employ a 
quota (3 percent) of disabled people, where disability was defined by being 
registered disabled. In addition, employment as electric passenger lift attendant and 
car park attendant were available only to the registered disabled (see Malisoff, 1952). 
However, individual employers could apply for a reduction in their quota and in 
some industries a ‘special percentage’ was also applicable (see Malisoff, 1952). 
Partly as a result of this, the effectiveness of the legislation has been widely 
questioned (see Woodhams and Corby, 2003, 2007 for discussion). Indeed, they 
suggest it “was never effectively policed” (Woodhams and Corby, 2007, p558) and, 
reflecting this, only a handful of prosecutions that were brought under the Act.
The employment component of the DDA {Part IT), which replaced the Disabled 
Persons Employment Act, was introduced in December 1996. Unlike the previous 
legislation, the basis of the 1995 Act was equality of treatment and the legislation
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made it unlawful to discriminate against disabled applicants or employees in terms of 
hiring, in the conditions of employment or in the opportunities made available for 
advancement and promotion. 174 The Act also makes it the duty of the employer to 
make reasonable accommodation to remove workplace disadvantage concerning 
employment arrangements (such as hours of work) or physical features of the 
workplace. It was designed to give the disabled more protection and, thus, improve 
the situation of the disabled. 175 Indeed, in sharp contrast to the situation under the 
previous legislation, between 2nd December 1996 (the date of enforcement) and 1st 
September 2000, 8,908 cases were brought under the employment component of the 
DDA (Leverton, 2002) indicating more widespread enforcement.
The key features of the employment component of the DDA are similar to those of 
the ADA introduced in the US . 176 Previous analysis in the US highlights that while 
the legislation may reduce barriers to employment and raise the relative wages of the 
disabled, it may have important unanticipated negative effects through the additional 
costs posed on employers (see DeLeire, 2000, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001). As 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) show, the increased costs of adapting the workplace 
and workplace practices, and from increased cost of firing (which arise from the
1 7 7  •increased risk of legal action), will reduce employment. It is worth noting that 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) argue that it is accommodations where the marginal 
cost exceeds the marginal benefit (through, for example, an increase in productivity 
among the disabled) that are induced under the Act, since employers would, 
optimally, undertake accommodations where the net benefit is positive. Furthermore, 
they highlight that the anti-discrimination element of the Act may reinforce these 
negative employment effects, since employers are not able to adjust the wages of the 
disabled in response to these accommodations. Moreover, as Schwochau and Blanck 
(2 0 0 0 ) note, if employers are forced to pay equal wages to the groups when there are 
unobservable differences in productivity, this is also likely to exacerbate the decline 
in hiring amongst the disabled.
174 For full details see http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl995/1995050.htm.
175 Under both the 1944 Disabled Persons Act and the 1995 DDA it would seem that firms may have 
an incentive to hire the least severely disabled either to fill their quota (if enforced) or to minimise the 
costs o f the adjustment element of the 1996 legislation.
176 Prior to the ADA, disability discrimination related protection varied between states (see Jolls and 
Prescott, 2004).
177 They do note, however, that hiring costs will have a positive employment effect.
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Indeed, the original evidence presented in the US, identified a negative employment 
effect of the ADA (DeLeire 2000, Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). However, there has 
been considerable debate whether the decline in the employment rate of the disabled 
can be directly attributed to the ADA. 178 In particular, Kruse and Schur (2003) 
conclude that the analysis of the employment effects of disability legislation is 
confounded by changes in the composition of those reporting disabilities, the role of 
disability income (see, also, Bound and Waidmann, 2002) and the relative effects of
• • , 179business cycles on workers with and without disabilities.
The most obvious issue in relation to measurement is defining the disabled 
population in surveys in the same manner as the legislation; Kruse and Schur (2003), 
using fourteen alternative measures of disability, find the definition of disability has 
an important influence on the estimated impact of the ADA. However, since 
disability is dynamic, evaluation may be further complicated by changes in the 
composition of the disabled. As Kruse and Schur (2003) and Schwochau and Blanck 
(2003) discuss, the introduction of the legislation, in increasing the accessibility of 
workplaces, may cause some individuals not to report a disability, or to report a 
disability as non-work-limiting. In contrast, the introduction of the ADA may, by 
reducing the stigma associated with disability, encourage individuals to report their 
disability. The former would result in the disabled population being more severely 
disabled after the ADA, which may increase the estimated impact of disability on 
labour market outcomes. 180 In contrast, the latter effect will work in the opposite 
direction if individuals who flow into disability are less severely disabled. Kruse and 
Schur (2003) find that the reporting of work-limiting disabilities increased post- 
ADA, which was partly due to an increase in functional limitations and partly due to
178 This is despite a range of sensitivity analysis conducted by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), 
including the small firm exemption o f the DDA and analysis o f non-disability benefit claimants.
179 This study is able to consider the influences o f changes in composition and cyclical effects; 
however, since individual disability income is not observed in the HSE, the issue of benefit income 
cannot be considered here. In April 1995 the main disability benefit for individuals who are unable to 
work was changed from invalidity to incapacity benefit. The increased stringency o f testing that 
accompanied incapacity benefit may have encouraged more disabled individuals into work. Thus, the 
change is expected to have a positive influence on employment, although it may also influence the 
reporting of a disability. Moreover, the proportion who receive incapacity benefits is relatively small 
(using data from the LFS, about 14 percent o f individuals with a long-term health problem are in 
receipt o f incapacity benefit), limiting the effect on overall labour market outcomes.
180 Within the UK, Berthoud (2006) and Jones (2006a) both find that the severity of a disability has a 
negative effect on the probability of employment for a disabled individual.
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an increase in reporting amongst those with such limitations. The increase in 
reporting, also, coincided with some increase in severity.
In terms of identifying cyclical effects, Kruse and Schur (2003) include regional 
unemployment rates and time trends in their model. Whilst they find evidence that 
the disabled suffer disproportionately in downturns, their estimated policy effects are 
robust to the additional controls.
7.3 Data and Methodology
7.3.1 Data
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, the HSE is a nationally representative annual cross 
sectional survey, of about 18,000 individuals, commissioned by the Department of 
Health. It was first undertaken in 1991 and the data are available between 1991 - 
2004.181 However, in this Chapter the annual data are pooled across time to create a 
repeated cross sectional data set that extends before and after the change in 
legislation. 182 Disability is defined in the DDA as a physical or mental impairment 
which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his or her ability to carry 
out normal day-to-day activities. However, as has been the case in many surveys (see 
the discussion relating to the LFS in Section 3.3.1), questions on limiting 
longstanding illness which are more closely related to the DDA definition have only 
been introduced after the DDA, making a before and after comparison using this 
definition impossible. Instead, the definition of disability used in the analysis relates
• 1RTto longstanding illness where individuals respond positively to:
181 The data from 1991 and 1992 are based on a smaller sample size than the subsequent years; these 
years are included to increase the time span of the data, but the main results are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of the additional data.
182 The HSE contains different modules each year; however, the analysis is based on information from 
core questions that are available throughout the period. The different modules also frequently involve 
over sampling from a particular group in the population. To remove these sharp changes in sample 
composition, only the representative general population component of each year sample is included in 
the analysis. This is consistent with the sample used for publication o f time series trends in the HSE 
(www.ic.nhs.uk/pubs/hlthsvveng2004upd'). However, the resultant sample sizes vary considerably by 
year, since in some years the survey is entirely o f the general population and in other years the general 
population is about half o f the total sample.
183 The criticisms o f any self-reported measure apply here (see Bound, 1991).
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Do you have any long-standing illness, disability or infirmity? By long-standing I  
mean anything that has troubled you over a period o f time, or that is likely to affect 
you over a period o f time?
This definition is broader than the DDA definition and 37 percent of the working age 
sample have a longstanding illness. 184 Using the additional information on whether 
the disability limits daily activity, available in the latter part of the sample, it would 
suggest that about 5 5  percent of those with a longstanding illness are limited in their 
activities. 185 Thus, as shown in Figure 7.1, some individuals in the broad disabled 
(treatment) group used in the analysis will not actually be covered by the DDA and 
will, therefore, not be affected by its provisions; this may lead to an underestimate of 
the true effect of the DDA. However, where possible, the trends between the two 
disability measures are compared over the latter part of the sample. 186 The definition 
of disability is different to Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) who use work-limiting 
disability but is similar to the long-standing illness measure in the FRS used by Bell 
and Heitmueller (2005), who consider four alternative measures of disability.
7.3.2 The Employment Effect
The sample is restricted to individuals of working age and excludes students and the 
self-employed. The specification of the model adapts the difference in difference 
approach applied in this context by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). Employment for 
individual i and time period t ( Eit) is modelled using a probit model:187
Eit = X itp  + ccDi( + STU + <j>(Dit * postDDA) + s it (7.1)
X it contains information on the determinants of employment, including personal 
characteristics, such as age, marital status, age of leaving full-time education and
184 The focus o f the survey on health may also increase the reporting of disability.
185 After 1997, those individuals who respond positively to longstanding illness are also asked: Does 
this illness or disability/do any o f  these illnesses or disabilities limit your activities in any way?.
186 It should be noted that employers may also experience difficulties in identifying if  an individual is 
DDA disabled and covered by the legislation.
187 The models are also estimated separately by gender, but, since the results are consistent across 
genders, the overall results are reported.
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188ethnicity, and household characteristics such as size and housing tenure. Dit is a
dummy variable indicating disability status and, therefore, a  captures the direct 
effect of disability on employment. Annual time series dummy variables are denoted 
Tit and post DDA is a dummy variable that identifies observations after the 
introduction of the DDA, that is, 1997-2004. The impact of the DDA, relative to the
189previous legislation is, thus, given by the difference in difference parameter $ . 
Controlling for characteristics, this measures the change in employment that is 
specific to the disabled group over the post-DDA period. Alternative specifications 
are also estimated, including a full set of disability time period interaction terms to 
identify a year by year effect.
The impact of the DDA on the disabled will only be accurately measured if the 
control group, the non-disabled, is unaffected by the legislation. Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) highlight that, theoretically, the provisions of the ADA may have 
spillover effects onto the non-disabled. However, they find no empirical evidence to 
support this in the US. Theoretically, direction of any spillover effect is ambiguous. 
Some firms may reduce hiring of both disabled and non-disabled individuals in 
response to the additional adjustment costs, whereas other firms may seek to avoid 
costly adjustments by substituting non-disabled for disabled labour. If the non­
disabled are affected positively (negatively) by the DDA, the difference in difference 
parameter will underestimate (overestimate) a positive effect of the DDA and 
overestimate (underestimate) a negative effect, relative to the true impact of the DDA 
on the disabled.
Employment (Ejt= 1) is defined as being in paid employment during the last week. 
However, there were two changes to the question over the sample period. 190 As
188 See Table 7.1 for variable descriptions and means. Since, unlike Bell and Heitmueller (2005), the 
HSE does not contain longitudinal information, there are no controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
189 Only if  compliance with, and enforcement of, the 1944 legislation was insufficient to give the 
legislation any impact will the interaction term measure purely the effect o f introduction o f the DDA.
190 Between 1991-1994 individuals are asked Were you in paid  employment or se lf employment in the 
week ending last Sunday?. After 1995, individuals were asked Which o f  these descriptions applies to 
what you were doing last week, that is in the last seven days ending last Sunday? o f which in paid  
employment or se lf employment is one of the options. After 1998, two additional options were 
included in the response to the above question (on a government scheme fo r  employment training and 
doing unpaid work fo r  a business that you own or a relative owns). However, the definition o f in pa id  
employment or se lf  employment was unaffected by this change.
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would be expected, given the introduction of alternative options to paid employment * 
from 1995, there appears to have been a slight dip in the employment rate (see Figure 
7.2). There is no visible evidence that the latter, more minor, change, which, given 
the additional categories, may also be expected to reduce employment, has had any 
effect on employment rates. 191 Indeed, the employment rate appears to continue on 
an upward trend between 1997-1998. The inclusion of time series dummy variables 
in the econometric analysis should capture the change in reporting that is constant 
between the disabled and non-disabled groups; however, any difference in the 
change in reporting between the two groups will appear in the interaction term and, 
thus, may affect the policy measure. The sensitivity of the results is tested to the 
change in definition in 1995 and the main results are robust to restricting the sample 
to 1995-2004.
Given Kruse and Schur’s (2003) concerns about the differential business cycle effect, 
equation (7.1) is also estimated including GDPt and an interaction term (GDPt * D it)
where GDPt refers to annual GDP growth, and, thus, the interaction captures 
disability specific cyclical effects. 192
7.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The Coverage o f the DDA
The sign on the difference in difference parameter, (j>, is a measure of the impact of 
the DDA on the employment rate of the disabled. However, it will also capture the 
effect of other group specific shocks that occur during the same period. 193 As a 
further test of the results, the coverage of the DDA is used to identify if the 
employment effects are consistent with the predicted effect of the legislation. In a 
similar manner to the ADA, small firms (fewer than 20 employees) are exempt from
191 Less than 0.5 percent o f the sample (either disabled or non-disabled) have responses in either of the 
two additional groups, supporting the limited impact.
192 GDP data are obtained from ONS time series data, identifier IHYP, and measure year on year GDP 
growth at 2003 prices. The conclusions, with respect to the influence of the DDA, are robust to the 
alternative o f the annual employment rate from the LFS being used as a cyclical control.
193 There have been a series of policy measures designed to increase the employment rate of the 
disabled, for example, the New Deal for Disabled (July 2001) and the Disabled Persons Tax Credit 
(which replaced Disability Working Allowance October 1999); however, these should all have a 
positive influence on the employment rate of the disabled.
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the DDA . 194 Thus, if the adjustment costs are significant in the UK, the predictions of 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), who state “we might expect the ADA to have had the 
largest effect on employment in firms that are sufficiently large to be covered by the 
ADA provisions but small enough to be vulnerable to an increase in costs” (pp. 943- 
944), would also apply to the UK.
For those individuals who are employed, the size of the firm is grouped into 3 bands: 
small firms have between 1-24 employees, medium firms between 25-499 and large 
firms 500 or more. 195 Similar to equation (7.1), the following multinominal logit 
model is estimated:196
Fit = X uP'+a'Du + 8'TU + </>\Dit * postDDA) + s ’, (7.2)
where Fit has 4 groups, non-employment and the three firm size groups, and all other 
variables are as described above. As Greene (2000) shows, if Zit denotes the vector 
of explanatory variables in equation (7.2) and the associated vector of coefficients is 
given by y . , the probability that individual i chooses category j  in this model is given
by:
194 From December 1996 to December 1998 the small firm exemption covered firms with less than 20 
employees; from December 1998 this was modified to firms with less than 15 employees. In October 
2004 the exemption was removed. The first change (amendment o f section 7) is documented in 
Statutory Instrument 1998 No. 2618 The Disability Discrimination (Exemption for Small Employers). 
The latter change (repeal o f section 7) is documented in Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 1673 The 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003.
195 The exact Wording o f the question changes over the period from: How many employees work at the 
establishment? to (in 1994): Including yourself about how many people are employed at the place  
where you usually work?. Due to the bounds in the responses, the firm size split, at 25, does not 
exactly match the original DDA exemption of 20. Indeed since firms with between 20 and 25 
employees, may actually face the largest adjustment costs the effect on small firms will be 
overestimated in this model. Moreover, there is an additional measurement error created by multi­
establishment firms. A small establishment may be part of a larger firm and, therefore, covered by the 
legislation. There is no information in the HSE to identify these cases. However, this will again lead to 
an overestimate o f the impact in small firms and, thus, an underestimate o f the impact in medium 
sized firms.
196 The model relies on the assumption of the Independence o f Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The 
Small-Hsiao test is unable to reject the null hypothesis o f independence in all specifications. The 
results are more mixed from the Hausman test, but the sensitivity of the results to this assumption is 
tested by using a multinomial probit model. The results are robust to the choice o f model.
235
To identify the model, being employed in a medium sized firm is used as the base 
category, where y0 = 0. Three log-odds ratios can be identified from equation (7.3)
and are given by: In p.
i 0
= y jZ i . Thus, the coefficients represent the effect of an
explanatory variable on the log-odds ratio of choosing category j  relative to the base 
group. Since the coefficients are quite difficult to interpret, the marginal effects
dR  3
associated with each variable are also computed as follows:----- = R  [y ■ -  2 .P ikYk ].
dZ. fo
If the adjustment costs of the DDA dominate, the marginal effect of the disability 
DDA interaction term will be positive for the non-employment category and the
1 0 7  •employment losses will be concentrated in medium sized firms. That is, the 
marginal effect on the interaction in medium sized firms would be negative and 
greater (in absolute terms) than in small firms, which are likely to be unaffected by 
the legislation.
The Composition o f the Disabled
Kruse and Schur (2003) suggest that the introduction of the DDA itself may have 
changed the composition of the disabled and, thus, in equation (7.1) changes in the 
composition, unrelated toX/(, may be captured by (j) . For example, increases in 
reporting of disability that reduce the average severity may cause ^ to be positive. 
However, to assess the policy, it is important to identify what effect the DDA has had 
on the employment probability of a given disabled individual. In contrast to most 
surveys, the HSE has additional information on health which facilitates the testing of 
changes in the reporting of disability and changes in the composition of the disabled 
over time.
197 In terms o f the coefficients, relative to the base group o f workers in medium sized firms, </>' would 
be positive for all other groups.
Changes in reporting of disability can be modelled using the following probit model:
Du = X iJ  + z u<P + ri(postDDA) + n it (7.4)
where all variables are defined above, with the exception of Z it, which are controls
for more objective health information such as BMI, being prescribed medicine and 
an index of mental well being (GHQ12) . 198 The BMI is a measure of measuring 
height adjusted obesity and, this measure, together with physician diagnosed 
conditions and/or prescriptions, and composite measures of health, have been widely 
used as more objective health measures to instrument disability in empirical analysis 
(see Section 6.3.2). These more objective measures should be insensitive/less 
sensitive to changes in stigma and environment brought by the policy change. As 
such, 77 measures any change in the reporting of disability after the introduction of 
the DDA.
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Employment Effects
The employment gap between the disabled and non-disabled groups is visible in 
Figure 7.2, which plots the employment rates by disability status over time. On 
average, the probability of employment is about 60 percent for the disabled 
compared to more than 75 percent for the non-disabled. 199 Before 1999, the trend in 
employment is similar between the two groups, although the employment declines 
are more pronounced for the disabled. In the latter, post-DDA, period, the 
employment rate of the disabled does not match the non-disabled as closely; in 
particular, between 1999 and 2000 the employment gap widens due to a fall in the 
employment rate of the disabled. However, after 2000 the employment growth is 
higher for the disabled, narrowing the employment gap over the final part of the 
sample. Reassuringly, the ‘U’ shaped appearance of employment between 1998-
198 Whilst each HSE contains an extensive range o f more objective and truly objective information on 
health, the modular nature o f the survey means that much o f this information is not collected every 
year. As such, a restricted specification is estimated on information that is available throughout the 
sample period. Several alternative specifications are estimated on a restricted time period but with an 
enhanced set o f objective health measures, but the conclusions with respect to the DDA remain the 
same.
199 This employment gap is relatively narrow compared to other studies that use work-limiting 
disability (and the results in Chapter 3) and is consistent with the use o f a broad measure o f disability.
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2 0 0 2 , identified for the disabled, is also evident for the activity-limited disabled. 
However, it seems there is less consistency in the patterns between the two disability 
measures after 2 0 0 2 .
The descriptive statistics for the variables included in the econometric analysis are 
included in Table 7.1. The difference in personal characteristics between disability 
groups is largely consistent with the patterns identified in Chapter 3 and is not 
repeated here. However, Table 7.1 also includes the health measures included in Zit
and some features are worthy of note. The average BMI is higher for the disabled, 
indicating they are more likely to be overweight.200 The average GHQ12 score, 
which aims to provide information about non-psychotic psychiatric morbidity, is 
significantly higher for the disabled as may be expected, given mental health 
problems will be the cause of disability for some individuals in this group. The 
disabled are also more likely to be currently prescribed medicine from their doctor 
(62 percent), compared to the non-disabled population ( 2 2  percent).
The marginal effects from four alternative specifications of the difference in
201 •difference procedure in equation (7.1) are presented in Table 7.2. The basic 
specification is presented in column 1 , specification (2 ) includes controls for 
personal characteristics, the cyclical controls are added in specification (3) and 
specification (4) replaces the difference in difference term with a full set of disability 
time series interaction terms. Since the employment effects of personal 
characteristics are well established, the discussion focuses on the impact of the DDA. 
The direct effect of disability, as expected, is negative across all specifications. 
Conditional on characteristics, having a disability (as measured by longstanding 
illness) reduces the probability of employment by at least 10 percent. The controls 
for the period indicate the probability of employment was higher in the latter part of 
the sample period. However, the interaction term, which is the difference in 
difference or policy effect, is negative and significant across the specifications.202 
The inclusion of personal and household characteristics (column 2) only reduces the
200 Typically, a value <18.5 is taken to represent underweight, 18.5-24.9 normal, 25-29.9 overweight, 
30-39.9 obese and 40+ very obese.
201 The coefficients are presented in Table A7.1.
202 The term is also negative and significant for both genders when estimated separately.
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estimated policy effect slightly. The marginal effect indicates the DDA reduced the 
employment of the disabled by about 3 percent, which is similar to the estimate of 4 
percent identified by Bell and Heitmueller (2005). The inclusion of the cyclical 
controls in column 3  suggests the employment rate of the disabled is sensitive to the 
economic cycle. However, the sign of the influence is counterintuitive and contrasts 
with the evidence from Kruse and Schur (2003). Importantly, the negative influence 
of the policy is robust to the inclusion of these controls.
The specification in column 4 modifies the analysis, slightly, by replacing the policy 
period effect with a full set of time series interaction dummies. Relative to the 
omitted group (1996, the year of policy introduction), and, unlike the period prior to 
the DDA, the policy interaction terms are negative after 1997 and they are significant 
between 1999 and 2001. The evidence is consistent with a negative policy effect, 
which appears to lag behind the introduction of the DDA and may reflect delays in 
the awareness and implementation of the legislation within firms. However, there is 
also evidence that the negative impact has been relatively shortlived; from 2 0 0 2  the 
interaction terms are not significant. This is consistent with evidence relating to the 
ADA from Jolls and Prescott (2004) who find the accommodation component of the 
ADA had only a short term negative impact on employment.
7.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Firm Size Effects
Table 7.3 presents the marginal effects from two specifications of the multinominal 
logit model specified in equation (7.2) . 203 The basic specification (1) does not include 
controls for personal and household characteristics, whereas these are included in 
specification (2) . 204 Consistent with the previous discussion, the disabled are 
significantly more likely to be non-employed and, conditional on employment, are, 
particularly, more likely to be employed in large relative to other sized firms. The 
disability interaction term confirms that non-employment has increased more for the 
disabled, but suggests that the majority of the decline in employment has occurred in 
medium sized firms. Indeed, there is no significant effect of the legislation on the
203 Coefficient estimates are presented in Table A7.2. The results are qualitatively similar if  the 
multinomial logit is estimated only on the three firm size groups.
204 Two further specifications are presented in Table A7.3, the first contains cyclical controls and the 
second a full set o f time period and disability interactions.
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probability of employment in either small or large firms. The inclusion of 
characteristics in column 2 does not alter the main results. The results are consistent 
with the predictions of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), who argue that if  the 
adjustment costs of the ADA are important employment will decline most in the firms 
with the greatest adjustment costs. Moreover, the conclusion is robust to the inclusion 
of controls for the economic cycle.205 The negative employment effect identified 
above is consistent with the costs of adaptation varying by firm size and, therefore, 
supports the influence of the DDA. More specifically, due to the presence of the small 
firm exemption, medium size firms are predicted to face the largest adjustment costs 
as a result of the DDA. It is medium sized firms where employment losses are 
observed, consistent with the adjustment cost element of the DDA having a negative 
influence on employment of the disabled.
Following Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) the analysis by firm size can be used to 
consider the impact of the DDA on the non-disabled. The absence of spillover effects 
would be consistent with no change composition of employment in terms of firm size 
among the non-disabled. However, after 1996, among the non-disabled, non­
employment declines and employment increases in medium and large firms. There is 
no evidence of employment growth in small firms, who are exempt from the DDA. 
As such, it appears that, any spillover effects seem to be positive, that is, firms 
covered by the DDA appear to be substituting non-disabled for disabled labour. 
Although interpretation should be cautious, given the range of influences on the 
employment of the non-disabled, if the DDA did have positive spillover effects, the 
negative difference in difference effect would be an overestimate of the impact of the 
negative influence of the DDA on the disabled.
The Composition o f the Disabled
Data from the HSE suggests disability has increased significantly between 1991 and 
2004 (see Figure 7.1) and, consistent with this increase, the proportion reporting poor 
or very poor general health and the proportion prescribed medicine also increased
205 The specification which controls for disability year interactions does not suggest the declines in 
employment were predominately among medium sized firms, although the absence o f employment 
growth in medium sized firms post DDA is in contrast with the trend prior to the introduction o f the 
DDA.
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significantly over time.206 The proportion with activity-limiting disability follows a 
more stable pattern over time, which is consistent with the evidence presented in 
Chapter 3, that increases in disability were concentrated amongst the non-work- 
limited group. The descriptive statistics (in Table 7.1) also suggest that the increase 
in the size of the disabled group has been accompanied by an increase in the average 
number of conditions, which is often used as a proxy for severity. Consistent with 
this, there has been an increase in those who report they are disabled and 
permanently unable to work. As such, it is possible the fall in employment is due to 
the change in the composition of the disabled.
Marginal effects estimated from equation (7.4), which identifies the determinants of 
disability, are presented in Table 7.4.207 Whilst the controls for characteristics are 
relatively limited, the estimates are consistent with previous evidence. For example, 
the probability of disability increases with age, reflecting the fact that many 
disabilities are age onset, and falls with the level of educational attainment, as 
measured by school leaving age. For those whose disability is birth onset, their 
disability may directly limit their access to education. However, the disadvantage 
associated with low educational attainment is also likely to increase the risk of age 
onset disability. This is consistent with evidence from Jenkins and Rigg (2004) who 
find disability is a consequence as well as a cause of disadvantage. As expected, the 
measures of (ill) health have a positive effect on disability.208 Importantly, consistent 
with the above discussion (and Kruse and Schur, 2003), reporting of disability is 
found to be higher after the introduction of the DDA. Controlling for measures of 
health reduces the size of the effect, but it remains positive and significant after the 
DDA and indicates that reporting increased by nearly 2 percent in the post-DDA 
period. Whilst the measures of health available consistently throughout the period 
capture only aspects of disability, the evidence suggests that disability has increased, 
partly because the measures of health have deteriorated and, partly, because 
disability reporting, conditional on the given health measures, has increased. Either
206 Table 7.1 also shows an increase in average BMI over the period, but the average GHQ12 score 
shows an improvement in mental well-being.
207 The coefficient estimates are presented in Table A7.5.
208 It is actually the deviation from the ‘normal’ group that is probably a better measure of ill-health, 
rather than the BMI itself, but this analysis suggests that a high BMI (or obesity) is more associated 
with disability than being underweight.
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of the two influences may cause the composition of the disabled group to change 
over time, which may affect the employment results from equation (7.1) . 209
Kruse and Schur (2003) test the sensitivity of their employment results by changing 
the definition of disability. In a similar manner, equation (7.1) is re-estimated, but 
more specific measures of health replace disability. These measures of health provide 
more control for changes in the composition of the treatment group and, therefore, 
provide a robustness test of the main results. The results are presented in Table 7.5 
where, in column 1 , disability is replaced by a dummy variable indicating currently 
prescribed medicine and, in column 2 , the health control is an index of mental 
wellbeing (GHQ12). This latter measure is, in particular, more able to control for
• • ‘710changes in composition, since it includes an element of severity. In both cases, the 
conclusions discussed above hold, ill-health (whether mental or related to physician 
prescribed medicine) has a negative influence on the probability of employment and 
the employment probabilities of this group have suffered relative to more healthy 
individuals in the post-DDA period.211
7.5 Conclusion
Whilst the DDA was designed to enhance the employment opportunities of the 
disabled, the theoretical and empirical evidence from the US would suggest that the 
impact of the policy may be ambiguous. Whilst the difficulties involved in estimating 
the impact of the DDA should be acknowledged, the existing empirical evidence in 
the UK by Bell and Heitmueller (2005) suggests that the introduction of the DDA 
also had adverse consequences on the employment rate of the disabled.
This Chapter adds to the UK evidence, by using a similar methodology on data from 
the HSE, a survey that is unexplored in this context. Despite using different data and 
a different time period for the analysis, the evidence confirms that of Bell and 
Heitmueller (2005); there is no evidence to suggest the DDA has improved the 
employment rate of the disabled. In fact, the evidence suggests that, following the
209 Similar analysis o f the number o f conditions suggests that, after controlling for changes in 
characteristics, the severity o f disability has also increased post-DDA.
210 Since this information is not collected in 1996, the sample period differs from previous estimation.
211 This conclusion holds if  the number of conditions (a proxy for severity) replaces disability in the 
equation.
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DDA, there was a period when the policy may have had a negative effect. Therefore, 
despite being introduced in a more favourable macroeconomic climate and the 
financial support provided through the Access to Work Scheme , there is growing 
evidence that the negative consequences of this type of legislation are not restricted 
to the US. Moreover, tests using the small firm exemption confirm that these 
employment losses were concentrated in medium sized firms, which is consistent 
with the adjustment costs of the DDA being a significant negative influence. The 
evidence also suggests that the composition of the disabled group has changed over 
time, with higher rates of disability after the DDA. Despite this, analysis on the basis 
of more objective health information suggests the results are not sensitive to the 
precise measure of health. Individuals in poor health are found to have a lower 
employment probability after the DDA, confirming the above results. This is 
particularly reassuring given the definition of disability is broader than the DDA 
definition. Future research may also want to consider how the influence of the DDA 
has impacted on specific disability types. Identification of such differences may aid 
understanding of the channels through which the effect operates.
The analysis demonstrates the possibilities for using data sets that are not primarily 
designed for labour market analysis, to overcome the absence of more specific health 
information. However, as a result, the analysis is unable to control for disability 
benefit income or, more particularly, changes in the benefit regime which may have 
contributed to the change. Furthermore, the nature of the data, which is primarily 
intended for cross sectional analysis, is also restrictive, given the repeated cross 
sectional analysis undertaken here. More specifically, there are a number of 
modifications to the precise nature of the questions over time; this is of particular 
concern for the definition of the dependent variable. In addition, changes in the size 
of the general population element of the sample mean the composition of the sample 
is not balanced across time.
Despite the consistency of the results with Bell and Heitmueller (2005), identifying 
the influence of the DDA on labour market outcomes clearly warrants further 
research, particularly since the evidence (in Chapter 3) from the LFS, the largest
212 Bell and Heitmueller (2005) highlight the low uptake amongst this scheme.
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government household survey, does not support these conclusions. In addition to 
seeking other UK data sources to evaluate the employment effects, it may be 
informative to consider the measure of employment more carefully, since 
adjustments may occur at the intensive and/or extensive margin. Moreover, 
consideration of dynamic effects may also provide evidence on the source of these 
job losses. Information about changes in hiring and/or firing will provide more 
information on how the DDA influences employment.
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Figure 7.1. Disability Rates, 1991-2004
40 -•
1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20041993 1994
[ D isabled  W ork-lim ited disabled  |
Notes: Data from HSE. The sample is restricted to the working age population and excludes students 
and self-employed. Disability is defined as having a long-standing illness, disability or infirmity. 
Activity limitation is having a long-standing illness, disability or infirmity that limits your activities in 
any way. This is only available after 1996.
Figure 7.2. Employment Rates by Disability Status, 1991-2004.
70 -
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
- • - D is a b l e d  N on-disabled  A ctiv ity -lim ited  disabled
Notes: See notes to Figure 7.1.
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Table 7.2. Employment Probit Model Marginal Effects.
Marginal 
Effect (1)
Marginal 
Effect (2)
Marginal 
Effect (3)
Marginal 
Effect (4)
Disabled -0.154*** -0 .1 2 0 *** -0.095*** -0.130***
(34.06) (25.49) (9.43) (13.32)
1991 0.018* 0.039*** 0.090* 0.016
(1.69) (3.72) (1 .8 8 ) (1 .2 1 )
1992 -0 .0 0 2 -0.015 0 .0 2 1 -0.028**
(0 .2 0 ) (1.45) (0.58) (2.04)
1993 -0 .0 0 1 -0.004 0.003 -0 .0 1 1
(0 .2 1 ) (0 .6 6 ) (0.29) (1.32)
1994 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 2 -0.023 -0.004
(0 .0 1 ) (0.31) (1.04) (0.47)
1995 -0.008 -0.009 -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 1 0
(1.31) (1.42) (1.61) (1 .2 2 )
1996 0.026*** 0.023*** 0 .0 2 0 ** 0 .0 1 0
(3.35) (2.92) (2.36) (1 .0 2 )
1998 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.036***
(6.44) (5.88) (3.39) (4.46)
1999 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.044***
(4.92) (4.48) (3.79) (4.48)
2 0 0 0 0.028*** 0 .0 2 2 *** 0.009 0.026**
(3.59) (2.74) (0.56) (2.57)
2 0 0 1 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.044***
(6.89) (6.75) (5.99) (5.49)
2 0 0 2 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.043***
(7.10) (6 .2 1 ) (4.91) (4.16)
2003 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.048***
(8.98) (8.78) (8.67) (5.93)
2004 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.050*** 0.044***
(7.37) (6.95) (4.84) (4.02)
PostDD A* disabled -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.027***
(5.57) (4.65) (4.33)
Age 16-24 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152***
(29.82) (29.82) (29.88)
Age 25-34 q 1 9 7 *** 0197*** q 197***
(46.78) (46.78) (46.82)
Age 35-44 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(58.12) (58.15) (58.21)
Age 45-54 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.198***
(54.38) (54.40) (54.45)
Married 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087***
(10.36) (10.36) (10.37)
Single 0 .0 2 0 ** 0 .0 2 0 ** 0 .0 2 0 **
(2.24) (2.25) (2.25)
Male 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057***
(6.31) (6.31) (6.31)
Ageftedl6 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(8.59) (8.61) (8.60)
Ageftedl7 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(12.38) (12.39) (12.36)
Ageftedl8 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085***
(16.86) (16.88) (16.86)
248
Ageftedl9 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(2 2 .8 6) (2 2 .8 6 ) (22.85)
White 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175***
(26.29) (26.28) (26.25)
Adults 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(12.80) (12.82) (12.80)
House owned or
mortgaged 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150***
(26.94) (26.94) (26.95)
Social housing -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154***
(23.73) (23.73) (23.72)
Married* female -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140***
(13.27) (13.27) (13.27)
Single*female 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 1
(1 .0 1 ) (1 .0 1 ) (1 .0 2 )
GDP 0.017
(1.23)
GDP*disabled -0.009***
(2.70)
Disabled*1991 0.061***
(2.98)
Disabled* 1992 0.031
(1.53)
Disabled*1993 0.017
(1.32)
Disabled* 1994 0.004
(0.32)
Disabled* 1995 0.002
(0.16)
Disabled* 1997 0.002
(0.16)
Disabled* 1998 -0.022
(1.57)
Disabled* 1999 -0.051***
(2.88)
Disabled*2000 -0.038**
(2.21)
Disabled*2001 -0.028**
(2.02)
Disabled*2002 -0.012
(0.68)
Disabled*2003 -0.006
(0.47)
Disabled*2004 0.003
(0.20)
Observations 99810 99034 99034 99034
Log Likelihood -59111.14 -51896.08 -51891.92 -51883.41
L &Z2(k) 3382.75 16782.11 16790.41 16807.43
(p-value) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 )
Pseudo R2 0.0278 0.1392 0.1393 0.1394
Notes: Z statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The policy influence is highlighted in bold.
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Table 7.4. Disability Probit Model Marginal Effects
Marginal Effect 
(1)
Marginal Effect 
(2 )
Marginal Effect 
(3)
PostDDA 0.034*** 0.012*** 0.017***
(10.85) (3.10) (4.04)
Age 16-24 -0.277*** -0 .2 0 2 *** -0.208***
(58.16) (28.51) (27.36)
Age 25-34 -0.263*** -0 174*** -0.176***
(57.45) (27.96) (26.11)
Age 35-44 -0.194*** -0 .1 1 1 *** -0 .1 2 0 ***
(42.18) (18.19) (18.21)
Age 45-54 -0.106*** -0.064*** -0.069***
(21.83) (10.45) (10.46)
Married -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.017**
(6.55) (4.83) (2.38)
Single -0.004 -0.007 0.003
(0.74) (0.98) (0.37)
Male 0.015*** 0.084*** 0.091***
(4.58) (21.26) (2 1 .1 2)
Agedftedl6 -0.048*** -0.032*** -0.031***
(1 1 .2 1 ) (6.17) (5.50)
Ageftedl7 -0.041*** -0.026*** -0.025***
(6.99) (3.55) (3.20)
Ageftedl8 -0.050*** -0.033*** -0.029***
(8.61) (4.61) (3.73)
Ageftedl9 -0.065*** -0.041*** -0.046***
(13.62) (6.91) (7.12)
White 0.014** -0.003 0 .0 1 1
(2.30) (0.32) (1 .2 0 )
Adults -0 .0 1 0 *** -0.009*** -0.006**
(5.19) (3.82) (2.50)
House owned or mortgaged -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.029***
(6.13) (5.45) (3.79)
Social housing 0.080*** 0.049*** 0.048***
(1 2 .0 2 ) (6.03) (5.40)
Medicine 0.386***
(102.93)
0.375***
(91.17)
BMI
GHQ12
0.006***
(15.08)
0.006***
(13.74)
0.025***
(31.78)
Observations 99079 72947 62821
Log Likelihood -62065.571 -40847.303 -34656.997
LR X 2(k) (p-value) 6620.41 (0.00) 14791.65 (0.00) 13734.42 (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.0506 0.1533 0.1654
Notes: See notes to Table 7.2.
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Table 7.5. Employment Probit Model with Health Controls Marginal Effects.
Marginal Effect (1) Marginal Effect (2)
1991 0.037*** 0.043
(3.38) (0.97)
1992 -0 .0 2 0 * -0 .0 1 0
(1.78) (0 .2 0 )
1993 -0 .0 1 0 0 .0 0 2
(1.46) (0.05)
1994 -0.004 0.004
(0.52) (0.08)
1995 -0.007 -0.004
(1.07) (0.09)
1997 0.015* 0 .0 2 2
(1.78) (0.49)
1998 0.031*** 0.037
(4.26) (0.83)
1999 0.043** 0.037
(2.54) (0.84)
2 0 0 0 0.014 0 .0 2 1
(1.59) (0.46)
2 0 0 1 0.041*** 0.038
(5.63) (0.85)
2 0 0 2 0.033*** 0.046
(3.71) (1.04)
2003 0.055*** 0.048
(7.58) (1.09)
2004 0.066*** 0.044
(2.78) (1.0 1 )
Medicine -0.087***
(17.58)
PostDDA*medicine -0 .0 1 2 *
(1 .6 8 )
GHQ12 -0.019***
(21.74)
PostDDA*GHQ12 -0.005***
(4.13)
Age 16-24 0.162*** 0.176***
(29.67) (36.16)
Age 25-34 0.205*** 0 .2 2 2 ***
(44.43) (53.28)
Age 35-44 0.219*** 0.237***
(52.21) (62.45)
Age 45-54 0 .2 0 0 *** 0.208***
(49.73) (55.77)
Married 0.097*** 0.066***
(10.15) (7.47)
Single 0.025** 0.006
(2.51) (0.62)
Male 0.033*** 0.049***
(3.26) (5.16)
Ageftedl6 0.033*** 0.032***
(7.37) (7.37)
Ageftedl7 0.057*** 0.063***
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(9.70) (11.47)
Ageftedl8 0.081*** 0.085***
(14.38) (16.04)
Ageftedl9 0.094*** 0 .1 0 0 ***
(19.66) (22.08)
White 0.171*** 0 1 4 9 ***
(22.15) (20.13)
Adults 0.025*** 0.024***
(1 1 .8 6 ) (12.34)
Home owned or mortgaged 0.153*** 0.145***
(24.22) (24.29)
Social housing -0.155*** -0.156***
(20.90) (22.34)
Married* female -0.146*** -0.134***
(12.34) (11.96)
Single* female 0.006 0.015
(0.54) (1.37)
Observations 
Log Likelihood
LR Z 2(k) (p-value) 
Pseudo R2
77809 
-40881.673 
12295.11 (0.00)
0.1307
85441 
-44489.735 
13931.93 (0.00)
0.1354
Notes: See notes to Table 7.2.
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Table A7.1. Employment Probit Model
Coefficients (1) Coefficients (2) Coefficients (3) Coefficients (4)
Constant 0.658*** -1.009*** -1.154*** -0.998***
(47.41) (29.73) (9.40) (28.21)
Disabled -0.437*** -0.353*** -0.282*** -0.383***
(34.54) (25.93) (9.59) (13.57)
1991 0.053* 0 .1 2 1 *** 0.299* 0.050
(1.67) (3.57) (1.67) (1.19)
1992 -0.006 -0.045 0.064 -0.081**
(0 .2 0 ) (1.47) (0.57) (2.08)
1993 -0.004 -0.013 0.008 -0.033
(0 .2 1 ) (0 .6 6 ) (0.29) (1.33)
1994 0 .0 0 0 -0.006 -0.069 -0 .0 1 2
(0 .0 1 ) (0.31) (1.05) (0.47)
1995 -0.024 -0.028 -0.032 -0.031
(1.32) (1.43) (1.62) (1.23)
1996 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.060** 0.031
(3.29) (2 .8 6) (2.32) (1 .0 1 )
1998 0.125*** 0 .1 2 1 *** 0.098*** 0 .1 1 2 ***
(6.27) (5.69) (3.31) (4.33)
1999 0.115*** 0 .1 1 0 *** 0.099*** 0.138***
(4.77) (4.33) (3.68) (4.29)
2 0 0 0 0.084*** 0.068*** 0.027 0.080**
(3.52) (2.69) (0.55) (2.51)
20 0 1 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.139***
(6 .6 8 ) (6.49) (5.74) (5.29)
2 0 0 2 0.168*** 0.155*** 0.180*** 0.133***
(6.78) (5.91) (4.63) (3.99)
2003 0.176*** 0.181*** 0.183*** 0.152***
(8.61) (8.33) (8 .2 2 ) (5.68)
2004 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.160*** 0.138***
(6.99) (6.54) (4.59) (3.85)
PostDDA*disabled -0.097*** -0.086*** -0.081***
(5.64) (4.71) (4.39)
Aged 16-24 0.530*** 0.530*** 0.531***
(24.91) (24.91) (24.95)
Aged 25-34 0 .6 6 8 *** 0 .6 6 8 *** 0.669***
(40.52) (40.52) (40.55)
Aged 35-44 0.755*** 0.755*** 0.756***
(49.15) (49.17) (49.21)
Aged 45-54 0 .6 8 6 *** 0 .6 8 6 *** 0.687***
(45.91) (45.92) (45.95)
Married 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.260***
(10.46) (10.46) (10.48)
Single 0.059** 0.060** 0.060**
(2.23) (2.23) (2.23)
Male 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.171***
(6.27) (6.27) (6.28)
Ageftedl6 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105***
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(8.49) (8.51) (8.50)
Ageftedl7 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.205***
(11.65) (1 1 .6 6 ) (11.63)
Ageftedl8 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.275***
(15.50) (15.51) (15.50)
Ageftedl9 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.312***
(21.27) (21.27) (21.26)
White 0.479*** 0  4 7 9 *** 0  4 7 9 ***
(27.98) (27.96) (27.93)
Adults 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071***
(12.80) (12.83) (12.80)
Home owned or 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.430***
mortgaged (27.91) (27.92) (27.93)
Social housing -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.432***
(25.01) (25.02) (25.01)
Married* female -0.406*** -0.406*** -0.406***
(13.64) (13.64) (13.64)
Single*female 0.032 0.032 0.032
(1 .0 0 ) (1 .0 0 ) (1 .0 1 )
GDP 0.052
(1.23)
GDP*disabled -0.026***
(2.70)
Disabled*1991 0.195***
(2.77)
Disabled*1992 0.095
(1.48)
Disabled *1993 0.051
(1.30)
Disabled* 1994 0.013
(0.32)
Disabled* 1995 0.007
(0.16)
Disabled* 1997 0.007
(0.16)
Disabled*1998 -0.064
(1.60)
Disabled*1999 -0.148***
(2.99)
Disabled*2000 -0.112**
(2.27)
Disabled*2001 -0.084**
(2.07)
Disabled*2002 -0.035
(0.69)
Disabled*2003 -0.019
(0.48)
Disabled*2004 0.010
(0.20)
Notes: Coefficients relate to marginal effects presented in Table 7.2. See notes to Table 7.2.
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Table A7.2. Employment by Firm Size Multinomial Logit Model (1)
Coefficients ( f Coefficients (2)
Non­
employment
Small
firm
Large
firm
Non­
employment
Small
firm
Large
firm
Constant -0.342*** -0.328*** -1.066*** 2.809*** 0.480*** -0.841***
(12.95) (11.90) (30.21) (41.35) (6.60) (9.28)
1991 -0.058 0.050 0 .1 1 0 -0.185*** 0.019 0.148*
(0.95) (0.79) (1.38) (2.80) (0.30) (1.84)
1992 0.026 0 .0 1 1 0 .1 0 0 0.085 -0.008 0.133*
(0.47) (0.19) (1.34) (1.41) (0.14) (1.78)
1993 0 .0 1 1 -0.041 0.127*** 0 .0 2 2 -0.046 0.139***
(0.32) (1 .10) (2.75) (0.59) (1.24) (2.97)
1994 -0.004 -0.064* 0.094** 0.003 -0.077** 0 .1 0 2 **
(0 .12) (1.69) (2 .0 1 ) (0.08) (2.03) (2.14)
1995 0.055 0.043 -0.003 0.063* 0.039 0 .0 0 2
(1.57) (1.15) (0.06) (1.67) (1.03) (0.04)
1997 -0.165*** -0 .1 1 1 ** 0.029 -0.160*** -0.113** 0.026
(3.75) (2.39) (0.51) (3.39) (2.42) (0.45)
1998 -0 .2 1 0 *** -0.024 0.074 -0 .2 1 2 *** -0.034 0.075
(5.50) (0.61) (1.50) (5.19) (0.85) (1.52)
1999 -0.192*** -0.042 0 .1 1 0 * -0  1 9 4 *** -0.042 0 .1 1 2 *
(4.19) (0 .8 8 ) (1 .8 8 ) (3.96) (0 .8 8 ) (1.90)
2 0 0 0 -0.175*** -0.113** 0.049 -0.154*** -0 .1 0 2 ** 0.043
(3.86) (2.36) (0.83) (3.16) (2 .11) (0.73)
2 0 0 1 -0.228*** -0.050 0 .1 0 2 ** -0.248*** -0.056 0.093*
(5.92) (1.28) (2.07) (6 .0 1 ) (1.41) (1.87)
2 0 0 2 -0.292*** -0.082* 0 .1 2 2 ** -0.288*** -0.092* 0.115*
(6.18) (1.69) (2.06) (5.70) (1 .8 8 ) (1.93)
2003 -0.288*** -0.063 0.180*** -0.316*** -0.067* 0.162***
(7.40) (1.57) (3.69) (7.55) (1.65) (3.28)
2004 -0.314*** -0.060 0.118* -0.322*** -0.048 0.092
(6.27) (1.18) (1 .8 8 ) (6 .0 0 ) (0.92) (1.46)
PostDDA* 0.208*** 0.056 0.099** 0.193*** 0.054 0 .1 0 1 **
disabled (6.27) (1.53) (2.18) (5.41) (1.44) (2 .2 2 )
Disabled 0.697*** -0.030 -0.058* 0.576*** -0.033 -0.026
(28.74) (1.09) (1 .6 8 ) (21.81) (1.17) (0.76)
Aged 16-24 -0.865*** 0.037 -0.008
(20.67) (0.85) (0.15)
Aged 25-34 -1.159*** -0.247*** 0 .2 1 0 ***
(35.61) (6.97) (4.77)
Aged 35-44 -1.312*** -0.209*** 0.131***
(43.11) (6.32) (3.15)
Aged 45-54 -1.186*** -0.158*** 0.103**
(39.90) (4.84) (2.46)
Married -0.462*** -0.131*** 0.059
(9.72) (2.60) (1 .0 0 )
Single -0 .1 2 2 ** -0.006 -0.071
(2.37) (0 .11) (1 .11)
Male -0.409*** -0.357*** 0.028
(7.69) (6 .2 1 ) (0.40)
Ageftedl6 -0.175*** -0.005 0.042
(7.26) (0.19) (1.27)
Ageftedl7 -0.343*** -0.053 0.193***
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(10.04) (1.59) (4.59)
Ageftedl8 -0.470*** -0.107*** 0.252***
(13.69) (3.21) (6 .2 2 )
Ageftedl9 -0.603*** -0.315*** 0.258***
(21.24) (11.18) (7.65)
White -0.901*** -0.129*** -0.254***
(26.08) (3.34) (5.75)
Adults -0.118*** 0.055*** -0.069***
(10.80) (5.22) (5.10)
Home owned -0 .8 8 8 *** -0.401*** -0.069*
or mortgaged (29.21) (12.92) (1.79)
Social housing 0.616*** -0.089** -0.377***
(17.64) (2.32) (7.21)
Married* female 0.691*** 0.130** -0.138*
(11.91) (2 .11) (1.85)
Single*female -0.113* -0.217*** 0.058
(1.82) (3.32) (0.73)
Notes: Base group is medium sized firms. Coefficients relate to marginal effects presented in Table 7.3. 
See notes to Table 7.2.
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Table A7.5. Disability Probit Model
Coefficients (1) Coefficients (2) Coefficient (3)
Constant 0.323*** -0.754*** _0 9 4 4 ***
(11.34) (16.24) (18.50)
PostDDA 0.091*** 0.032*** 0.045***
(10.83) (3.10) (4.04)
Aged 16-24 -0.890*** -0.611*** -0.632***
(43.93) (24.13) (22.94)
Aged 25-34 -0.773*** -0.495*** -0.501***
(50.15) (25.93) (24.17)
Aged 35-44 -0.552*** -0.307*** -0.332***
(38.81) (17.51) (17.47)
Aged 45-54 -0.292*** -0.175*** -0.190***
(20.98) (10.23) (1 0 .2 2 )
Married -0.092*** -0.084*** -0.045**
(6.56) (4.85) (2.38)
Single -0 .0 1 2 -0 .0 2 0 0.008 .
(0.74) (0.98) (0.37)
Male 0.039*** 0.224*** 0.242***
(4.59) (21.24) (2 1 .10)
Ageftedl6 -0.129*** -0.087*** -0.085***
(1 1 .12) (6.14) (5.47)
Ageftedl7 -0 .1 1 2 *** -0.070*** -0.068***
(6.87) (3.51) (3.17)
Ageftedl8 -0.137*** -0  090*** -0.079***
(8.41) (4.54) (3.68)
Ageftedl9 -0.178*** -0 .1 1 1 *** -0.124***
(13.31) (6.82) (7.01)
White 0.039** -0.007 0.029
(2.29) (0.32) (1 .2 0 )
Adults -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.017**
(5.19) (3.82) (2.50)
House owned or mortgaged -0.092*** -0 .1 0 1 *** -0.076***
(6.17) (5.49) (3.81)
Social housing 0.208*** 0.130*** 0.127***
(1 2 .2 0 ) (6 .1 1) (5.47)
Medicine 1.036***
(97.13)
1.005***
(86.54)
BMI 0.017***
(15.08)
0.017***
(13.74)
GHQ12 0.067***
(31.83)
Notes: See notes to Table 7.2. Coefficients relate to marginal effects presented in Table 7.4.
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Table A7.6. Employment Probit Model with Health Controls
Coefficients (1) Coefficients (2)
Constant -1.035*** -1 019***
(26.82) (6.87)
1991 0.117*** 0.137
(3.25) (0.93)
1992 -0.059* -0.029
(1.81) (0 .2 0 )
1993 -0.030 0.007
(1.47) (0.05)
1994 -0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 2
(0.52) (0.08)
1995 -0 .0 2 2 -0.013
(1.08) (0.09)
1997 0.046* 0.069
(1.75) (0.48)
1998 0.096*** 0.117
(4.15) (0.81)
1999 0.136** 0.118
(2.43) (0.81)
2 0 0 0 0.044 0.065
(1.57) (0.45)
2 0 0 1 0.129*** 0.119
(5.43) (0.82)
2 0 0 2 0.104*** 0.145
(3.59) (1 .0 0 )
2003 0.175*** 0.152
(7.20) (1.05)
2004 0.214** 0.141
(2.56) (0.97)
Medicine -0.259***
(17.84)
PostDDA*medicine -0.035*
(1.69)
Aged 16-24 0.581*** 0.649***
(24.07) (28.47)
Aged 25-34 0.707*** 0.785***
(38.04) (44.58)
Aged 35-44 0.763*** 0.847***
(44.08) (51.47)
Aged 45-54 0.702*** 0.742***
(41.82) (46.12)
Married 0.289*** 0 .2 0 1 ***
(10.28) (7.54)
Single 0.075** 0.018
(2.48) (0.62)
Male 0 .1 0 1 *** 0.150***
(3.25) (5.13)
Ageftedl6 0 .1 0 2 *** 0.098***
(7.29) (7.29)
Ageftedl7 0.181*** 0.205***
(9.20) (10.78)
Ageftedl8 0.264*** 0.281***
268
(13.26) (14.69)
Ageftedl9 0.304*** 0.325***
(18.31) (20.45)
White q 4 7 1*** 0.415***
(23.62) (21.48)
Adults 0.075*** 0.075***
(11.87) (12.34)
House owned or mortgaged 0.440*** 0 419***
(25.18) (25.23)
Social housing -0.436*** -0.443***
(22.08) (23.64)
Married* female -0.427*** -0.393***
(12.69) (12.30)
Single*female 0.019 0.046
(0.53) (1.35)
GHQ12 -0.058***
(21.75)
PostDDA*GHQ12 -0.014***
(4.13)
Notes: See notes to Table 7.2. Coefficients relate to marginal effects presented in Table 7.5.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis contributes to the relatively limited 
UK evidence on the impact of disability on labour market outcomes. Overall, the 
evidence confirms the significant and persistent employment and earnings 
disadvantage associated with disability in the UK. However, the research also 
investigates a wider range of labour market outcomes, such as hours and employment 
type, which are affected by disability status and, by examining a wider range of 
issues, attempts to further the understanding of the channels through which disability 
impacts on labour market performance. This Chapter highlights and uses the key 
results from each of the preceding empirical Chapters to develop overall conclusions, 
particularly on issues that feature across Chapters. This broader examination of the 
contribution of the thesis provides a more informative point to consider the 
fundamental assumptions on which the evidence is based and directions for future 
research.
Discrimination, Productivity and Preferences
The analysis of data from the LFS in Chapter 3 shows that in 2003, a 47 (37) 
percentage point gap exists in the probability of employment between work-limited 
disabled males (females) and non-disabled males (females). Despite important 
differences in educational attainment between disability groups, the difference in 
observable characteristics explains less than a quarter of the overall gap; hence, 
standard decomposition methods would attribute the remaining difference (over three 
quarters of the overall gap) to (albeit an upper bound measure of) discrimination. The 
results from the DeLeire (2001) decomposition, which identify a lower bound on 
discrimination, suggest these methods, which assume that the unobservable 
productivity difference between the groups is zero, are severely biased. In fact, the 
estimate of discrimination in employment is, essentially, zero and the unobserved 
productivity difference makes the most important contribution, accounting for 80
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percent of the employment gap. Whilst the selectivity earnings gap is smaller, 
characteristics similarly explain less than half the differential for males (48 percent) 
or females (24 percent), again suggesting a sizeable effect of discrimination. The 
DeLeire (2001) decomposition finds that a far greater proportion of the unexplained 
component is the result of unobserved productivity differences than discrimination. 
Indeed, similar to DeLeire (2001), when using US data, wage discrimination in the 
UK is found to represent less than 10 percent of the wage gap in 2003.
The dramatic differences in results that arise from changes in the decomposition 
methodology have significant implications for the literature. Firstly, discrimination is 
unlikely to have the dominant role identified in previous studies (Blackaby et al., 
1999, Kidd et al., 2000). Therefore, eliminating discrimination will not remove the 
disadvantage associated with being disabled and will not make a significant 
contribution to achieving government targets to increase the employment rate of the 
disabled. Secondly, the question arises, to what extent can policymakers reduce the 
size of the unobserved productivity effect? Whilst it is unrealistic to suggest this 
component can be eliminated, elements of current policy measures, such as 
workplace accommodations, may serve to reduce its effect.216 Importantly, the 
applicability of these results may extend beyond the disability literature, since the 
analysis demonstrates the potential sensitivity of decomposition analysis to 
neglecting unobservables. Even in more developed literatures, such as gender, 
differences in preferences, motivation and productivity are likely to exist. In this 
respect, this study may motivate researchers to look for innovative ways to 
investigate, if not resolve, this issue.
Crowding into certain types of employment may also be the result of discrimination 
and, consistent with the US literature, the concentration of part-time employment 
amongst the disabled in the UK is identified in Chapter 4. In a similar manner to the 
analysis of employment and earnings, after controlling for observable characteristics, 
it is the work-limiting nature of disability that causes the concentration in part-time 
employment. Hence, by applying similar assumptions to DeLeire (2001), it is 
possible to attribute the higher incidence of disabled workers in part-time
216 The Pathways to Work programme also contains an element o f NHS help with condition 
management.
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employment to differences in preferences, rather than to discrimination. The 
differences in preferences are thought to be driven by accommodating features of 
part-time employment, which may be more important for the disabled. Similarly, 
Chapter 5 identifies the concentration of the disabled in another non-standard form of 
employment, self-employment. One fifth of male disabled workers classify 
themselves as self-employed and, therefore, this provides an important source of 
income for the disabled, which has been neglected in the literature. After controlling 
for observable characteristics, the evidence, at least for males, confirms that self- 
employment is largely a voluntary decision. It is argued that self-employment may 
provide opportunities, in terms of the location and nature of work, which means, for 
some individuals, it facilitates access to employment. If the decisions to enter non­
standard work are largely voluntary, then policymakers should view these non­
standard forms of employment as an opportunity to facilitate disabled individuals, 
who would otherwise be unable to work, into work.
Measurement Issues
Despite widespread use of self-reported information on disability, international 
evidence, particularly relating to health and retirement, has questioned the use of 
self-reported information. Chapter 6  considers the influence of two prominent 
sources of bias, justification bias and measurement error, on the decision to 
participate in the labour market. This issue is investigated using data from the HSE, 
which has appropriate information to instrument disability, such as more objective 
health measures and regional and genetic controls. Consistent with recent evidence 
from Canada, accounting for the potential bias in self-reported disability actually 
leads to a greater impact of disability on labour market participation. This suggests, 
in contrast to expectations, that the influence of measurement error outweighs the 
influence of justification bias (see Bound, 1991). Importantly for this area of 
research, it confirms that the link between disability and labour market outcomes is 
not a result of mis-measurement. The situation may indeed be worse if ‘true’ 
disability was observed.
TheDDA
The recognition that the ADA did not have a positive effect on labour market 
outcomes of the disabled in the US has stimulated interest and debate, particularly in
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countries which have subsequently introduced similar legislation. Attempts have 
been made throughout this thesis to consider the role of the DDA, which, after 
several years in existence, has had the potential to have a significant influence on 
labour market outcomes for the disabled. Chapter 3 documents evidence from the 
LFS that suggests the employment rate for the disabled has grown over the post 
DDA period. Moreover, the growth in employment is not explained by changes in 
characteristics of the disabled over time. This residual or unexplained effect would 
be consistent with a change of environment, such as the positive influence of the 
DDA. The results for earnings are less robust, but there seems to be some evidence 
of a slight reduction in the contribution of discrimination and a narrowing of the 
earnings gap for disabled men. Since the growth in male earnings over the period is 
not explained by changes in the composition of the group, there is, again, potential 
for the legislation to have had a positive effect. However, these results contrast with 
Bell and Heitmueller (2005) who find no evidence of positive effects using the FRS 
and the BHPS. As such, Chapter 7 revisits this issue, using data from the HSE and 
applying the same methodology as Bell and Heitmueller (2005). Consistent with 
their results, there is evidence of a negative short-run employment effect 
immediately after the introduction of the DDA. Moreover, following the literature 
which questions the sensitivity of the initial studies in the US, several robustness 
tests are applied to confirm that this effect is consistent with the influence of the 
DDA. Therefore, and notwithstanding the differences in the methodology, data and 
geographical coverage, the analysis in this thesis provides inconclusive evidence on 
the impact of the DDA.
Heterogeneity
The influence of within group heterogeneity has been considered in several Chapters 
and differences in labour market outcomes on the basis of disability type and severity 
are evident. Thus, conclusions made on the basis of the entire disabled group mask 
the true degree of disadvantage faced by some individuals. After controlling for 
observable characteristics, individuals with mental health problems have lower 
earnings, lower employment probabilities and higher probabilities of part-time 
employment, which illustrate the additional difficulties experienced by this group. 
The evidence is timely, given the recent emphasis on mental health (Shaw Trust, 
2006) and supports the use of impairment specific policy alongside more general
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measures. As expected, severity also plays an important role, with those individuals 
with multiple health problems having lower employment probabilities, lower 
earnings and higher incidence of part-time employment. Therefore, it is likely that 
general policies, which aim to increase employment amongst the disabled, will be 
more effective for certain sub-groups that are ‘nearer to the labour market’. More 
effective policy measures will relate to the specific needs of sub-groups of the 
disabled and, thus, acknowledge the existing differences in labour market 
performance within the group.
What emerges from this thesis, and is fundamental for future research on disability, 
is that attention needs to be paid to features of the disabled group that make it distinct 
from the rest of the population (and equally features of groups within the disabled 
population that generate within group heterogeneity). It is acknowledging and 
attempting to understand these differences in contributing to their inferior labour 
market outcomes that will provide useful information for policy development. 
Moreover, applying standard models and econometric techniques without paying 
attention to the differences that arise in this context may be inappropriate.
Limitations
The analysis in this thesis is not without limitations and many of the issues (and 
subsequent sensitivity analysis) are drawn out during the individual Chapters. Whilst 
the more specific issues, predominately relating to model specification and data 
limitations, are not repeated here, it is important to reiterate the main, overarching 
limitations of the analysis.
The results from the DeLeire (2001) decomposition, which is fundamental to 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, are based on two main assumptions. Firstly, that the non-work- 
limited disabled have no difference in unobserved productivity relative to the non­
disabled and, secondly, that discrimination is equal against the two disabled groups. 
In support of the first assumption, severity is an important influence on labour 
market outcomes for the work-limited disabled, but is frequently less important (and 
often insignificant) for the non-work-limited disabled. The second assumption is 
more difficult to test, but differences in the composition of the groups, in terms of the 
type of health problem and the differences in perceptions of discrimination, suggest
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that it is less likely to hold. However, if discrimination is positively related to the 
work-limiting nature of the disability, the estimates of discrimination are a lower 
bound and should be interpreted with this in mind.217 It is also worth highlighting 
that any unobservable difference between the work-limited disabled and the non- 
work-limited disabled is attributed to the unobserved productivity effect (Chapter 3) 
or the workplace accommodation effect (Chapters 4 and 5). If there are differences in 
factors, such as discrimination or motivation between the groups, through, for 
example, the receipt of benefit income, this will be included in the unobserved 
productivity effect. Therefore, caution should be exercised when trying to interpret 
the determinants of this component.
As is typical with a difference in difference procedure (used in Chapter 7), the impact 
of the DDA is established under the assumption that unobservables are held constant. 
Despite introducing controls for changes in characteristics and the economic cycle, 
the procedure only identifies the true policy effect if  there has been no other group 
specific shock. In practice, there has been a considerable change in the policy 
environment and in the awareness of the disabled group, which may have changed 
the outcomes of the disabled but which are unrelated to the specific provisions of the 
DDA. However, in support of the findings in Chapter 7, the timing of the effect and 
the impact by firm size is consistent with the impact of the DDA. Moreover, if 
anything, the change in environment is a result of an increase in policies which 
support the disabled and, therefore, these changes are anticipated to have a positive 
impact on the outcomes of the disabled. Thus, the negative influence of the DDA 
identified may even have been diluted by these changes.
Directions for future research
This thesis has considered country specific evidence on a range of key labour market 
indicators to monitor the recent situation of the disabled in the UK and, hence, 
evaluate the impact of the DDA. There are a number of complementary aspects of 
disability research that would provide further evidence and a number of other areas 
that would further extend understanding of how disability impacts on the labour 
market.
217 The exception to this is the estimate of the balance of discrimination relating to self-employment in 
Chapter 5.
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Organisations such as Eurostat have recently recognised the need for more consistent 
measurement of disabilities across countries and several initiatives, such as the 2 0 0 2  
European ad-hoc module on disability, have advanced data collection.218 Whilst the 
difficulties in undertaking international (relative to national) comparisons are 
magnified, particularly in relation to measurement (Banks et al., 2004 and Kapteyn et 
al., 2007), the benefits may also be significant.219 An examination of labour market 
outcomes of the disabled in an international context is likely to contribute further 
understanding of the extent of, and reasons for, the disadvantage faced in the UK, 
and will be particularly important in attempting to identify the contribution of the 
legislative frameworks.
The evidence presented in this thesis has all been based on cross sectional (or 
repeated cross sectional) data and, as such, the dynamic effects of disability and the 
associated transitions have largely been ignored. Previous evidence in the UK has 
considered dynamic effects with respect to disability and employment and earnings 
(see, for example, Jenkins and Rigg, 2004). This type of analysis could, naturally, be 
extended to establish causal relationships between the timing of disability onset and 
transitions between employment types, such as part-time and self-employment. 
Moreover, an analysis of transitions over time is likely to be useful in informing how 
the DDA influences employment.
While the heterogeneity within the disabled group is identified and considered, 
where possible, during the course of this research, it is restricted by data availability. 
Unfortunately, current cross sectional or longitudinal data do not simultaneously 
cover all the different forms heterogeneity may take in terms of type, severity, 
duration and age of disability onset (including at birth). If a disability survey is 
commissioned in the UK, (see, Purdon 2005, for a feasibility study), it is essential 
that this contains retrospective questions relating to disability onset, a longitudinal 
element which traces changes in both the disability and labour market performance, 
and sufficient observations for the examination on the basis of disability type.
218 This is essential if  the European Commission is to monitor the EU Disability Action Plan, which 
was established after the 2003 European Year of the Disabled.
219 See Hagan et al. (2006) for a recent international examination o f  health and retirement.
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Despite growing analysis of disability using individual data, the current UK (and 
international) economic evidence neglects the important role employers have in 
determining labour market outcomes of the disabled. This type of analysis appears 
particularly appropriate given the requirement to make workplace adjustments under 
the DDA. The DWP has commissioned specific surveys, such as by Simm et al. 
(2007), who suggest that awareness of the Act is high and that there is widespread 
compliance with the accommodation element of the legislation. Moreover, 
Woodhams and Corby (2007) have undertaken their own survey of employers in
• • 9901995 and 2003, and find a large increase in the use of disability equality practices. 
However, information in large scale matched employer-employee surveys, such as 
the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), remains underutilised and 
could provide evidence on the prevalence of employer provided accommodations 
and, possibly, even the impact of these accommodations on disabled employees and 
on the profitability of establishments. Moreover, it would be relatively 
straightforward to include additional questions in this survey relating to, for example, 
the nature and cost of the accommodation to enhance our understanding of the 
practical implications of this component of the legislation.
Finally, it is undoubtedly the case that disability benefits have an important role in 
the incentive to report disability and, subsequently, to participate in the labour 
market. However, existing research has largely considered the determinants of 
benefit receipt quite separately from the evidence relating to disability and labour 
market outcomes. While the two definitions of disability are distinct, there is a 
substantial overlap between these groups (see Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2005). 
Therefore, an integration of these two aspects of the disability literature is likely to 
be important in understanding the inter-relation between self-reported disability, 
employment and disability benefits.
It is this type of evidence that will aid policymakers who seek to encourage the 
disabled into employment in the UK, a country with one of the highest rates of 
working age disability.
220 The perspectives of employers have been investigated, predominately in other disciplines (see, for 
example, Cunningham and James, 1998, Jackson et al., 2000 and Goldstone, 2002).
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